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Abstract
There is a double meaning in the name of this thesis. This duality emerges from how the term 
‘hermeneutics’ can be applied. In one sense the hermeneutics of this thesis is a textual 
interpretation of the philosophical history of ontology. This is an interpretation of 
ontological theory from its genesis with the Pre-Socratic concern with the ‘question of being’ 
and onwards through its salient historical developments up until the early twentieth century. 
The thesis interprets these developments as nevertheless maintaining a foundational 
understanding of ‘being’ as ‘quiddity’ or ‘what-ness’. While the ontological tradition diverges 
over disagreements about ‘realism’, ‘idealism’, or ‘nominalism’, for example, these 
disagreements are interpreted as having an unchanging understanding of ‘being’ in terms of 
‘what-ness’ that unites them. Furthermore, this traditional understanding of ‘being’ as ‘what-
ness’ is documented as having an implicit connection to a conceptual model of human 
understanding that divides the knowing subject from the known object. In opposition to a 
prominent interpretation that identifies this model as a Cartesian development, it is rather 
presented that it has roots that can be found within the philosophy of Plato. Moreover, this 
model is interpreted as being contingent on the technological development and adoption of 
literacy that predicated an emergent and reflexive understanding of the ‘what-ness’ of the self-
subject.
However, this textual hermeneutics of the history of ontology also presents the 
challenge to understanding ‘being’ as ‘what-ness’ that occurred in the early twentieth century. 
This is found in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and in particular in his treatise Being 
and Time. This alternative understanding of ‘being’ is interpreted as presenting an ontology of 
‘how-ness’. This understanding of ‘being’ as ‘how-ness’, as opposed to ‘what-ness’, is 
presented through Heidegger’s introduction of the concept of the ‘ontological difference’. 
This concept, it is shown, enables Heidegger’s  understanding of human existentiality as self-
interpretation. In addition, the inheritance of this ontological thesis of self-interpretative 
existence is traced from its phenomenological, hermeneutic, and existentialist roots. This 
includes the analysis of the ideas of such scholars as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm 
Dilthey, and Edmund Husserl. Through documenting this provenance, the duality of this 
thesis’ title is demonstrated. It is not only a textual hermeneutics that is presented in this 
treatise, but also an example of hermeneutic phenomenology. Hermeneutic phenomenology, 
as Heidegger argued, is presented as the methodology for an ontology that understands human 
existentiality as self-interpretative. This methodology is analysed, and differing 
interpretations of its processes are critiqued. Furthermore, by interpreting human 
4
existentiality as hermeneutic, Heidegger’s understanding of ‘being’ as temporal is elucidated. 
The thesis of the temporality of human existentiality is then explained in terms of its 
structure as ‘being-in-the-world’. The equiprimordial characteristics of ‘being-in-the-world’ 
are analysed, such as ‘who-ness’, ‘there-ness’, and ‘world-ness’, and these are shown to 
together constitute human existentiality. The thesis then concludes by demonstrating how 
this hermeneutic phenomenology of ontological ‘how-ness’ also enables the explication of the 
temporality of technological existentiality.
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Preface
Writing this thesis has proved to be a truly frustrating exercise. Aside from my own quirks as 
a writer, which have a tendency to slow progress generally, this has been down to the 
exasperatingly opaque subject material that the thesis draws upon. The traditions of 
phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, and others, often blithely sandwiched into an 
undifferentiated label of ‘continental philosophy’, have, in their various ways, provided some 
of the most important philosophical insights into the questions of human existence that can 
be found. A key strength that they have is the very willingness to tackle these questions in 
the first place. However, these strengths are all too easily overlooked when compared to the 
anarchy of neologisms and idiosyncratic uses and abuses of language that they also produce. 
This problem is only worsened when some other authors adopt, or appropriate, the styles 
and manners of these traditions to produce material that while superficially resembling their 
hosts, lacks the underlying structural understanding of the concepts involved to produce 
meaningful content. As well as contributing little value of their own, such work also manages 
to damage the reputations of the various philosophical traditions that it apes. Consequently, 
casual readers coming across such dross can be forgiven for wrongly concluding that little of 
value will be found in studying these subjects in greater depth.
Because of this situation it is very tempting to blame these traditions for their clumsy 
use of language and deployment of concepts. It seems straightforward to argue that the 
chicanery that belittles them would not be so easy to perpetrate if they developed a superior 
stability and ordering of their ideas and used a more established vernacular. However, the  
situation is sadly more complicated than this, and for more than one reason. Firstly, the 
idiosyncratic language that many phenomenologists, existentialists, and hermeneutically 
inclined theorists utilise is not developed on an arbitrary whim. Their motivation is frequently 
the desire to critique the metaphysical heritage that permeates our conventional understanding 
of the world and ourselves. In the attempt to break away from this heritage they deploy 
neologisms and other linguistic techniques that do not imply the traditional dichotomies and 
systems of thought with which more conventional language is saddled. 
Given then that these philosophers require their unusual turns of phrase, the opacity 
of their prose could still be reduced if they systematised their arguments in order to produce 
greater coherency in the general discourse of their interrelated traditions. It would seem 
acceptable that even if a group of philosophers disagreed on the specifics of their critiques, 
they could still develop a general structure or system for presenting a unified account of how 
and why they deal with questions of human existence in the way that they do. In many ways 
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the success of the Enlightenment was based on providing such general structures that enabled 
bodies of knowledge to be easily related to each other, and it seems a shame that such a model 
has not been replicated here. However, this too is stymied by the content of the actual 
philosophy. Many of the philosophers involved in the traditions I have been discussing were 
notably antithetical about the possibility of systematising an account of human existence, and 
those who were not so at first often changed their view on this later in their life. Personally I 
am more optimistic than this. While I doubt that a general structure that will provide a better 
clarity of the interrelated ideas of traditions such as phenomenology, existentialism, and 
hermeneutics will be arrived at easily, I nevertheless believe, perhaps unfashionably, that the 
possibility remains and can be worked towards.
One philosopher that fits the category of an early systematiser who later moved away 
from such a project was Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s magnum opus, however, was Being 
and Time, a text he produced in his earlier systematising period, and which is the key text for 
my thesis. However, while attempting to provide a systematic account of the scope of human 
existence, he also engaged, for his own theoretical reasons, in the development of the 
idiosyncratic language that I’ve been detailing. The consequence of this is my aforementioned 
frustration in writing this thesis, of how to communicate important ideas on the ontology of 
human existence while drawing upon Heidegger as well as from many other important 
philosophers in the area who each used their own idiosyncratic terminology. To this end I 
have attempted to utilise a systematic structure to avoid replicating the often gnomic qualities 
of my sources while preserving the meaning of their ideas. Whether or not the reader agrees 
with the analyses contained in this thesis, I hope at least to have communicated them in a 
manner that does not frustrate the attempt to understand them.
I would like to make several acknowledgements. I would not have been able to write 
this thesis without the support of the whole community of scholarship that thrives at 
Humanities Advanced Technology Information Institute (HATII). The many helpful 
comments I have received over the last three years from staff and fellow PhD students has 
been of an immense help to me in formulating my understanding and interpretation of the 
central concerns of ontology, hermeneutics, and phenomenology. I would like to thank all my 
colleagues who took an interest in studying Heidegger and attended the reading seminars on 
Being and Time, and all those who attend the seminars of the Centre for Technology and 
Phenomenological Research. The funding I received from Glasgow University enabled me to 
take the time to study for a PhD, the value of which cannot be overlooked. A special mention 
needs to be made about the assistance I have received from Elaine Wilson over the years, 
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whose knowledge of the University’s systems and processes has never failed to amaze me. I 
am grateful to Ian Anderson for the tolerance he showed with the directions my research took 
me. Finally, the sustained patient assistance I have received from Susan Stuart has been an 
unmeasurable support, and without it this whole project would have been impossible.
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Prologue
This thesis analyses the hermeneutic phenomenology of the ontology of the ‘how-ness’ of 
‘being’, and in particular the ‘how-ness’ of time and technology. This hermeneutic 
phenomenology is carried out through a close exegesis of the twentieth century philosopher 
Martin Heidegger’s philosophical texts, and in particular his Being and Time. This is 
structured over three chapters, which are predicated on a recursive investigation of the 
question of ‘being’ and human existentiality. The thesis can also be characterised as being 
constituted by eight aspects, which will be outlined in this prologue to the thesis. However, 
these eight aspects are not described in terms of a linear order in which they occur in the 
thesis, and are only being outlined here as an interpretative aid to reading the thesis.
The fulcrum of this investigation is one particular concept. This concept, introduced 
by Heidegger, is the ‘ontological difference’. The ontological difference is one of the most 
important concepts in the history of philosophy. It enables a shift from considering the 
ontology of entities in terms of their ‘ontical what-ness’, or ‘quiddity’, to the ontology of the 
‘being’ of entities. Implicit in Heidegger’s text Being and Time and explicit in the lecture 
course that followed it, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, the ontological difference is a 
distinction between ‘being’ and ‘entities’. The ‘being’ of an entity is not its ‘what-ness’ but 
rather a complex , yet unified, phenomenological architecture including structures such as the 
‘there-ness’, ‘who-ness’, ‘they-ness’, and ‘world-ness’ of an entity. These are characterised 
in this thesis as constituting the ‘how-ness’ of one particular entity, the ‘human being’, as a 
unified ‘being-in-the-world’. For example, a teapot as an entity has many investigable 
‘ontical’ qualities that make up its ‘what-ness’ – form, material, colour, decoration and so 
forth. But the ‘being’ of the teapot, its ‘how-ness’, is none of these qualities, and only begins 
to become intelligible as part of the contextual totality of ‘how’ it is encountered in the human 
ontological structure of being-in-the-world. It is through this ‘ontological difference’ 
distinction that the criticism of the history of Western ontology as a ‘metaphysics of 
presence’ has been derived, built upon the fundamental ‘what-ness’ characterisation of a 
knower-subject entity that thinks about known-object entities. This is the cognitive subject-
object model of understanding. By critiquing this model, we can phenomenologically follow 
Heidegger in being able to characterise all previous philosophy and ontology as having 
misunderstood the ‘question of being’ in terms of the ‘what is’. The tradition of ontology is 
revealed as having served the analysis of ‘ontical’ characteristics of entities, while usage of the 
term ‘ontological’ is now appropriated, as by Heidegger, for the study of what pertains to 
‘being’.
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There is a twofold difficulty regarding the ontological difference. The first is clarifying 
the meaning and the importance of the distinction, and the analysis drawn from it. To 
convincingly demonstrate the claim, a detailed and thorough analysis of the history of 
ontology is required. However, this is not as simple as comparing one old sense of a term and 
its tradition with a new one, for the history of ontological thought does not possess the 
degree of homogeneity that such a straightforward approach would require. Rather, the 
multifarious interpretations of ‘being’ that existed before the concept of the ‘ontological 
difference’ was introduced have to be carefully separated and evaluated. Only then can the 
new understanding of ontology be elucidated, and potentially accepted. This task represents 
the first aspect of the thesis. We will later be able to characterise this critical analytic of the 
history of the ontological tradition as an aspect of the phenomenological method that is called 
the ‘phenomenological destruction’. Yet this characterisation will be recursively reinterpreted 
as such only after the introduction of the concept of phenomenology.
The second difficulty pertaining to the ‘how-ness’ understanding of ontology, which 
proceeds from a positive result regarding the validity of the ontological difference, is how to 
implement it methodologically for the analysis of ‘being’. The method that was initially 
submitted by Heidegger for this task was the emerging discipline of phenomenology. 
However, phenomenological inquiry was not a technique that Heidegger first introduced. 
While it had existed as a term for many years, it was not until Edmund Husserl appropriated 
the word for his brilliant new methodology that it gained formal structure. Husserl was 
Heidegger’s main philosophical mentor, and in such a context it might seem surprising that 
such a degree of originality be attributed to Heidegger. Yet Heidegger’s usage of 
phenomenology is conventionally understood to be dramatically different from Husserl’s, 
even antagonistic. Nevertheless, some scholars have raised doubts about the traditionally held 
polemic existing between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, which includes 
reappraising whether Husserl had an orientation to ontology in Heidegger’s sense of the term. 
This claim is difficult to substantiate given that Husserl’s use of the word ‘ontology’ was 
unambiguously in the ontical sense as criticised by Heidegger. However, a deeper analysis of 
Husserl’s phenomenology in relation to Heidegger’s may reveal some grounds for this 
counterintuitive claim. This comparative analysis represents the second aspect of the thesis, 
which is distributed throughout the thesis as are all the aspects, and ranges from comparisons 
of methodological concepts such as Husserl’s ‘epoché’ and Heidegger’s ‘formal indication’, to 
comparisons of phenomenological observations such as Husserl’s ‘life-world’ and Heidegger’s 
‘with-world’.
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The goal of this descriptive analysis is not only to establish whether Husserl’s 
phenomenology can provide techniques alongside Heidegger’s for inquiring into ‘being’, it also 
starts the phenomenological investigation. This process occurs through a central theme of the 
thesis, its recursive structure. Initially this recursion is a small feature, such as involving going 
back into Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology throughout the thesis in order to enable a 
systematic usage of the concept of phenomenology. In particular the area of 
phenomenological interest in this third aspect of the thesis relates to the phenomena of time, 
temporality, and historicity, and to their relationship with ‘being’.
The phenomenological ontology of historicity splits, as the fourth aspect of the 
thesis, into two separate regions. One region is the analysis of hermeneutics, while the other 
is existentialism. The relevance of these dual regions results from the Heideggerian conception 
of the temporalised self-interpreting ‘existence’ of the human entity. The development of an 
understanding of the history of hermeneutics is the fifth aspect of the thesis, and traces the 
salient features in the development of hermeneutical concepts and methods of interpretation 
in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s textual hermeneutics and Wilhelm Dilthey’s hermeneutics of the 
human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), to Heidegger’s characterisation of human ‘being’ as 
hermeneutical. This characterisation of human existentiality as hermeneutical unites this 
exegesis with the existentialist tradition of thought, where human ‘being’ is regarded as anti-
essentialist and ‘self-making’.
The phenomenological analysis of the temporality and historicity of human 
‘potentiality-for-being’ unites and utilises the dual traditions of hermeneutics and 
existentialism to further the investigation of ‘being’. One specific concern, however, is with 
the hermeneutic phenomenology of the ontological tradition itself, that is, that is the 
phenomenological uncovering of the historical contingency of human ‘being’ in its 
understanding about the ‘being’ of the world. This process, it will be shown, also closely 
mirrors Heidegger’s proposed technique for the dismantling of the history of ontology from 
Being and Time, which as we have previously mentioned is called the phenomenological 
destruction. This represents a double hermeneutic of the phenomenology of ‘being’. Within 
the hermeneutic phenomenological description of the development of human ‘being’ there is 
the spiral between the historical development of ‘being’ and the historical understanding of 
‘being’. 
It is in this context of the hermeneutical contingency of human ‘being’ within the 
understanding of ‘being’, that the sixth aspect of the thesis proceeds to reinterpret ontology 
as representing not only the general study of the ‘how-ness’ of ‘being’, to also representing 
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the study of the equiprimordially constitutive parts of this ‘how-ness’. One such ‘part’ is the 
ready-to-hand ‘technological’ disclosure of being-in-the-world. The argument here is that if 
the study and comprehension of ‘being’ is an aspect of the ‘making’ of ‘being’, then that 
study and comprehension of ‘being’ cannot be thought of as a passive process, but is rather 
intrinsically bound as a utility in the ‘referential totality’ of ‘being’ – though it is necessary at 
this stage of our description to be careful not to accidentally appear to be reifying ‘being’ as if 
it were the onticality of an entity. To aid in avoiding this entanglement, disclosure of the 
‘being’ of world through its ‘modal’ constitution as ‘technology’ will be formally indicated, in 
the Heideggerian sense of indication, in the later part of the thesis by the term ‘techné’.
The seventh aspect of the thesis turns to the phenomenological investigation of 
technology, or techné. Through this, technology will be characterised as an ‘existentialia’ of 
human ‘being’, that is, part of its existential constitution. The technologies of the 
arrangement, inscription, depiction, and dissemination of meaning will be our primary focus in 
the early part of the thesis. These technologies, which are sometimes collectively known as 
information and communication technologies, are primarily represented by the systems of 
orality and language, literacy, print culture, and the emergent digital culture of computers. 
These technologies will be analysed in terms of their disclosive capacities through the 
established horizon of temporality and historicity, and their techné modality will be 
established as part of the totality of being-in-the-world.
The eighth aspect of the thesis involves a final recursive move back into the history of 
ontology. The concern now is to reinterpret the hermeneutic spiral between the formation of 
‘being’ and the comprehension of ‘being’ through the additional discrimination of the 
historical development of technology or techné. This process will be analysed through the 
particular lens of the transition from a primarily oral culture to a primarily literate culture of 
Plato’s Greece as found in the thesis of Eric Havelock’s Preface to Plato, and will involve a 
textual hermeneutical analysis of Plato’s concern about the impact of writing on human 
memory from the Phaedrus.
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Chapter 1
The History of Ontology and the Question of ‘Being’
§1 – Guide to chapter one
In this chapter the history of the ontological tradition of ‘quiddity’ or ‘what-ness’ is  
presented. This tradition begins with the Pre-Socratic introduction of the ‘question of being’ 
and the formative contributions of Plato and Aristotle to this question. The chapter continues 
with the history of this ontological tradition by presenting and analysing the subsequent 
philosophers and scholars who made the most salient and influential contributions since this 
inception. The analysis of the history of this ontological tradition continues with its 
development until the period when it is critiqued by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. The 
chapter also documents the relationship of ‘what-ness’ ontology with the foundations of the 
subject-object model of human understanding, and with the historical development of 
information technologies such as literacy.
§1.1 – Summary of the ontological tradition of quiddity
The term that has arisen for the study of ‘being’ is ‘ontology’. However, under the dominion 
of competing academic traditions the meaning of this term has become as ambiguous as the 
concept of ‘being’ that it is supposed to study. This ambiguity has a certain irony considering 
that ontology has represented the ‘proto-question’ for establishing the basic concepts – or 
‘first principles’ – upon which all other concepts could be grounded upon. In this sense 
ontology is the attempt to determine the anterior categories of existence. However, this is not 
the only sense in which the name ‘ontology’ has been applied. The ambiguity that the term 
provokes does not merely stem from idiomatic inconsistencies, though this is common, but 
also from fundamental incompatibilities about the idea of ‘being’. There are at least three 
major senses in which the word ontology can be used, and these different senses represent 
notably distinct fields of inquiry. The first sense is a general concern with understanding what 
entities can be said to exist. The second sense is a particular concern with what the existence 
of an entity ‘is’, with the ‘what-ness’ of entities. These two interrelated senses are the 
traditional interpretations of the word ‘ontology’. The third sense of ontology was developed 
principally in the twentieth century as a criticism of the conceptual limitations of this 
tradition, and attempts to analyse the ‘how-ness’ of entities. However, a grasp of the two 
traditional senses of ontology are required before this newer sense of ontology can be 
explained.
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The first major sense of ‘ontology’ is as the foundational understanding of existence of 
a group or person, hereafter referred to as the subject. In this sense, ontology is the subject’s 
understanding of the totality of what ‘is’. It is the subject’s view of what exists, and 
potentially also why it exists. Because of this, ontology, used in this sense, is similar to the 
concept of a ‘worldview’, in so far as a particular conception of the world may also 
necessitate an understanding of how to act in that world that usually accompanies a 
‘worldview’. This sense of ontology can be differentiated from the concept of the worldview, 
however, in terms of the ontology representing the underlying categorial structure of ‘what is’ 
that provides the subject’s framework for understanding existence and upon which the 
worldview is based.
The idea of the ‘categorial structure’ is central in this sense of ontology. To illustrate 
with an example, an abridged categorial structure could be one where the subject held that 
there was three types of a certain ‘thing’1: a gold type, a silver type, and a bronze type. Each 
type would have certain attributes associated with it that differentiated it from the other 
types of that ‘thing’. This would then lead to a view, implicit or explicit, of the essence of 
each type, a ‘gold-ness’, a ‘silver-ness’, or a ‘bronze-ness’. This categorial structure, 
however, would be challenged if a type were encountered, an iron type for example, that did 
not conform to the existing understanding of how the ‘thing’ was composed. Many reactions 
could then follow this encounter such as a process of restructuring their categorial structure to 
include the new type, a widening of the account of the essence of one of the existing types so 
that the new type would be included as subtype of one of the originals, or an attempt to 
eliminate or discount the new type in order to preserve the existing categorial structure. The 
act of categorical adjustment could belong to a process of logical assessment of the available 
evidence, to an ad hoc arbitrary decision, or to a variety of intermediary acts between these 
broad generalisations.
This sense of ontology, the subject’s categorial structure of their understanding of 
existence, can be divided into whether the ontology is ‘classical’ or ‘noetic’. The ‘classical’ 
understanding of existence correlates to what is sometimes called ‘metaphysical realism’, and 
sometimes also ‘pragmatic realism’. Its characteristic is that the subject regards the actualities 
of existence as being independent of their own existence. In this ‘classical’ conception the 
subject’s ontology may either correctly or incorrectly correspond to these actualities of 
existence. The ‘noetic’ variant, however, differs from this ‘classical’ conception through what 
might be called its ‘egocentric’ or self oriented attitude, and this can be further divided on 
1 ‘Thing’ is here used in the widest and most general sense possible, and could refer not only to objects but also 
to people, ideas, opinions, processes and any other actual, possible, or even impossible existents.
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whether it is a weak attitude or a strong attitude. The weak ‘noetic’ attitude holds that the 
experience of existence is predicated on the operations of the human mind, and consequently 
that a mind independent understanding of existence is impossible. This version of ‘noetic’ 
ontology can also be called the epistemological variant. The strong ‘noetic’ attitude, however, 
holds that there is no difference between existence and the experience of existence, and 
therefore that existence is predicated on the operations of the human mind. This version of 
‘noetic’ ontology can be correlated with what is sometimes called ‘dogmatic idealism’.
The second major sense of ontology is arguably the more abstract version, however it 
is nevertheless closely related to the first. In the example used above for describing the idea of 
a subject’s ‘categorial structure’ it was mentioned that this structure could require adjustment 
if it became challenged by a previously unknown existent. The second usage of ontology can 
describe the process of analysis that ascertains the categorial understanding of existence. The 
distinction is that whereas the first sense of ontology referred to the subject’s understanding 
of what ‘is’, the second sense refers to study of what ‘is-ness’ ‘is’. This is the question of the 
quiddity, or quidditas, of an existent – its ‘what-ness’. While the first sense of ontology was 
concerned with understanding what has existence, the second concerns understanding what an 
existent is. This is expressed as questioning ‘being’ qua ‘being’ – ‘being’ in its capacity as 
‘being’. 
The most common examples of ontology in the sense of the study of ‘being’ qua 
‘being’ are known as ‘substance ontologies’ and ‘process ontologies’, and there are many 
variations within these two types. A non-pluralist substance ontology typically holds that 
there is a fundamental component of existence, the ‘being’ of ‘things’, and that it is a bearer of 
properties that has no properties of its own. This is because if this substance had properties 
then something even more fundamental would arguably have to exist to bear them, which 
logically leads to infinite regression of ever more fundamental substances. Pluralist versions of 
substance ontologies hold that an indefinite number of ‘things’ exist in a unique way and that 
these ‘things’ cannot consequently be understood as having a fundamental characteristic in 
common. Furthermore, substance ontologies also commonly give rise to a view that ‘things’ 
have an ‘essence’, typically viewed as the fundamental ‘being’ of the ‘thing’ once all of its 
accidental properties are removed or discounted, and which cannot undergo any form of 
change without the ‘thing’ itself being destroyed. Change, however, is a central concept in 
process ontologies. A process ontologist generally holds either that the ‘being’ of ‘things’ are 
dynamic processes, or that processes give rise to their ‘being’. In such process ontologies 
concepts relating ‘time’ and ‘being’ predominate as matters of concern. It is also possible for 
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an ontological pluralist to hold some form of hybridised ontology, in which both ‘substance’ 
and ‘process’ share a role as basic categories of existence.
The type of ontology in the sense of studying ‘being’ qua ‘being’ can also be 
subdivided into another two parts, as ‘general’ or ‘formal’ ontology, and ‘regional’ or 
‘material’ ontology. A ‘formal ontology’ seeks to determine either or both the general and 
universal structures of existence, as the ontologist may hold ‘general’ and ‘universal’ to be 
potentially different categories. Examples of formal categories in a pluralist substance 
ontology could  include ‘substance’, ‘quantity’, and ‘quality’. While the permutations of 
formal ontology are many, they are usually developed in order so that they can be employed 
in the analysis of regions of existence. These are the ‘regional ontologies’, which are the 
analyses of the structures of particular categories of existence such as ‘life-forms’ or 
‘literature genres’. Potentially, the ontologist may determine intermediate categories, such as 
‘natural’ for ‘life-forms’ and ‘cultural’ for ‘literature genres’, which would form a hierarchical 
structure for the regional categories of existence. One modern and ubiquitous application of 
the word ‘ontology’ is for the regional ontology of informational architectures. In some 
epistemic communities this has become the sole meaning of ontology. 
There are also many other important variations in the relationship between formal 
ontology and regional ontologies. For example, if the ontologist maintains a ‘classical’ attitude 
of existence then structures such as ‘the mind’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘perception’ would be 
regarded as regional ontologies. An ontologist with a ‘noetic’ attitude would potentially regard 
the analysis of these structures as part of their formal ontology. Alternatively, if the 
ontologist concluded that there are no universal structures in existence, that existence can only 
be analysed in terms of its particulars, then one consequence of this ‘nominalistic’ conclusion 
is that a division between the ‘formal’ and the ‘regional’ collapses. This nominalism would 
still result in an ontology that could be either ‘classical’ or ‘noetic’, and a ‘noetic’ nominalism, 
for example, could be correlated with many of the attributes typically associated with the 
theories of postmodernism. This is because these theories frequently argue that there is no 
single ‘meta-truth’, rather only particular subjective ‘truths’, and consequently that there is 
no possible formal classification for existence.
When correlating ‘noetic’ nominalism with postmodernism a degree of caution is 
required due to the extensive range of concepts to which the postmodern label has been 
applied. However, postmodernism is certainly not the first grouping of ideas or theories to be 
resistant to conventional classification. Such relational categorisation in and of itself is an 
example of regional ontology, in this case the region of theories, and as such is subject to the 
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same disputes and criticisms that govern the second sense of ontology generally. These 
disputes revolve around problems of the discreteness and determinacy of categories, a 
problem called ‘categorial indefiniteness’. Brian Cantwell Smith analysed this phenomenon in 
his text on ontology, On the Origin of Objects, to describe how boundaries between some 
entities, but not necessarily all entities, while not “wholly chaotic” are neither “wholly 
regularizable” (Smith 1998: 330). Smith provides a good list of six areas that illustrate 
examples of the potentiality for categorial indefiniteness:
1. Indefiniteness at the edges of given objects, such as the boundaries of the 
region on the wall where I ask you to write your name...;
2. Indefiniteness between and among objects of the same type, such as whether 
you are standing on this sand dune or the neighboring one; or whether the 
massif above our campsite consists of three or four mountains;
3. Indefiniteness among different types, such as among chutzpah, bravado, 
ego, self-confidence, and brashness;
4. Indefiniteness among the notions ‘concept,’ ‘type,’ and ‘property’ – as for 
example in debates between philosophers and psychologists on the nature of 
concepts: about whether they are mental or abstract, and about what is that 
people can and cannot share (do we share a concept of red? do we each have 
private concepts that represent the same abstract property? or do we all have 
different concepts?);
5. Indefiniteness between objects and the types they exemplify, implying that 
the “instance-of” relation is itself approximate, contested, and potentially 
unstable – as for example whether the headache you have this morning is the 
same one you had last night, or a different one of same type; and similarly for 
patches of color, fog, and “the rain”; and
6. Indefiniteness between and among different realms of human endeavour, 
such as the political, the social, the technical, the religious, the esthetic, the 
psychological, etc. (ibid: 324-325, emphasis as in original)
Nevertheless, when there is a case for categorial indefiniteness to be recognised in an 
ontological schematisation, certain categories are going to possess greater degrees of 
indefiniteness than others. It is also important to recognise that an ontologist might deny the 
validity of categorial indefiniteness, and could argue instead that the phenomenon stems from 
an inadequately developed formal ontology to support fully the discrete and effable regional 
ontologies that would not have indefiniteness as a characteristic. However, in the absence of a 
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formal ontology that sufficiently provides for a discrete understanding of all conceivable 
regions of existence, the concept of categorial indefiniteness can be retained as a valuable 
explanatory device.
As previously mentioned postmodernism is a category that exemplifies indefiniteness. 
Another grouping of ideas that is prone to a similar degree of categorial indefiniteness is the 
set of thought that makes up the third and most recent major sense of ontology. Because of 
this shared resilience to strict classification this third sense of ontology can also be mistaken 
as an example of postmodern theory. This is partially excusable because of the high degree to 
which postmodernism is an indefinite category, a consequence of the near absurdity of trying 
to provide a generalised account of a set theories that frequently, though not universally, 
argue in different ways against making generalised accounts. It is because of this fluidity of 
meaning that it is easy to arbitrarily decide what is a postmodern theory, and because the 
third sense of ontology shares enough of its canon of literature with what is normally 
considered within postmodernism it is consequently open to this amorphous classification. 
This is arguably anachronistic however, in as far as the development of the third sense of 
ontology predates the emergence of  postmodernism as a reference to a group of ideas, with 
postmodernism largely a late twentieth century development and the new sense of ontology 
nearer to the beginning of that century. The third sense of ontology arose out of a challenge to 
the traditional understanding of ontology as the study of ‘being’, as the study of the ‘what-
ness’ of entities. This challenge can be found in the works of the phenomenological 
philosopher Heidegger. Heidegger argued that the understanding of the ontology of an existent 
as its ‘what-ness’ was the single greatest mistake of Western philosophy, “perhaps the most 
consequential, influential, and disastrous philosophical definition in Western thinking” 
(Heidegger 1994: 58). Heidegger’s alternative modal ontology, or ontology of ‘how-ness’, 
represents a decisive break from this ontological tradition when that tradition is understood as 
the study of ‘what-ness’. However, as a significant component of Heidegger’s philosophy is 
predicated on maintaining a critical historical awareness of the formation of the ontological 
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tradition2, a detailed presentation of the history of ontology is required in order to analyse his 
radical departure from its discourse.
§1.2 – The history of ‘classical’ ontology and the realist concept of ‘being’
The word ‘ontology’ was first introduced into philosophy at the beginning of the 17th 
century. Until recent scholarship on the subject it was believed that Rudolf Göckel coined the 
term in his 1613 Lexicon philosophicum (Mora 1963). It is now believed that the first 
recorded use of the term is in Jacob Lorhard’s 1606 Ogdoas scholastica (Øhrstrøm et al. 
2005). Peter Øhrstrøm, Sara Uckelman, and Henrik Schärfe argue that while Lorhard used the 
word ‘ontology’ as a synonym for ‘metaphysics’, it is probable that his use of a new word 
was to emphasise its reinvention or renewal as a discipline that conformed with the rise of a 
scientific worldview at the beginning of the 17th century (Øhrstrøm, et al. 2007 & 2008). 
‘Ontology’ literally translates the Greek for the study of ‘being’, which closely resembles one 
of Aristotle’s four conceptions for metaphysics as the science of ‘being qua being’, which can 
be found in Book Gamma of his Metaphysics (Aristotle 1984e: 1003b19-23). One of several 
points that can be drawn from this is that ontology has existed long before Lorhard named it, 
what transformations occurred by this naming is another matter. 
It is apparent from this provenance that to understand the historical development of 
ontology we should begin with the formation of the philosophical subject of ‘metaphysics’. 
To this day it is not uncommon for the terms ‘ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’ to be used 
interchangeably. When a differentiation of the two terms is pursued one common, but not 
universal, distinction is that ‘ontology’ consists of a categorial list of the basic items of reality 
and an account of the relationship amongst them (see Graham 1987: 20-21 for an example of 
this usage), while ‘metaphysics’ is the theoretical viewpoint that generates this account. 
However, this definition will not be adopted in this thesis, as metaphysics is sometimes also 
used as a synonym with theology. Instead ontology is used as the primary term for the same 
2 This critical historical awareness of the development of the ontological tradition, it will be shown in sections 
2.6 and 2.7, is not an afterthought in Heidegger’s methodology. Rather, it constitutes what he calls the 
‘phenomenological destruction’ of the history of ontology. It will be argued in sections 2.6 and 2.7, that the 
phenomenological destruction is not a historical survey of past interpretations of ‘being’ that is separate from an 
overall phenomenological analysis of ‘being’. It will be shown that, as Heidegger argues, ‘being’ is temporal-
historical, and that consequently a phenomenology of ‘being’ must necessarily include a historical awareness of 
‘being’. As a temporally unified structure, ‘being’, along with ‘being-not-yet’ and ‘being-no-longer’, must not 
be understood as the traditionally privileged atemporal presence of ‘what-ness’. Furthermore, this understanding 
of ‘being’ as atemporal presence will be shown in section 3.5 to be a derivative modality of how an entity’s 
‘being’ can be encountered as present-at-hand. This derivative understanding, is not incorrect in itself, rather it 
is incorrect if it is the only, or the privileged, understanding of ‘being’. Consequently, a phenomenological 
destruction of the history of ontology also provides insight into how to understand ‘what-ness’, when, in 
limited contexts, it is the ‘what-ness’ of entity that matters for an investigation. It will be shown in section 2.7 
how these possible contexts can arise, when it is only the ‘what-ness’ of an entity that matters within the strict 
limits of that context.
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reason as Lorhard potentially intended – to emphasise the subject as the systematic study of 
the ‘being’ of intra-worldly entities. Metaphysics, in our usage, refers to the study, 
speculation, our contemplation of possible or potential extra-worldly3 entities. 
As stated, the metaphysical characterisation of ontology has an exceptionally long 
history. The origin of the term lies in a series of fourteen texts by Aristotle that bear the name 
Metaphysics. The name was a philological referent assigned to these texts by later scholars 
and not by Aristotle himself, originally as a technical term designating those treatises that 
were sequenced after Aristotle’s Physics. The name in this philological context simply meant 
[the texts] after the Physics. However, scholars such as Heidegger have argued that this 
nomenclature was not harmless in that the name “later became a philosophically interpreted 
characteristic of what is contained in these rearranged treatises” (Heidegger 1997: 4). In this 
context it is apparent why later scholars, such as Lorhard in the 17th century, could have 
wanted to emphasise a name that did not suggest the study of entities in someway after or 
beyond the world in order to distinguish it from the theological connotations in the idea of 
metaphysics. However, the Western philosophical tradition of studying the ‘what-ness’ of 
entities did not originate with Aristotle’s metaphysical inquiries.
The genesis of ontology occurred when the question of ‘being’ began to be posed. 
Within the Western philosophical tradition, the explicit engagement with this question began 
with the group called the Pre-Socratics. Dating from between 600 and 400 B.C.E. their work 
3 In section 3.4 the multiple senses of the word ‘world’ as identified by Heidegger are analysed. The use of the 
word ‘world’ that we adopt is what is called the ontological-existential sense of ‘world’. In this sense a 
speculated metaphysical entity whose ‘what-ness’ would normally be considered ‘extra-worldly’, could rather be 
understood as ‘intra-worldly’. This means that the character or ‘how-ness’ of its ‘being’ as circumspectively 
known would be from ‘inside’ someone’s ‘world’. See the next two chapters for further elaboration of these 
concepts from the perspective of an ontology of ‘how-ness’. The present point is that our forthcoming concern 
with the ‘how-ness’ of intra-worldly entities has sufficient flexibility to address the ‘being’ of entities that are 
not in ‘physical existence’. Nevertheless, while the potential for this discourse is available, an ontology of the 
‘how-ness’ of metaphysical or theological entities is not within the scope of this thesis. An argument about the 
existence of extra-worldly entities is not the objective of this thesis. Despite this, the process of analysing the 
history of ontology must not overlook the substantial contemporaneous development of ontology as a field of 
metaphysics.
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represents some of the earliest surviving textual fragments of Western culture4, and also marks 
the beginning  of Western philosophy. They attempted to explain the structure of existence 
through reason and argument, a movement that marked “a shift away from earlier mythical 
ways of understanding the world” (Janaway 1995: 339). A significant proportion of this 
work can be described as an attempt to answer the question of ‘being’. The question of 
‘being’ is what it means when something is said ‘to be’.
Parmenides of Elea, who flourished in the 5th century B.C.E., is arguably the most 
influential of the Pre-Socratics in the development of a philosophical attempt to answer this 
question. Christopher Janaway, for example, makes the argument that Parmenides “was the 
instigator of a new chapter in the history of philosophy, and of all the Pre-Socratics he is the 
single most important figure” (ibid: 347). His poem On Nature survives in large fragments, 
within it he argues that there are only two ways of thinking about the world: “It is” and “It is 
not” (ibid: 347-349). Øhrstrøm et al. argue that this forms an ontology of two categories: 
“being” and “non-being” (Øhrstrøm, et al. 2005: 426). Furthermore, in this ontology, the 
world has to be described as being unchanging. This is because ‘what is’ must be, and ‘what is 
not’ cannot be, allowing no exchange between the two. Parmenides states:
It must be that what is there for speaking and thinking of is; for [it] is there  
to be,
Whereas nothing is not; that is what I bid you consider, 
(Parmenides 1984: B6.1-2, emphasis as in original)
And furthermore, as his poem goes on to describe, being and not-being must be critically 
distinguished because those who do not:
4 The existence of ‘culture’ is open to ontological debate. ‘Culture’ is not a physical entity that is available to 
empirical observation, yet there is a conventionally uncritical understanding of the concept of societies or 
civilizations having a ‘culture’ or ‘cultures’. However, this conventional understanding of ‘culture’ is often 
inchoate, and the explicit ontological question of ‘what is’ ‘culture’ is very difficult to answer. The root of the 
difficulty is that any definition that can be articulated would be predicated upon an established ontological 
framework of what constitutes ‘what-ness’ or ‘is-ness’. For the purpose of this thesis the term ‘culture’, unless 
otherwise stated, will be used in the ‘anthropological’ rather than ‘humanistic’ sense. The latter refers to 
‘culture’ as a quality that can be acquired, by becoming ‘cultured’, while the former refers to the idea of plural, 
collective categories used to differentiate groups of people. The use of the anthropological sense does not, 
however, endorse a view of cultures as “discrete, bounded systems” (see Barnard and Spencer 1996: 136-142). 
Reifying the concept of ‘Western culture’, for example, is problematic when the diffusion and acculturation of 
ideas and practices throughout history is considered, not only in the relatively recent context of rapid 
globalisation. Use of the term ‘Western’ therefore, such as in ‘Western philosophic tradition’, will be as a rough 
characterisation of a clustering of cultural particulars with a narrative, rather than normative, structure. However, 
this trouble of defining the ‘what-ness’ of ‘culture’, or whether ‘culture’ can be said to exist, can also be 
understood as indicative of the general problems of the ontology of the ‘what-ness’ of entities. In section 3.3, as 
part of the analysis of Heidegger’s understanding of ontology as the study of the ‘how-ness’ of entities, the 
concept of ‘das Man’ is introduced. Das Man can be translated variously as ‘the They’ or ‘the Anyone’, and is 
part of Heidegger’s phenomenological architecture of ‘how’ a person ‘exists’ as part of a shared ‘world’. Terms 
such as ‘exists’ and ‘world’ are important technical devices in Heidegger’s vocabulary, and so an analysis of 
how ‘das Man’ offers an alternative understanding of ‘culture’ in terms of the ‘how-ness’ of ‘human being’ will 
have to wait until section 3.3. In this section a full critical analysis of Heidegger’s phenomenological 
observations on this subject is provided.
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Wander, two-headed; for helplessness in their
Breasts guides their distracted mind; and they are carried
Deaf and blind alike, dazed, uncritical tribes,
By whom being and not-being have been thought both the same
And not the same; and the path of all is backward-turning.
(ibid: B6.5-9)
The consequence of this ontology of the category of ‘being’ is that only eternal truths are 
possible, as the structure of what exists is fixed. ‘Being’, ‘what is’, is changeless, neither 
coming into existence or perishing, and never exists incompletely (ibid: B8.26-33).
The ontological tradition of Western philosophy has been very much dominated by 
the category of ‘being’. However, a contemporary of Parmenides is another Pre-Socratic 
philosopher called Heraclitus of Ephesus. Contrary to Parmenides’ ontology of the 
unchanging reality of ‘being’, Heraclitus asserted the exact opposite, that reality is always in a 
state of constant change or flux (Seibt 1991: 725). A consequence of this belief leads to an 
argument for which Heraclitus is most famous5, discussed by Plato in the Cratylus (Plato 
1997a: 402a), that someone “cannot step twice into the same river” (Heraclitus 1979: LI). 
Because the waters of a river are always flowing, always being replaced, and, therefore, 
because the river is never composed of what it used to be composed of, it is impossible for 
the river at two temporally separate moments to be considered the same entity. As the river 
is never the same entity twice, it is impossible to step into it twice. This perspective on the 
‘what’ of the river extends to encompass all types of existents, an argument that all entities 
are always developing, are always in ‘flux’6.
Heraclitus’s emphasis on flux expresses an ontological schema predicated on a 
temporal understanding of ‘being’, as opposed to Parmenides’s timeless or atemporal version. 
5 No direct fragment by Heraclitus of this statement survives, rather it is referenced by other writers such as 
Plato and Plutarch.
6 It would also be logical to derive from Heraclitus’s philosophy that the same person never exists at two 
different points in time. This is not an easy issue to resolve, and has been a source of much philosophical 
anxiety over history. In the attempt to settle the dilemma it has given rise to concepts such as ‘numeric 
identity’ and ‘specific identity’ in ‘analytic philosophy’. An equivalent set of concepts from ‘continental 
philosophy’ can be found in the work of the philosopher Paul Ricoeur in his text Oneself as Another. In this 
text Ricoeur separates the concept of the identity of the self into idem-identity, the sameness of an individual’s 
identity that constitutes its permanence in time, and ipse-identity, the selfhood of an individual's identity that 
develops through time and which also involves a “dialectic of self and other than self” (Ricoeur 1994: 3). It is 
by this introduction of time and otherness into the question of personal identity that Ricoeur raises his notion 
of narrative identity, which allows the “taking into full account the temporal dimension (the temporality) of a 
being who, by existing with others in the horizon of a common world, is led to transform him (her) self in the 
course of a life history” (Villela-Petit 2007: 3). This theory of narrative identity helps act as a “mediator 
between the pole of character, where idem and ipse tend to coincide, and the pole of self-maintenance, where 
selfhood frees itself from sameness” (Ricoeur 1994: 119), where character is understood as those lasting 
dispositions by which an individual can be known. However, these attempts to resolve how an entity can be 
said to to remain the same entity over time, and yet also to be changing over time, all revolve around the 
traditional ontological understanding of ‘being’ in terms of the ‘what-ness’ of an entity. An alternative approach 
develops when the ontology of ‘being’ is reinterpreted as a question of the ‘how-ness’ of an entity. This 
approach is described when Heidegger’s philosophy from Being and Time is analysed later in this thesis.
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This divergent path of ‘ontology’, however, still analyses ‘being’ in terms of ‘what-ness’. 
From this perspective, Heraclitus’s philosophy can be understood as a variation of the 
ontological tradition’s concern with ‘what-ness’, rather than an absolute break from it. It 
differs in that it understands ‘what-ness’ not as a ‘thing’, but as a ‘process’. Therefore, 
Heraclitus’s alternative understanding of ‘being’ marks the beginning of what is termed 
‘process ontology’. While ‘process ontology’ has generally remained on the periphery of 
mainstream ontological discourse, it has enjoyed periodic revivals in the work of such 
philosophers as Alfred North Whitehead7. Furthermore, the role of process ontology within 
the ontological tradition is paramount. This is because the work of Plato and Aristotle, and in 
the metaphysical realist tradition that followed them, developed as a reaction against an 
apparent consequence of Heraclitus’s doctrine. The problem they found was that if reality is 
in flux and is not fixed, if perceptions of ‘what is’ are incomplete at any point in time and are 
therefore ‘illusory’, then there can be no complete and accurate account of existence. 
In the thirteenth book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle suggested that the “supporters of 
the ideal theory were led to it because they were persuaded of the truth of Heraclitean 
doctrine that all sensible things are ever passing away, so that if knowledge or thought is to 
have an object, there must be some other and permanent entities, apart from those which are 
sensible; for there can be no knowledge of things which are in a state of flux” (Aristotle 1984e: 
1078b12-17). This reference to “supporters of the ideal theory” is an allusion to Plato and his 
theory of Forms or Types. The difference in terms is because the ancient Greek word ‘eidos’, 
has been variously translated as ‘Forms’, ‘Ideas’, and ‘Types’. When not directly quoting an 
alternative interpretation, the term ‘Types’, rather than ‘Ideas’ or ‘Forms’, will be employed 
from this point on, and will be capitalised to distinguish Plato’s metaphysical usage of the 
word. Plato, like Heraclitus, believed that change characterized the world. Unlike Heraclitus, 
he believed that this changing world was merely the world of appearances. In addition to the 
7 Whitehead’s process ontology is immensely sophisticated. In summary, Whitehead develops a categorial 
scheme consisting of four groups: the general ‘category of the ultimate’, eight ‘categories of existence’, twenty 
seven ‘categories of explanation’, and nine ‘categoreal [sic] obligations’ (Whitehead 1978: 20-28). Included in 
the categories of explanation are the statements:
(i) That the actual world is a process, and that the process is the becoming of actual entities. 
... [and]
(ix) That how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the two 
descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its ‘being’ is constituted by its 
‘becoming.’ This is the ‘principle of process.’
(ibid: 22-23, emphasis as in original)
Whitehead’s process ontology, emphasising ‘becoming’ over ‘being’, constitutes the basis for his wider 
philosophy found in his Process and Reality. As the example of cited above shows, Whitehead’s philosophy is 
not an outright example of the ontological tradition’s concern with ‘being’ as a question of ‘what-ness’. Rather, 
he understood ‘what-ness’ and ‘how-ness’ as not being independent structures of existence. A full critical 
analysis of Whitehead’s philosophy is not within the scope of this thesis, but as this example demonstrates, 
Heidegger was not the only philosopher to challenge the traditional ontological understanding of ‘being’.
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world of appearances coexisted an intelligible world of unchanging Types. The world of 
appearances was to be regarded as an imperfect reflection of the world of Types. The 
existence and relationship between the two worlds or realms forms the core of Plato’s 
ontology. Furthermore, as indicated by the above quote from Aristotle, Plato believed that his 
bifurcated philosophy of the Types solved the epistemological problem raised by 
Heraclitus’s flux philosophy. Change, flux, process, progress, regress, and any other cognate 
phenomena of temporality were not a dimension of the ‘being’ of Plato’s Types. Because 
Plato emphasised this atemporality of the objects of his philosophical reflection it is more 
accurate to say that he adopted – and propagated – the ontological tradition of Parmenides 
rather than that of Heraclitus. 
In order to convey the structure of his ontological conception Plato presented three 
successive images in his Republic, and appraising these images will serve to demonstrate the 
operation of his philosophy. His first image is the simile of the sun, second is the image of the 
divided line, and third is the allegory of the cave. The simile of the sun is an analogy 
presenting ‘goodness’ as that which makes truth and knowledge of the intelligible realm 
possible in a similar way as the light of the sun makes sight of things possible in the realm of 
appearances.
‘Well, what I’m saying is that it’s goodness which gives the things we know 
their truth and makes it possible for people to have knowledge. It is 
responsible for knowledge and truth, and you should think of it as being in the 
intelligible realm, but you shouldn’t identify it with knowledge and truth, 
otherwise you’ll be wrong: for all their value, it is even more valuable. In the 
other realm, it is right to regard light and sight as resembling the sun, but not 
to identify either of them with the sun; so in this realm it is right to regard 
knowledge and truth as resembling goodness, but not to identify either of 
them with goodness, which should be rated even more highly.’ (Plato 1993: 
508e-509a)
By proposing two realms of existence, the visible realm of appearance and the intelligible 
realm of truth, Plato allowed for the ‘lesser’ reality of appearances to be subject to 
“generation and decay” (ibid: 508d) and still allow knowledge of an unchanging ‘greater’ 
reality of the intelligible.
However, as Plato states (ibid: 509c), this explanation and differentiation of intelligible 
and visible things is incomplete. To further elucidate his idea he draws upon an image of a 
line. The line is divided into two unequal sections, corresponding to the visible and the 
intelligible, and each section is then divided again by the same ratio. Each subsection is 
ordered to the degree to which its object possesses truth. Thus:
24
(ibid: 509d-511e and Plato 1997c: 509d-511e)
As a consequence of the ratio of the line’s divisions, parts ‘B’ and ‘C’ are of a equal length. 
Parts ‘A’ and ‘B’ total the realm of appearance, part ‘A’ being likenesses and images such as 
reflections and shadows, and part ‘B’ being the “originals of these images” (Plato 1997c: 
510a) that form the material world, such as animals and artefacts. The way the mind 
approaches part ‘A’ is by imagination and conjecture, and part ‘B’ is approached by 
confidence and belief. Parts ‘C’ and ‘D’ both refer to the Types of the realm of the 
intelligible, but are differentiated by the methodology employed in their reasoning (Plato 
1993). Part ‘C’ is when the intelligible is approached by ‘thought’, an “intermediate state 
between believing and knowing” (ibid: 511d). Part ‘C’ is when the intelligible Types are dealt 
with by “the mind [exploring] them only by taking things for granted, [when] its goal is not a 
starting-point” (ibid: 511a). Part ‘D’ represents knowledge or understanding, and differs from 
‘C’ by working out first principles. 
When it takes things for granted, it doesn’t treat them as starting-points, but 
as basic in the strict sense — as platforms and rungs, for example. These 
serve it until it reaches a point where nothing needs to be taken for granted, 
and which is the starting-point for everything. Once it has grasped this 
starting-point, it turns around and by a process of depending on the things 
which depend from the starting-point, it descends to an end-point. It makes 
absolutely no use of anything perceptible by the senses: it aims for types by 
means of types alone, in and of themselves, and it ends its journey with 
types. (ibid: 511b-c)
The methodology of part ‘D’ begins by taking a concept or body of existing knowledge as its 
base, as part ‘C’ does, but then reasons by dialectic back from that starting-point to 
determine the true starting-point for knowledge. This process of determining the first 
principles of knowledge represents a persistent definition for ontology. Furthermore, for 
Plato, the first principles of knowledge are the Types. Because Plato believed in an absolute 
reality, and furthermore because he believed that this reality can be accurately known, in his 
case knowledge of the reality of the Types through the application of reason, he is argued to 
be a metaphysical realist.
Plato draws upon one more image in the Republic to differentiate knowledge of the 
illusory world of the senses and knowledge of intelligible word of the Types: the allegory of 
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the cave. A short but deep parable, it describes a group of prisoners tied up at the bottom of a 
cave in a manner so that they can only look one way towards the end of the cave wall and not 
back in the direction of the cave mouth. Further up in the direction of that cave mouth lies a 
large fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a partition or wall is set up in a style similar 
to a puppet show. At that partition puppeteers manipulate crude likenesses of the outside 
world in such a manner that the fire behind them casts the shadows of the marionettes out in 
front of prisoners on the cave wall facing them. Plato suggests that people are like the 
prisoners in the cave (ibid: 515a) – who in this case are seeing likenesses of likenesses, the 
shadows of constructs – and proceeds to describe the various stages of encountering the 
world one of those prisoners would meet if freed from the cave8. These stages of encountering 
reality roughly equate to the partitions of the divided line, and the fire in the cave can be seen 
as representing the sun from the simile of the sun, the sun itself in the allegory of the cave 
equating to ‘goodness’ from that previous image. The Types are represented by the true 
items found outside the cave, illuminated by the sun, and are what the constructs and 
shadows inside the cave mimic.
Plato developed his theory of Types in other dialogues including the Phaedo, 
Symposium, and Parmenides along with the Republic in his middle period, and again in many 
of his texts in his late period such as the Sophist. In the dialogue Parmenides, Plato has a 
young Socrates elucidate the theory of Types. This is done so that Parmenides, as a member 
of Socrates’s audience, can provide a critique of the theory to enable its further development. 
The Types expressed include “likeness and unlikeness, multitude and oneness, rest and 
motion” (Plato 1997d: 129d-e), which could be called ‘relations’ (Janaway 1995: 378), as well 
as ‘properties’ such as, for example, being beautiful. The Types are ‘universals’9, existing in 
the unchanging realm of the intelligible, and are copied in the ‘particulars’ of the mundane 
realm. As the text of Parmenides makes plain, Plato recognises that this theory required 
refinement. However, the overall structure that has been described remained Plato’s 
philosophy of existence: a bifurcated reality consisting of a sensible and temporal realm, 
study of which reveals no true knowledge, and an intelligible and atemporal realm of Types, 
study of which reveals the first principles upon which true knowledge can be based. These 
first principles are universals, such as ‘redness’, which are then represented in particulars, 
such as a red flower, a red book, or any object with the colour red. 
To aid his argument that studying the Types revealed the first principles for 
8 Including a stage describing the harsh treatment that this prisoner would receive if he or she returned to the 
cave to tell the other prisoners about the greater reality outside the cave.
9 Though Plato never expressed the idea in terms of universals or particulars.
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establishing the basis for knowledge, Plato needed to demonstrate how this study could be 
accomplished. In the Sophist Plato develops the technique of dialectic, which serves for this 
demonstration. Philosophical knowledge, he argued, results from properly dividing things by 
kinds (Plato 1997g: 253d). By engaging in such activity, Plato writes, someone will:
be capable of adequately discriminating a single form spread out all through a 
lot of other things, each of which stands separate from the others. In addition 
he can discriminate forms that are different from each other but are included 
within a single form that’s outside them, or a single form that’s connected as a 
unit throughout many wholes, or many forms that are completely separate 
from others. (ibid: 253d-e)
Earlier in the Sophist Plato gives an example of how this technique works by showing the 
hierarchical structure involved in identifying the act of angling. He begins by considering the 
Type ‘expertise’, which, he argues can be divided into expertise in acquisition and expertise in 
production. Expertise in acquisition can then itself be divided by whether the acquisition is 
obtained by willing exchange or by taking possession. Taking possession again divides into 
combat and hunting, combat being when the act is done openly and hunting when it is secret. 
Again, Plato argues, hunting divides into whether it is the hunting of living things or of lifeless 
things. The hunting of living things, animal hunting, is then divided into land hunting and 
aquatic hunting. The hunting of things on land divides into many kinds, while the hunting of 
things that swim separates into bird catching and fishing. Fishing divides into the use of nets 
and the use of striking. Striking divides on account of whether it acted at night or day, and 
during the day is called hooking. Hooking is achieved by either spearing or by use of a rod 
which is called angling (ibid: 218e-221c). 
Plato’s dialectical method demonstrates the hierarchical taxonomy of Types through 
the process of differentiation, which shows the relationship between a certain Type with the 
Types within it. This dialectical method of differentiation produces a ‘tree’ of categories, a 
manner of representation that has persisted throughout the history of ontology. However, the 
practice of producing a descending taxonomy from general categories towards particular 
categories has been contested by an opposing process of creating an ascending taxonomy. 
While the taxonomic structures these two processes map may superficially resemble each 
other, they are based on a fundamental ontological dispute that can be traced to Aristotle’s 
rejection of Plato’s philosophy of the Types.
Aristotle was sympathetic but critical to Plato’s dialectical approach of differentiating 
from a genus. The difficulty, he believed, was that the verb ‘to be’, and the noun ‘being’, were 
being used to mean a variety of fundamentally different concepts (Lawson-Tancred 1995: 
400-403), and consequently the method was subject to confusion. However, as he argues in 
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Book Gamma of the Metaphysics, these homonymous meanings of ‘being’ are all drawn from 
a central meaning of what ‘to be’ is, and therefore that the ambiguity of what ‘being’ is can be 
removed by explicating this central meaning.
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they are 
related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not 
homonymous. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in 
the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, 
another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is 
capable of it.... So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, 
but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are 
substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because 
they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or 
qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things 
which are relative to substance, or negations of some of these things or of 
substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is 
non-being. (Aristotle 1984e: 1003a33-1003b11, emphasis as in original)
As stated Aristotle rejected Plato’s bifurcated approach to reality upon which the Platonic 
theory of Types is based. Nevertheless, Aristotle also wanted to reject Parmenides’s 
conclusion that no change occurred in the world, whilst also rejecting the Heraclitean attitude 
that persisting knowledge of things that changed was impossible – a task which Plato’s 
bifurcation theory resolved. Therefore, if Aristotle wanted to challenge the Platonic 
philosophy of Types he needed to advance a new understanding of ‘being’. 
In his physical-metaphysical texts Aristotle stresses the importance of trying to 
determine ‘first principles’. He states in the opening of the Physics, when “the objects of an 
inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance 
with these that knowledge and understanding is attained” (Aristotle 1984d: 184a10-12). 
Furthermore, as he went on to argue in the Metaphysics, “the principles and the causes we are 
seeking are those of substances” (Aristotle 1984e: 1069a18-19). Because of this, Aristotle 
offers a new definition for his metaphysical philosophy: the study of ‘being qua being’, from 
which ‘ontology’ meaning the study of ‘being’ has since been derived. 
Obviously then it is the work of one science to examine being qua being, and 
the attributes which belong to it qua being, and the same science will examine 
not only substances but also their attributes, both those above named and 
what is prior and posterior, genus and species, whole and part, and the others 
of this sort.  (ibid: 1005a14-17)
‘Being’ in its capacity as ‘being’, ‘being qua being’, for Aristotle is substance. Because 
Aristotle’s takes substance and the attributes of substance as its subject of study, it is 
described as his ‘substance ontology’. As he states near the opening of Book Zeta of the 
Metaphysics, the question of ‘being’ is the same question as asking what is substance (ibid: 
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1028b4-5). 
However, it should not necessarily be assumed that Aristotle’s ‘substance ontology’ 
can be described as a monolithic, unitary system. Rather, following Daniel Graham’s ‘two 
systems theory’, it can be divided into two systems: one being atomic substantialism where 
“basic entities are indivisible substance which fall under natural kinds and which enter into 
complex relationships of essence and accident”, and the other being hylomorphic 
substantialism where “substances are complexes of form and matter which participate in 
developmental processes” (Graham 1987: 84).
Aristotle’s atomic first system, Graham argues, consists of the texts collectively 
referred to as the Organon and also the Rhetoric, while the remaining physical-metaphysical 
treatises comprise the hylomorphic second system (ibid: 20). The ontology of the first 
system is laid out in the Categories, in which Aristotle begins by addressing the various 
meanings attributed to the idea of ‘being’. He provides a list of ten categories, hence the name 
of the treatise, that he argues can be used to classify the nature of ‘being’: substance, 
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, possession, action, and being acted upon 
(Aristotle 1984a: 1b25-2a4). As has already been intimated, the category of substance stands 
in a privileged position in relation to the other categories for Aristotle. Before putting forth 
the ten categories he introduces two divisions that form a fourfold schema of what there is: 
‘being said-of and being present-in’; ‘being said-of and not being present-in’; ‘not being said-
of and being present-in’; and ‘not being said-of and not being present-in’ (ibid: 1a20-1b9). 
Things that are ‘said-of’ can be correlated to universals, while things that are ‘not said-of’ to 
particulars. Thus universals are ‘said-of’ the particulars. 
Substance is held as the privileged category because all the other categories are 
‘present-in’ substance, while substance itself is that which is ‘not present-in’ anything. The 
other categories inhere in substance, while substance does not inhere in anything, and primary 
substance is that which cannot be ‘said-of’ a subject either. Therefore primary substance is 
the substantial particular. The things that are ‘said-of’ stand in a relation of increasing 
generalities of the particulars of the ‘not said-of’. These generalities are the species and 
genera, which are the secondary substances and are that which are also ‘not present-in’ the 
subject but which are said-of the subject (the primary substance).
The species, Aristotle states, “is more substance than the genus, since it is nearer to 
the primary substance” (ibid: 2b9-8). This is because, in the ‘said-of’ relation, when “one 
thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said 
of the subject also. For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; 
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so animal will be predicated of the individual man also—for the individual man is both a man 
and an animal” (ibid: 1b10-15). This chaining together of the ‘said-of’ relation is a transitive 
relationship. By asserting that the indivisible particular is the more substantial existent, and 
that the universal is what can be ‘said-of’ it as the subject, Aristotle refutes Plato’s privileging 
of the universal Types. Altogether, this is Aristotle’s ‘atomic substantialism’. The ontological 
perspective that this generated is the basis for forms of ascending taxonomic structures of 
‘being’, which move from indivisible particulars towards the more general categories of 
existence. However, while Aristotle’s atomic substantialism provides a systematic alternative 
to the Types, without being able to rely on the bifurcated reality aspect of Plato’s 
philosophy this incarnation of ‘substance ontology’ is unable to  account for change. As a 
consequence of this descriptive shortcoming Aristotle developed a hylomorphic 
understanding of ‘being’ as an alternative to his first philosophical system of atomic 
substantialism.
In the Physics Aristotle attempts to refute Parmenides’s Eleatic school that insisted 
that change was illusory. He summarises their position as: “they say that none of the things 
that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so 
either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible. For what is cannot 
come to be (because it is already), and from what is not nothing could have come to be 
(because something must be underlying)” (Aristotle 1984d: 191a27-31, emphasis as in 
original). Aristotle wanted to refute this because he believed that this attitude had become a 
hindrance to the development of the natural sciences (Lawson-Tancred 1995: 409). Towards 
this he distinguished two types of change: one where the attributes that inhere in a substance 
change, where something alters to become something else; and one where new substances are 
brought into existence, where something comes to be without qualification (Aristotle 1984d: 
190a31-190b10). Of the two, only the second type of change is a challenge for Aristotle’s 
existing atomic substantialism. To account for the generation of new substances he introduces 
the twin concepts of matter (hyle) and form (morphe). Substance, which in the Categories 
was fundamentally indivisible, in the Physics now becomes a composite of both matter and 
form. So, for example, a bronze statue is a composite of bronze as its matter and ‘statue 
shape’ as its form. 
In the Physics, however, Aristotle was ambivalent about whether matter or form was 
the primary concept. He states, on the one hand, that his definition of matter is “the primary 
substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the result, not 
accidentally” (ibid: 192a31-33), but then later that “form indeed is nature rather than the 
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matter; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when 
it exists potentially” (ibid: 193b7-8). In Book Theta of the Metaphysics, Aristotle again 
stresses that actuality is the higher concept over potentiality, as it is prior to both 
potentiality and to “every principle of change” (Aristotle 1984e: 1051a3). While any single 
instantiation of actuality is “later in generation” (ibid: 1051a32) to its potentiality, actuality 
in general must always precede in time potentiality. This is because there is always a “first 
mover” which “already exists actually” to instigate the production of the actual from the 
potential (ibid: 1049b24-29).
It is because of the difficulty that the Physics opened upon the concept of substance, 
which had seemed settled in the Categories, that Aristotle returned to clarifying it as the 
central task of the Metaphysics. As substance is what ‘being’ is, it is the first principle from 
which all other ontological questions can be understood. Aristotle became certain that 
formless matter could not be considered substance (ibid: 1029a12-29), and, while the 
particulars of his argument remain a matter of scholarly dispute, argues that form as species is 
the essence of substance. He states that only species, and not genus, has essence (ibid: 
1030a11-12), that essence is substance without matter (ibid: 1032b14-15), and that form “is 
the essence of each thing and its primary substance” (ibid: 1032b1-2). He also ties matter to 
potentiality and form to actuality: “matter exists in a potential state, just because it may 
attain to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form” (ibid: 1050a15-16, 
emphasis as in original). This hylomorphism depicts the form of a ‘being’ as its essence,  
realised in the movement from states of potentiality towards actualisation. 
As a structure, the ‘hylomorphic substance ontology’ succeeds in temporalising 
Aristotle’s account of ‘being’. However, it does this by introducing a teleological essentialism 
to the concept of ‘being’. As opposed to existing in states of unruly change, entities for 
Aristotle are moving to become their actual form and realise their essence-telos. This type of 
ontological essentialism is a central point of critique in existentialist, phenomenological, and 
hermeneutic philosophical discourses, which frequently argue that ‘being’ – and in particular 
‘human being’ – have no inherent essence. Nevertheless, the historical value of the ‘substance 
ontology’ of Aristotle cannot be understated. It provided a coherent structure for 
understanding existence and enabled the progress of scientific knowledge.
A primary concern for Aristotle in advancing his ‘substance ontology’ was to allow 
the development of the natural sciences. He emphasised substantial particulars related in 
terms of species and genus, with an account of actuality and potentiality to explain change. 
By providing this account of existence based on the particulars of the world in space and time 
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he developed the first principles and the intellectual structure through which multiple 
investigations into the world could be brought together as a unified body of knowledge. 
However, over time the advancement of scientific knowledge has moved the understanding of 
the natural world beyond Aristotle. Nonetheless, the legacy of Aristotle’s philosophy exists 
throughout the structure of our knowledge of the world. For example, the science of biology 
owes much of its progress to being able to divide the world into hierarchical taxonomies of 
discrete entities. This can be seen in the eighteenth century naturalist Carolus Linnaeus’s 
contribution to scientific theory, who developed the beginning of the modern system of 
classifying living organisms based on giving them a name with two parts – the binomial 
nomenclature of genus and species – derived from their structural similarities and differences. 
This has developed into the now familiar taxonomy of life10, of seven hierarchically layered 
groups that descend from the largest set towards the smallest set: kingdom, phylum, class, 
order, family, genus, and species.
We have been careful to outline how Aristotle’s ontology provided a basis for the 
scientific understanding of entities. This account should, however, be rebalanced in case the 
impression was mistakenly given that this was an entirely Aristotelian concern that did not 
feature in Plato’s own ontology. Plato, like Aristotle, insisted that the object of knowledge 
was to study that which ‘is’. To quote from the Republic: “Now, since the natural field of 
knowledge is reality – its function is to know reality as reality” (Plato 1993: 477b11-12). 
Consequently, while there are significant differences between Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
ontologies, they nevertheless share many similar features and objectives. Significantly, the 
underlying philosophical understanding of ‘being’ of their respective ontological structures is 
a metaphysical realism about existence.
To summarise the chronicle of ontology up to this point it can be said that, galvanised 
by the thoughts of the Pre-Socratics on the question of ‘being’, Plato and Aristotle together 
initiated the stance that is sometimes called metaphysical realism. This stance, and its 
approach to dealing with the entities in the world, is the basis for the standard understanding 
of ontology. While clearly differentiated, the two philosophers ideas on ‘being’ share many 
features. A credible interpretation of Aristotle’s ‘hylomorphic substance ontology’ is that it 
represents a compromise between his early emphasis on concrete particulars from the 
Categories with a partial reconciliation with Plato’s interest in Types. While their approach 
to the idea of universals are significantly different, they both incorporate it into their 
metaphysical realism. Furthermore, they both argue for the existence of reality independent of 
1 0 It is important to note that the details of this taxonomy are frequently debated with the sciences, motivated 
by the progress of scientific knowledge, such as genetics and the discovery of DNA.
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the perceiver. To quote Aristotle:
And, in general, if only the sensible exists, there would be nothing if animate 
things were not; for there would be no faculty of sense. The view that neither 
the objects of sensation nor the sensations would exist is doubtless true (for 
they are affections of the perceiver), but that the substrata which cause the 
sensation should not exist even apart from sensation is impossible. For 
sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond 
the sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that which moves is 
prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is 
no less the case. (Aristotle 1984e: 1010b30-1011a2)
Whether a Platonic concern with stepping away from the immediate experience of the sensible 
world in order to dialectically reason from high level abstract concepts down to lower level 
concepts to form a stratified taxonomy of reality, or an Aristotelian insistence on empirical 
investigation governed by basic categorial structures in order to individuate the entities 
existing in the experienced world, ‘classical’ ontology accepts that there is an independent 
structure of reality and that the entities within it, and the relationships between them, can be 
determined. The essence of an entity is what that entity ‘is’ (quiddity). However, within the 
ontological tradition of understanding ‘being’ as the ‘what’ of existence there is a prominent 
challenge to both the belief in universals and the belief that the ‘what-ness’ of entities exist as 
a structure that is external to human experience.
§1.3 – The history of ‘noetic’ ontology and the idealist concept of ‘being’
Within the ontological tradition the principle alternative to understanding ‘what-ness’ as the 
independent ‘being’ of entities is the ‘noetic’ understanding of existence. As with our 
depiction of ‘classical’ ontology, the idea of ‘noetic’ ontology does not represent a unified 
school of philosophy. Rather, it represents a group of loosely related arguments and views 
that share similar concerns about the understanding of ‘being’. ‘Noetic’ ontology is 
characterized by a discourse on the relationship between ‘being’ and the human mind. A 
history of this branch of the ontological tradition reveals the rise of ‘noetic’ ontology through 
the development of two challenges to the metaphysical realism of ‘classical’ ontology. The 
first is the denial of the existence of universals, the second is scepticism about the possibility 
of having a direct knowledge of existence. The philosophical debates within the ontological 
tradition of the ‘what-ness’ of existence can be called the ‘aporias’ of the tradition.
The word ‘aporia’ comes from the Greek for an impassible path. However, the 
modern usage of the term has divided in two: one philosophical, the other rhetorical. The 
philosophical usage of ‘aporia’ is to designate an irresolvable conflict of ideas. The rhetorical 
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usage of ‘aporia’ is as a description of the device of feigning doubt over an apparent impasse 
for dramatic effect. When we speak of the ‘aporia’ of ontology we refer to the insoluble 
puzzles that it developed. This embarrassment is what Immanuel Kant famously described in 
the Preface to the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason. He referred to how 
metaphysics11 was once regarded as “the Queen of all the sciences” but was now only scorned 
and forsaken for its failure to reach a satisfactory conclusion (Kant 2003: Aviii-Ax). The first 
aporia of traditional ontological discourse is whether existence can be understood in terms of 
particulars or in terms of universals. The denial of universal structures of existence is called 
nominalism. This aporia has its roots in the debate between Platonic and Aristotelian 
philosophy. While Aristotle is here interpreted as not being a nominalist, this is not a 
universal interpretation of his philosophical stance, and there are Aristotelian influenced 
philosophers who arrive at nominalistic conclusions. Furthermore, the nominalistic contention 
also lead many philosophers into the second major aporia of the ontological tradition, which 
is whether ‘being’ is a relational structure to the human mind.
It has been established that Plato and Aristotle, influenced by the Pre-Socratic interest 
in the question of ‘being’, developed ontological systems with a realist perspective. Their 
realism differs in that for Plato the Types are the truth of being, while for Aristotle, in his 
second system, being is hylomorphic substance. Over the course of philosophy the premises 
of this ontological realism were persistently challenged. The core challenge came from 
ontological idealism, which challenges the possibility of identifying a mind independent 
existence. Arguably the first Western philosopher to maintain a variant of this ‘noetic’ thesis 
was the Pre-Socratic Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras believed that ‘mind’ (nous) was the motive 
force that was responsible for the arrangement of everything that exists (Janaway 1995: 354-
355). The consequence of this view is that existence can not be understood independently of 
the ‘mind’, as the ‘mind’ “directs and is the cause of everything” (Plato 1997b: 97c). 
However, ‘noetic’ theses of this sort did not reach maturity until much later in the history of 
philosophy. Socrates in Plato’s Phaedo, for example, states he had initially hoped that 
Anaxagoras’ philosophy would explain the causal structure of existence. But Socrates is 
forced to critique Anaxagoras’ general philosophy for not being consistent with his specific 
proposition that ‘mind’ is at the heart of existence. “This wonderful hope was dashed as I 
went on reading and saw that the man [Anaxagoras] made no use of Mind, nor gave it any 
responsibility for the management of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water 
and many other strange things” (ibid: 98b-c). 
1 1 The distinction, such as it is, between ‘ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’ was only recent in Kant’s time. As such 
the terms were still used interchangeably.
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However, before the ‘noetic’ thesis reached maturity as an established challenge to 
realist ontology a different challenge arose. This challenge to traditional ontological realism is 
found in the nominalist assertion that universals do not exist. The nominalistic attitude stands 
as a modification of the realist ontological inquiry into the structure of existence, but it also 
represents a bridge into ‘noetic’ ontological theses such as idealism. While realism, in its 
various forms, asserts that a term such as ‘redness’ is a universal that is instantiated in any 
object that is red, such as a red book or red flower, a nominalistic reply would be that the 
universal ‘redness’ does not exist but, rather, that the book and the flower each have their 
own particular ‘redness’. Nominalism, as such, is a denial of general predicates. The existence 
of nominalistic attitudes was not unknown to the classical philosophers. In the Sophistical 
Refutations Aristotle, for example, reasserts principles from the Categories to argue that “one 
must not grant that what is a common predicate applying to a class universally is an 
individual, but must say that it signifies either a quality, or a relation, or a quantity, or 
something of that kind” (Aristotle 1984c: 179a7-10). While it is clear that Aristotle, unlike 
Plato, emphasised the importance of the particular over the universal, this emphasis does not 
equate to a rejection of the existence of universals. With the provenance of the great 
philosophers both endorsing a structural concept of the nature of reality, it might seem 
unusual that nominalism has gained the degree of prominence that it has in philosophy. 
However, it is not the weight of who argued a theory that is important, but the strength of the 
argument and the validity of its propositions that matter. Nominalism developed as a 
substantial proposition during the Middle Ages, and the basic tenets of the argument have not 
altered significantly since then. Therefore to get an understanding of nominalism, a topology 
of its features from this period is particularly useful.
Arguably, the greatest proponent of nominalism in the Middle Ages was the scholar 
William of Ockham. Ockham is most famous for the principle of ontological parsimony that 
bears his name. Ockham’s Razor, as it has come to be known, argues that “beings are not to 
be multiplied beyond necessity” (Spade 1999: 101). This expression is not a direct quotation 
of Ockham, rather it is a paraphrase of a variety of equivalent statements that he made, such 
as “plurality is not to be posited without necessity” and “what can happen through fewer 
[principles] happens in vain through more” (ibid: 101). The sentiments behind the Razor have 
been frequently expressed by nominalists12 over the course of history, such as W. V. Quine 
who viewed that an “overpopulated universe” to be “in many way unlovely”, offending “the 
1 2 It is worth noting that Quine took nominalism to refer to the rejection of the existence of abstract entities 
(Quine 1980: 15) and not universals. Consequently, referring to him as a nominalist is in keeping with our 
usage and not his.
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aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes” (Quine 1980: 4). 
However, Ockham’s nominalism is not directly based on the Razor. Rather than not 
positing a type of entity such as universals until there is a necessity to do so, he argued that 
the idea of universals is flawed in itself. In Ockham’s ontology seven of Aristotle’s ten 
categories are not needed, he only keeps substance, quality, and relation. Furthermore, the 
category of relation was kept only because of certain theological commitments (Spade 1999: 
104-105). His assertion for the reduced ontology is provided by arguing that what the other 
categories seemed to provide, can in fact be accomplished without them (ibid: 102-103). His 
rejection of universals followed a similar argument. He states: “No thing outside the soul is 
universal, either through itself or through anything real or rational added on, no matter how it 
is considered or understood” (Spade 1994: 204). The qualification ‘outside the soul’ is an 
important feature in Ockham’s ontology. In the first part of his Summa of Logic he divides 
language into three types: written, spoken, and mental. Written language is dependent on the 
spoken, which in turn is itself dependent on mental language. Mental language is therefore the 
most basic level of language (Spade 2008). While his nominalism took the form that he 
rejected that the same entity, such as redness for example, could be present in multiple and 
distinct particulars, he did however allow universals of a sort to be present in mental language 
– universal concepts.
Ockham held two different theories about the nature of the universal concepts. His 
early theory is referred to as fictum-theory, which treated universals as objects in the mind. 
This is how Ockham explained it:
The intellect, seeing some thing outside the soul, fashions a similar thing in the 
mind in such a way that, if it had a productive power as it has a fictive power, 
it would produce such a thing externally, numerically distinct from the former 
thing.... The fictum can be called a universal, because it is an exemplar and 
indifferently related to all external singulars. On account of this likeness in 
objective being, it is able to supposit for external things that have a similar 
being outside the intellect. In this way, the universal is not the result of 
generation but of abstraction—which is nothing but a kind of picturing. 
(Spade 1994: 218)
Ockham, however, was not content with this explanation of universals as mental objects. His 
intellectio-theory explains universal concepts not as objects in the mind but as an act of the 
mind thinking about multiple objects simultaneously (Spade 2008). To quote Ockham: “Now 
this theory can be held in various forms. In one form, this quality existing subjectively in the 
soul would be the very act of intellection” (Spade 1994: 230). 
Nevertheless, the general structure of Ockham’s nominalism does not alter with either 
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the fictum-theory or the intellectio-theory. He provides this summation of his overall stance 
on universals:
But I do hold this: No universal—unless perhaps it is a universal through 
voluntary institution—is anything existing in any way outside the soul. 
Rather everything that is a universal predicable from its nature of several is in 
the mind, either subjectively or objectively. No universal belongs to the 
essence or quiddity of any substance. (ibid: 230-231)
Universals have no real existence in the external world of substances. Rather they exist only 
as concepts in the mind, and in the forms of language that are developed from these mental 
entities. His qualification that universals potentially also exist as voluntary conventions 
foreshadows social constructivist variations of these principles. This proposition is 
consistent with his predication of spoken and written language on mental language. 
Furthermore, his approach to considering mental concepts strikingly mirrors Husserl’s later 
treatment of intentional objects and acts of consciousness (see section 3.5), a comparison that 
posits Ockham as a proto-phenomenologist. 
However, the weight of Ockham’s ontological thesis can be felt in particular when the 
later philosophical controversy considering ‘the veil of perception’ (a phrase coined by 
Jonathan Bennett in Locke, Berkeley, Hume, see Bennett 1971: 68-70) is brought to mind, and 
the related philosophical stance of idealism. While metaphysical realism takes the existence of 
a knowable external reality as certain, and nominalism challenges the existence of universals, 
relegating them if they exist in any sense to being in the mind, the ontology of idealism goes a 
step further and places all of existence into the mind. The consequence of this is a denial of 
the possibility of an accurate account of a mind-independent reality.
To understand the controversy over the phrase ‘the veil of perception’ and the idealist 
attack on realism, we can look at the ideas of the empiricist philosophers John Locke and 
George Berkeley. For Locke, in whose Essay Concerning Human Understanding a great 
variety of important ideas were raised, knowledge must conform to objects. This is because 
objects have certain qualities in them that produce in those that perceive them a certain kind 
of knowledge of them.
Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object of 
Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea; and the Power to 
produce any Idea in our mind, I call Quality of the Subject wherein that power 
to produce is. Thus a Snow-ball having the power to produce in us the Ideas 
of White, Cold, and Round, the Powers to produce those Ideas in us, as they 
are in the Snow-ball, I call Qualities; and as they are Sensations, or 
Perceptions, in our Understandings, I call them Ideas: which Ideas, if I speak 
of sometimes, as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean 
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those Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us. (Locke 1975: ii. viii. 
8, emphasis as in original)
Furthermore, Locke thought that qualities came in two types: primary and secondary. The 
five primary qualities are extension, shape, motion or rest, number, and solidity, and the five 
secondary qualities are colour, sound, taste, smell, and texture (Grayling 1995: 494). The 
primary qualities inhere in objects and are “utterly inseparable from the Body, in what estate 
soever it be”, while the secondary qualities are lesser as they do not inhere in objects but 
rather are “Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their primary qualities” (Locke 
1975: ii. viii. 9-10, emphasis as in original). 
Berkeley, however, thought that Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities was incoherent. He thought that the primary and secondary qualities were alike 
because they were both objects of perception, and such were both mind-dependent (Grayling 
1995: 497). According to Berkeley it is therefore impossible to go beyond ‘the veil of 
perception’, as objects are always mind dependent. In his Principles of Human Knowledge he 
argues to the contrary of Locke that:
That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, 
exist without the mind, is what every body will allow. And it seems no less 
evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however 
blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose) cannot 
exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge 
may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the 
term exist when applied to sensible things.... Their esse is percipi, nor is it 
possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things 
which perceive them. (Berkeley 1949: 42 [Principle 3], emphasis as in 
original)
For Berkeley the essence of a thing, its ‘being’, is its perception. It is because he held this 
view that Berkeley can be referred to as a dogmatic idealist. The Aristotelian realist stance, 
that exhorted that “sensation is surely not the sensation of itself” (Aristotle 1984e: 1010b30-
1011a2), is side stepped, how successfully is a matter that has rarely escaped debate. We 
could go further and say that the aporia of traditional ontology is formed by this irresolvable 
conflict of theories. Nevertheless, from this type of idealist perspective, ‘being’ is no longer 
to be regarded as substance, ‘to be’ is now ‘to be perceived’. The consequence of this is that 
the nature of the existence of the external world can only be met with doubt.
A slightly earlier philosopher than Locke (1632-1704) and Berkeley (1685-1753) 
made this form of doubt methodological. In his six Meditations on First Philosophy, René 
Descartes (1596-1650) proposed a process of methodological doubt that would seek to find 
necessarily true statements about reality that could then be used as foundational concepts for 
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understanding the world. Only with such a foundational, non-arbitrary, and undoubtedly 
certain starting point to build from could progress be made towards understanding the world. 
His doubt was methodological because it systematically considered every possible source for 
falsehood to enter his beliefs about the world, famously for example concluding that his 
senses are an unreliable source for knowledge because every experience in his life could be a 
dream (Descartes 1988: 77). His doubt goes even further than this, to the extent that he 
supposes not only that such innocent sources of falsehood are conceivable but also that he 
could be undergoing outright deception because it was possible that:
some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his 
energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, 
colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of 
dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself 
as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely 
believing that I have all these things. (ibid: 79)
He even considers the contents of his mind and memory as a possible source of deception 
(ibid: 80). Ultimately he determines that if there is an ‘I’ thinking, even if those thoughts are 
spurious, then this ‘I’ must certainly exist to think. This is the argument of his second 
meditation.
But I have convinced myself [through methodological doubt] that there is 
absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does 
it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something 
then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning 
who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too 
undoubtedly constantly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as 
much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I 
think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I 
must conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever 
it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (ibid: 80, emphasis as in 
original)
Regardless of the true nature of all other aspects of reality, the process of methodological 
doubt concludes that the statement ‘I think therefore I am’ – cogito ergo sum – is 
undoubtedly true. However, as Descartes quickly qualifies, “a sufficient understanding of 
what this ‘I’ is”, the ‘I’ that necessarily exists, is required in order to utilise this reflection 
(ibid: 81).
Having established that the ‘I’ necessarily exists, Descartes continues in his 
Meditations to the argument that the ‘I’ is a thing that thinks, sum res cogitans. He elaborates 
that a thinking thing is a “thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is 
unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions” (ibid: 83). All these activities are 
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acts of thinking, and consequently they are all aspects of the ‘I’, the res cogitans (ibid: 83). 
By developing the concept of ‘thought’ to cover all these criteria, as the philosopher Richard 
Rorty argues in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Descartes established the outlook that 
later enabled Locke to develop a new meaning for ‘idea’:
meaning “whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks” 
or “every immediate object of the mind in thinking.” (Rorty 2009: 48)
The ‘I’ for Descartes became the thinking ‘being’, and consequently all acts of the ‘self-being’ 
were necessarily mental. However, he did not regard the thinking thing as the only type of 
substance. Rather, the res cogitans was regarded as one of two fundamental substances. The 
other substance is the res extensa. As he describes it in his sixth meditation from Meditations 
on First Philosophy:
[On] the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am 
simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct 
idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And 
accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist 
without it. (Descartes 1988: 114-115)
Res cogitans is the thinking, non-extended substance and res extensa is the extended, non-
thinking substance. Furthermore, res cogitans is the internal ‘I’ of the self while res extensa 
remains as the external world, including the agent’s body. Mental substance is explicitly an 
entirely different kind of entity from physical substance, directly breaking from Aristotle’s 
view of substance as the unique substratum of existence. As he states, in Objections and 
Replies, substance is that which “can exist by itself, that is without the aid of any other 
substance”, and “the mind can be understood as a subsisting thing despite the fact that 
nothing belonging to the body is attributed to it, and that, conversely, the body can be 
understood as a subsisting thing despite the fact that nothing belonging to the mind is 
attributed to it” (ibid: 146). It should be noted that Descartes does not eliminate physical 
substance as an object of contemplation, rather he relegated it in terms of ontological  priority. 
This relegation has been argued to have established the ‘modern’ epistemological concern 
about mental representations of external existents, with whether we can “know that anything 
which is mental represents anything which is not mental” (Rorty 2009: 45-46). Nevertheless, 
while Descartes was sceptical about the actuality of external existence, it retained the attribute 
of potentiality in his ontological framework. In this regard he was not as staunch an idealist 
as, for example, Berkeley for who only perceived ‘being’ existed. This aside, by regarding the 
mind as a unique substance, sui generis, Descartes constructed the modern understanding of 
‘being’ in terms of a thinking self apprehending the external world. This mental understanding 
and prioritisation  of ‘being’ is what we have termed ‘noetic’ ontology.
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As we have been arguing, the development of ‘noetic’ ontology rests not only in 
privileging the mind as having a unique type of ‘being’, but also in the formalisation of the 
subject-object divide13. This ontological orientation for the understanding of ‘being’, was the 
genesis of the ‘modern’ concern with epistemology. This is Rorty’s ‘Glassy Essence’ 
argument:
In Descartes’s conception—the one which became the basis for “modern” 
epistemology—it is representations which are in the “mind”. The Inner Eye 
surveys these representations hoping to find some mark which will testify to 
their fidelity. (Rorty 2009: 45, emphasis as in original)
The Cartesian dualism between mind-subject and world-object enables the sceptical question 
of whether the mirror-like representations of world-objects in the mind are true to the reality 
of those objects. It is this question that leads to the sentiments of various ‘veil of perception’ 
theses, but whose heritage can be traced back to Descartes’ profession that it is “certain that I 
can have no knowledge of what is outside me except by means of the ideas I have within me” 
(Taylor 1992: 144). 
For Descartes we are a thinking thing, res cogitans, a conscious subject that is capable 
of considering the existence of material things, res extensa, or objects by the faculties the mind 
has available to it. The subject – the experiencing agent – has to make a cognitive leap in order 
to grasp the existence of other things. The Cartesian ontology makes the experience of 
reflecting on an ‘external’ existent a “professional philosophical question” (Rorty 2009: 46). 
Here is an example of how Descartes describes this cognitive engagement with a particular 
object:
Indeed, I think I have often discovered a great disparity <between an object 
and its idea> in many cases. For example, there are two different ideas of the 
sun which I find within me. One of them, which is acquired as it were from 
the senses and which is a prime example of an idea which I reckon to come 
from an external source, makes the sun appear very small. The other idea is 
based on astronomical reasoning, that is, it is derived from certain notions 
which are innate in me (or else it is constructed by me in some other way), 
and this idea shows the sun to be several times larger than the earth. 
Obviously both these ideas cannot resemble the sun which exists outside me; 
and reason persuades me that the idea which seems to have emanated most 
directly from the sun itself has in fact no resemblance to it at all. (Descartes 
1988: 90)
The subject in this example approaches the sun as an object in order to address what it is, and 
1 3 However, this is only a formalisation. As we will continue to argue in next section (1.4), the subject-object 
model of understanding was established in traditional Greek philosophy. This establishment occurred through 
the shift from a Homeric understanding of acting in the world to a the new Platonic model of a knowing subject 
and known world. This shift, it will be shown, was predicated by the Greek movement from an oral culture to a 
literate culture.
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determines its scientific and mathematical reality and dismisses perceptual illusions14. 
Generally speaking, this reflective being has a variety of faculties at their disposal for these 
operations: the senses, memory, reason, imagination, and so forth. The idea of this Cartesian 
subject and the way in which it relates to objects, the relation between knower and known, 
has been very successfully integrated into the fabric of the modern engagement with the 
world, to the extent that some philosophers admit, sometimes reluctantly, that we are all 
Cartesians at heart (for an example of such a sentiment see Polt 1999: 60). Even if this point 
were to be disputed, it would be hard to also dispute the prevalence of the subject and object 
distinction and its Cartesian heritage. In ontological terms what has occurred is not only the 
affirmation of the existence of mental entities and the attestation of these entities as basic 
constituents of reality, more than this these mental entities have been given a structurally 
privileged position as the primary lens for understanding ‘being’ up to and including theses, 
such as Berkeley's, that the ‘being’ of the things of the world is the minds perception of them. 
And Descartes, who is often cited as the starting point for modern thought, formalised this 
noetic approach of understanding ‘being’.
Though Descartes may have laid out the framework for a ‘noetic’ ontology, its 
development to maturity can be placed at the feet of future thinkers. The transcendental 
philosophy of Kant is, as was earlier stated, one of the most significant of these later 
developments. Transcendental philosophy is the attempt to establish the necessary 
conditions that make experiencing the world possible, attempting to avoid the traditional 
polemic between empirical deduction and sceptical epistemology. The transcendental 
philosophical approach does not attempt to determine the ‘being’ of a thing in the world, but 
rather attempts to determine what necessary structures must exist for that thing to be 
experienced. The sophistication of Kant’s philosophy makes labelling him either a realist or 
an idealist difficult without significant qualification and argument. However, he does provide 
this refutation of non-transcendental idealism in the Critique of Pure Reason: “The mere, but 
empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in 
space outside me” (Kant 2003: B275, emphasis as in original). This closely mirrors 
Aristotle’s argument that sensations are not the sensations of themselves but of the things 
that have been sensed. Consequently, it can be stated that for Kant, unlike Berkeley, entities 
have a ‘being’ beyond how they are perceived.
Despite this interest in entities, it is important to note that Kant did not consider his 
philosophy an activity in the emerging discipline of ‘ontology’. By Kant’s time this 
1 4 Though he only engages with the how the sun is visually encountered by the subject in this instance, and not 
with wider sensory illustrations such as feeling the warmth of the sun.
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nomenclature had been established, after its introduction by Lorhard and popularisation by 
others such as Christian Wolff. Wolff, for example, saw it as the deductive method to 
“investigate the most general predicates of all entes [entities]” (Mora 1963: 36, emphasis as in 
original). José Ferrater Mora suggests that the “whole Critique of Pure Reason is, in a way, 
the work of a man who was obsessed, and deeply distressed, by ontology” (ibid: 36, 
emphasis as in original). As Kant himself states when describing his own project: ‘the proud 
name of an Ontology that presumptuously claims to supply, in systematic doctrinal form, 
synthetic a priori knowledge of things in general (for instance, the principle of causality) 
must, therefore, give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of pure understanding’ 
(Kant 2003: A247/B303). 
If the description of ontology is the attempt to establish principles, concepts and 
categories that conform to the world of entities, then Kant’s transcendental analytic of pure 
understanding turns ontology upside down. This is Kant’s Copernican revolution.
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. 
But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something 
in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, 
ended in failure. ... If intuition [sensory experience] must conform to the 
constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the 
latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the 
constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such 
a possibility. Since I cannot rest in these intuitions if they are to become 
known, but must relate them as representations to something as their object, 
and determine this latter through them, either I must assume the concepts, by 
means of which I obtain this determination, conform to the object, or else I 
assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, that the experience in 
which alone, as given objects, they can be known conform to the concepts. 
(ibid: Bxvi-Bxvii, emphasis as in original)
Succinctly put, rather than have concepts conform to entities15, entities must conform to 
concepts. The a priori concepts that entities conform to, in particular, are a group of twelve16  
that Kant termed “the categories”, citing Aristotle as the source for his terminology (ibid: 
A80)17. These make up part of the structure of the human mind and are synthesised with 
what is experienced in order to make entities intelligible. Therefore the experience of entities 
conforms to the categories. In more general terms this is the argument that the experience of 
external entities is predicated upon the structure of the mind, and that consequently the 
1 5 As we have seen that they did for Locke.
1 6 Slightly more than Aristotle’s ten.
1 7 His categories fall into four groups: of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality. The categories of 
quantity are unity, plurality, and totality; those of quality are reality, negation; and limitation; those of relation 
are of inherence and subsistence, of causality and dependence, and of community; finally those of modality are 
possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, and necessity and contingency (Kant 2003: B106).
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understanding of external entities is predicated on the understanding of the mind. This 
statement can be correlated to an argument that general ontology is predicated on an ontology 
of the mind, that the structures of ‘classical ontology’ must conform to the new study of 
‘noetic ontology’.
Given that Kant was critical of the emergent discipline of ontology, it is arguable that 
his philosophical system should not be regarded as itself being an ontological exercise. This 
argument is undeniable in terms of the established nomenclature of ontology in Kant’s time. 
Nevertheless, there is an inherent ontological concern in his philosophy. In the Kantian 
model, entities in and of themselves are not shaped and structured by the categories. Entities 
in and of themselves cannot be known, as all knowing is structured by the system of the 
categories that makes them intelligible. In his terminology, entities in and of themselves are 
noumena, and entities as they are experienced are phenomena (ibid: B295-B315, A236- 
A260). Noumenal ‘being’ is beyond understanding, but phenomenal ‘being’ can be studied 
and understood.  Consequently, while Kant criticised ontology, it is argued that his analytic 
of understanding is a different form of ontology from what he was dismissing. It is a form of, 
and development of, ‘noetic ontology’ as opposed to its traditional variant, the ‘classical 
ontology’ that sought to describe the world of things in and of themselves. While that sought 
to determine a structure for understanding entities as they are in the world, ‘noetic’ ontology 
seeks to transcendentally determine how the framework of the mind structures the experience 
of phenomenal entities.
After Kant there is another development in philosophy that is significant in the 
history of ‘noetic’ ontology. We are referring to the work of Husserl and his introduction of 
phenomenology as methodological tool for studying ‘being’. However, a preliminary note of 
caution is required. This is because, much like Kant, Husserl was also wary of the concept of 
ontology. To be more specific, he was wary of the name ontology, as opposed to what that 
name might represent. The following quotation, found in a footnote from the first book of his 
Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, explains his 
early unease.
On the division of logical categories into signification-categories and formal-
ontological categories, cf. Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I, §67 [Logical 
Investigations, pp. 263f.] The entire “Third Investigation” specifically 
concerns the categories of whole and part. At the time I did not venture to 
take over the expression “ontology” which was objectionable on historical 
grounds; rather I designated this investigation (p. 222 of the first edition) as 
part of an “apriorische Theorie der Gegenstände als solcher” [“apriori theory 
of objects as objects”], a phrase contracted by Alexius von Meinong to make 
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the word “Gegenstandstheorie” [“object-theory”]. Now that times have 
changed, however, I consider it more correct to rehabilitate the old expression, 
“ontology”. (Husserl 1983: 22, emphasis as in original)
Husserl’s switch between his early use of ‘object-theory’ to ‘ontology’ was not a switch of 
subject matter. His use of ‘object’ was for many concepts, which he argued belonged together 
under the name ‘object’ and included: ‘physical thing’, ‘property’, ‘relationship’, ‘predicate 
formed affair complex’, ‘aggregate’, and ‘ordered set’ (ibid: 20). His early two volume text, 
the Logical Investigations, can thus be read as a sustained account of ontology.
Husserl’s ontological interest was to complete the scientific understanding of the 
world. In the German edition the first volume of the Logical Investigations Husserl provides a 
description of ‘psychologism’, a view that held that the human psyche determines the 
principles of logic, and then critiques it as a descent into ‘relativism’ that prevents a scientific 
and objective knowledge of the world (Husserl 2001). Psychologism was effectively18 a 
nineteenth century scepticism about epistemology derived from the consequences of 
metaphysical idealism. Following this critique the second volume, in the German edition, 
launches a series of six investigations with the intention to give ‘clarity to notions and laws on 
which the objective meaning and theoretical unity of knowledge is dependent’ (ibid: 166). 
Essentially the task of the six investigations is to establish an ontological framework upon 
which a non-relativistic epistemology could then be based.
The structure of Husserl’s ontological framework distinguishes between ‘formal 
ontology’ and ‘material ontology’. ‘Formal’, however, was not used in the conventional 
sense. Rather, in Husserl’s usage it was equivalent to ‘categorial’ (Albertazzi 1996: 199), in 
the sense of the general or universal ‘categories’ of existence. However, as his ‘material 
ontology’ also has a categorial structure the term ‘categorial ontology’ will not be employed. 
‘Material’ can also be misleading in a manner similar to how Husserl’s use of ‘object’ was not 
solely as a referent to physical things. ‘Material ontology’, in this context, refers to the 
structure of particular types of things. It is consequently easier to understand Husserl’s 
schema as a distinction between ‘formal ontology’ and ‘regional ontologies’. The following 
paragraph is how Husserl explains the ambiguity.
Let us begin with a not unimportant remark. At first formal ontology seems 
to be coordinate with material ontologies provided that the formal essence of 
any object whatever and the regional essences seem to play like roles <in 
formal ontology and in the regional ontologies respectively>. One is therefore 
inclined to speak not simply of regions, as we have up to now, but instead of 
material regions and now, in addition, of the “formal region.” If we accept 
1 8 The qualification ‘effectively’ is necessary because the tenets of psychologism varied through many 
modifications, and consequently a degree of generalisation is being employed.
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this manner of speaking, we must be rather cautious. On the one side stand 
material essences; and in a certain sense they are the “essences proper.” But 
on the other side there stands something that is indeed eidetic but which, 
nevertheless, differs in its fundamental essence: a mere essence-form, which is 
indeed an essence but completely “empty”, an essence that, in the manner 
pertaining to an empty form, fits all possible essences; it is an essence which, 
with its formal universality, has all material  universalities, even the highest of 
them, under it and prescribes laws for them by virtue of the formal truths 
pertaining to its formal universality. Therefore the so called “formal region” 
is, after all, not something  co-ordinate with the material regions (the regions 
simpliciter); properly it is not a region but the empty form of any region 
whatever; all the regions, with all their materially filled eidetic 
particularizations stand, not alongside it, but under it — though only 
formally. This subordination of the material to the formal is shown by the 
circumstance that formal ontology contains the forms of all ontologies (scl. all 
ontologies “proper,” all “material” ontologies) and prescribes for material 
ontologies a formal structure common to them all... (Husserl 1983: 20-21, 
emphasis as in original)
This text shows how Husserl redeveloped the idea of ontology. The Aristotelian hylomorphic 
heritage is still apparent in his use of ‘formal’ and ‘material’ as terms, and in emphasis on 
finding the ‘essence’ of things. However, his use of ‘material’ in particular differs 
considerably from Aristotelian ‘matter’ (hyle). Following in the tradition of Descartes, the 
mind is understood as a ‘material’ in the same way as physical objects, or any other type of 
‘object’. Each of these ‘material’, or ‘regional’, ontologies are understood to have a shared 
structure, such as a differentiation of higher order genera to lower order particulars, and this 
structure is understood as the categories or forms of ‘formal ontology’. Husserl’s ontology 
does not only represent a highly developed variation of the ‘noetic’ tradition, it also 
represents a culmination of that tradition up to the point when it became challenged by the 
third major sense of ontology. This sense of ontology was given its first mature exposition by 
Husserl’s pupil, Martin Heidegger. 
§1.4 – The history of subject and object ontology and the development of technology19 
However, before Heidegger’s ontology of ‘how-ness’ is analysed as an alternative to the 
traditional ontological understanding of ‘being’ as the ‘what-ness’ of an entity, the categorial 
indefiniteness of the ‘classical’ realist and ‘noetic’ idealist distinction must be addressed. 
Underneath its explicit ‘classical’ realist ontological statements it can be argued that an 
underlying ‘noetic’ idealist understanding of ‘being’ has been inherent in the Western 
1 9 An abridged version of this section appears in the author’s paper (Re)Conceptualising mnemonic technology 
in light of hermeneutic ontology (Girdwood 2009).
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philosophical tradition since the time of the Homeric works. This post-Homeric 
understanding of existence is a phenomenon that occurred through the conceptual separation 
of the knower from the known. This is the argument that the classicist Eric Havelock 
developed in his history of the Greek mind, the Preface to Plato. 
At some time towards the end of the fifth century before Christ, it became 
possible for a few Greeks to talk about their ‘souls’ as though they had selves 
or personalities which were autonomous and not fragments of the atmosphere 
nor of a cosmic life force, but what we might call entities or real substances...
Scholarship has tended to connect this discovery with the life and teachings of 
Socrates and to identify it with a radical change which he introduced into the 
meaning of the Greek word psyche. In brief, instead of signifying a man’s 
ghost or wraith, or a man’s breath or life blood, a thing devoid of sense and 
sense consciousness, it came to mean ‘the ghost that thinks’, that is capable 
both of moral decision and of scientific cognition, and is the seat of moral 
responsibility, something infinitely precious, an essence unique in the whole 
realm of nature. (Havelock 1963: 197, emphasis as in original)
Havelock continues to argue that the development of a concept of an inner self was not 
Socrates’ responsibility alone, citing for example the role of Heraclitus in this process (ibid: 
198),  and also that the development was not just tied to the meaning of the word ‘psyche’. 
As he further documents, the “Greek pronouns, both personal and reflexive, also began to 
find themselves in new syntactical contexts, used for example as objects of verbs of cognition, 
or placed in antithesis to the ‘body’ or ‘corpse’ in which the ‘ego’ was thought of residing” 
(ibid: 198). As we also earlier documented, the Pre-Socratic Anaxagoras developed a concept 
of the ‘mind’ (nous) as central for the understanding of existence.
Part of Havelock’s agenda in the Preface to Plato is to explain why Plato was 
antagonistic to poetry. His thesis is that the oral Homeric tradition of poetry was a cultural 
repertoire that perpetuated the earlier non-reflexive state of mind, or in the Heideggerian 
terminology which we will later adopt in sections 2.3 and 2.4, that it socialised people to a 
different understanding of their ‘being-in-the-world’, to a different understanding of their 
‘existentiality’. According to Havelock, Plato had to attack this tradition in order to advance 
his new reflexive understanding of human existence which had two main postulates: “that of 
the personality which thinks and knows, and that of a body of knowledge which is thought 
about and known” (ibid: 201). Plato’s philosophy, when its structure is appreciated in terms 
of a separation between the knower and the known, significantly predated what we called the 
Cartesian subject-object divide. Consequently, Rorty’s ‘Glassy Essence’ thesis that the 
subject-object model of understanding began with Descartes is not accepted. Furthermore, 
Havelock’s thesis, which disputes the Cartesian origin of the subject-object model of 
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understanding, is predicated on explaining the emergence of the Platonic frame of mind 
(subject understanding object) in terms of the development of the classical Greek 
informational technological architecture. Consequently, the development and the refinement 
of the subject-object model of understanding can be shown to be co-emergent with the 
development of new information technologies20, beginning with Greece’s transition from an 
oral culture to a literate culture. The beginning of this historical analysis of the co-
development of subject-object ontology with information technology is in keeping with a 
famous remark that the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead made in his text Process and 
Reality on the constitution of the Western philosophical tradition. “The safest general 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of 
footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have 
doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through 
them” (Whitehead 1978: 39). The origin of the subject-object ontology, and its relationship 
with information technology, can be found in the texts of Plato.
It was in the Phaedrus that Plato presented the case, through an engaging narrative of 
a fictionalised Socrates talking with his friend, that the knowledge of writing altered the 
capacity for recollection, that in fact learning the art of writing actually diminished the 
learners memory. His case for this is offered by recounting a parable – likely a pedagogic 
creation of Plato’s (see translators’ note on page 551 in: Plato 1997e) – in which the ancient 
Egyptian god Theuth has just invented writing and is demonstrating its usefulness to the king 
of the gods Thamus, who would praise and criticise Theuth’s inventions as appropriate. To 
quote:
The story goes that Thamus said much to Theuth, both for and against each 
art, which it would take too long to repeat. But when they came to writing, 
Theuth said: “O King, here is something that, once learned, will make the 
Egyptians wiser and will improve their memory; I have discovered a potion 
for memory and for wisdom.” Thamus, however, replied: “O most expert 
Theuth, one man can give birth to the elements of an art, but only another can 
judge how they can benefit or harm those who will use them. And now, since 
you are the father of writing, your affection for it has made you describe its 
effects as the opposite of what they really are. In fact, it will introduce 
forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using 
their memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is external 
and depends on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember 
2 0 It will be shown in section 3.5 how in the unified constitution of human existentiality as ‘being-in-the-
world’, it is necessitated that both the human’s world discloses how technology is ‘understood’, and that 
technology discloses how these worlds are ‘understood’. The human ‘being’, it will be shown, is its 
disclosedness, and worlds and technology are both constituted in the unified structure of the referential totality 
of disclosedness.
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from the inside, completely on their own. You have not discovered a potion 
for remembering, but for reminding; you provide your students with the 
appearance of wisdom, not with its reality. Your invention will enable them 
to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that 
they have come to know much while for the most part they will know 
nothing. And they will be difficult to get along with, since they will merely 
appear to be wise instead of really being so.” (Plato 1997e: 274e-275b)
There is a wealth of concepts, of general ideas, in this short parable, however our enquiry can 
only consider a few. Essentially the argument is first put forward that writing is a wonderful 
new technique, or technology, which supplements and enhances one’s memory and in so 
doing brings understanding. This view is then countered by the argument that this is in fact 
the opposite of what this new technology risks to the facility of memory. Rather than 
enhancing the user’s memory, a trust in writing reduces the individual’s reliance on their skill 
for remembering from the inside – a skill which requires practice to be kept honed. Writing 
requires a reliance on the signs of others, sharply drawing the distinction between the 
subject’s internal mental world and the external objects that it encounters. The parable thus 
ends with the warning that whilst this new technology will indeed allow its students increased 
access to information from the external world, from across different times and different 
places, the knowledge developed from this information will be a phantom as it will not be 
properly understood. It is transparently odd that what appears as Plato’s polemic against 
placing a trust in writing in order to learn and remember, where memory and truth are 
inseparably linked, is being communicated to us by the very medium of text, and it is this 
ambiguity that fuelled Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of the Phaedrus in his extensive 
essay Plato’s Pharmacy. He begins first by pointing out how for centuries Platonic 
scholarship of the Phaedrus has dismissed it as a poor dialogue, either the creation of a Plato 
who was either too young or too old, and all because it critiques writing (Derrida 1981: 72). 
Whatever else can be learned from studying the Phaedrus, it is evident from its historical 
context and Plato’s thoughts that it was written during a liminal phase in the adoption of 
writing and literacy. Plato was anxiously writing about writing in the time period that was 
only beginning to widely adopt this new technology for the inscription and dissemination of 
information.
Havelock studied this transition in ancient Greece from a predominantly oral culture 
to a predominantly literate culture from the end of the Greek Dark Age, through the Archaic 
period and into the Classical period and advanced the thesis that the changes in language and 
learning predicated upon this transition changed not just the culture but how thought itself 
was conducted and with that a change in self-understanding. Continuing a quotation from 
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Preface to Plato that was introduced earlier, Havelock makes the following argument:
The Greek pronouns, both personal and reflexive, also began to find 
themselves in new syntactical contexts, used for example as objects of verbs 
of cognition, or placed in antithesis to the ‘body’ or ‘corpse’ in which the 
‘ego’ was thought of as residing. We confront here a change in the Greek 
language and in the syntax of linguistic usage and in the overtones of certain 
key words which is part of a larger intellectual revolution, which affected the 
whole range of the Greek cultural experience... [a] crisis in Greek culture 
which saw the replacement of an orally memorised tradition by a quite 
different system of instruction and education, and which therefore saw the 
Homeric state of mind give way to the Platonic. (Havelock 1963: 198)
Havelock argued that this shift from a Homeric state of mind to a Platonic state of mind 
occurred because of the change effected by how information was stored. As he put in the 
Foreword to the text: all ‘human civilisations rely on a sort of cultural “book”, that is, on the 
capacity to put information in storage in order to reuse it. Before Homer’s day, the Greek 
cultural “book” had been stored in the oral memory... Between Homer and Plato, the method 
of storage began to alter, as the information became alphabetised, and correspondingly the eye 
supplanted the ear as the chief organ employed for this purpose’ (ibid: v). While Havelock’s 
thesis is not uncontested, it certainly is compelling and if nothing else provides a highly 
valuable window into understanding the inherent ambivalence contained within the Phaedrus. 
Through this window it can be discerned how Plato’s archetypically liminal point of cultural 
transition, from having been taught by the oral Socrates to now himself using the technology 
of literacy, would have affected his understanding of how the world could be known.
Since Plato and the adoption of literacy as an information technology of inscription 
and dissemination the development of print technology has occurred. This has further 
increased the dissemination of knowledge and ideas to individuals through increased access to 
recorded information. Some commentators have argued that with the development of the 
digital technology of computing, and in particular the information networks it enables in the 
form of the Internet, a similar shift in the dissemination of information is occurring. For 
example, Walter Ong wrote in Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word about the 
social-historical development of orality, literacy, print, and the ‘secondary orality’ of 
electronic culture, contrasting these technological forms of communication as significant stages 
in cultural development. Ong argues that the “electronic transformation of verbal expression 
has both deepened the commitment of the word to space initiated by writing and intensified 
by print and has brought consciousness to a new age of secondary orality” (Ong 2002: 133). 
This “secondary orality”, Ong argues, is “essentially a more deliberate and self-conscious 
orality, based permanently on the use of writing and print, which are essential for the 
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manufacture and operation of the equipment and for its use as well” (ibid: 134). However, 
rather than change the base ontological frame of a knowing subject and known world, self-
thing and world-thing, these further technological developments have rather served to 
reinforce this cognitive model of understanding by further distancing the distinction between a 
knower and a body of knowledge.
The philosopher of computer-mediated communication Charles Ess draws attention to 
two competing models that can arise in this kind of philosophy of technology. First there is 
‘technological instrumentalism’, a view that characterises all technologies as morally neutral 
and which do not “embed or foster any given set of ethical or cultural values” (Ess 2002: 
232). In this viewpoint it is only the end to which a technology is used towards, whether 
positive or negative, which is of concern. In opposition to this belief there lies ‘technological 
determinism’, in which the cultural values and opinions of a society are formed and reinforced 
by their technologies, a conviction underlying the optimistic belief that computer-mediated 
communication will foster “preferences for free speech and individualism”, even democracy, 
through such mediums as the Internet (ibid: 233). In his paper Cultures in Collision: 
Philosophical lessons from computer-mediated communication, Ess disputes both models by 
analysing ‘documented encounters between Western CMC [computer-mediated 
communication] technologies and diverse cultural groups’ (ibid: 233). In one example Ess 
discusses how Japanese engineers redesigned a Western computer supported collaborative 
work system to increase the level of visual information transmitted in the system in order to 
make the system more comfortable to use in their particular cultural context and its 
communicative practices. Ess concludes from this encounter, and from others, that computer-
mediated communication technologies “both embed specific cultural values and 
communicative preferences (contra technological instrumentalism), and (contra technological 
determinism) that these technologies do not simply reshape their users to conform with those 
embedded values and preferences” (ibid: 234, emphasis as in original). This perspective is 
termed as ‘soft determinism’, where the stress is shifted from cause and effect to influence 
and affect.
In keeping with this soft determinism, it could be argued that with the development of 
each of these technologies of recording and communication – orality, literacy, print, and the 
digital or ‘secondary orality’ – the development of a strong internal memory as a cognitive 
tool becomes less necessary as access to external memory becomes increasingly available. 
This argument would be in keeping with Plato’s observations on writing from the Phaedrus, 
simply expanding it to encompass the more recent technologies. As a brief excursus it should 
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be pointed out now that it is not being suggested that these technologies are the only methods 
of communicating information, techniques as various as architecture through to dance all do so 
if the recipient possesses the necessary ‘symbolic literacy’ to translate them. The focus on 
these technologies stems from a combination of the social-historical significance given to them 
because of their linguistic application. Nevertheless, the expansion of the substrates for high 
content external memory has inevitably resulted in the need to question how we understand 
the informational landscape. However, determining whether this expansion is in the same 
league as Havelock’s shift from a Homeric to a Platonic ontological landscape is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
One example of conceptual shifting coinciding with technological change lies in how 
the concept of the archive can be understood. Derrida precociously observed in Archive 
Fever: A Freudian Impression that nothing “is less reliable, nothing... less clear today than 
the word ‘archive’” (Derrida 1998: 90). The reason that Derrida develops for this lies in what 
he termed the “unlimited upheaval under way in archival technology” (ibid: 18), stating that 
all communicative technological changes “can only consist in a transformation of the 
techniques of archivization, of printing, of inscription, of reproduction, of formalization, of 
ciphering, and of translating marks” (ibid: 15). The acute consequences of this shifting 
technological structure of the archive is that it is this which “determines the structure of the 
archivable content even in its very coming into existence and in its relationship to the future” 
(ibid: 17, emphasis in original), in short it determines what can be articulated. From this 
perspective it is not surprising to find that Foucault, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
makes a similar statement when describing the archive as “the general system of the formation 
and transformation of statements” (Foucault 2002b: 146). The emphasis in Derrida’s 
description, however, brings to attention, whether we talk in terms of Foucault’s archive or 
Havelock’s cultural book, that such underlying structures are inseparably linked to their 
technologies of inscription, storage, and communication.
Nevertheless, the Platonic parable would, on face value, indicate that the technological 
structure of these external supplements to knowledge do not enhance what is truly known to 
the individual but rather the opposite. This demonstrates the existence of the subject and 
object ontology that began with the Homeric shift to the Platonic model of a knowing self and 
known world. The thinking since Plato, in the European or Western humanistic tradition, has 
customary focused on the delineation between the internal self and the external body, the 
external objects, and the external world. The origins of this ontological distinction coincide 
with Havelock’s thesis that the transition from a predominantly oral culture to a 
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predominantly literate one predicated a self reflexive awareness due to the shift in linguistic 
syntax. It is this self reflexive awareness of the mind that has continued throughout the 
history of the Western philosophical tradition. Augustine, for example, wrote in book ten of 
his Confessions that ‘the mind is one thing and the body another’ (Augustine 1955: 213). 
This book was a meditation on the nature of memory, where he describes it as a spacious 
storehouse (ibid: 208) of the mind, where among his various musings on the subject he 
indicates to us how we have come to possess and understand the word ‘cogito’ and its 
cognates. 
This is where we get the word cogitate [cogitare]. For cogo [collect] and 
cogito [to go on collecting] have the same relation to each other as ago [do] 
and agito [do frequently], and facio [make] and factito [make frequently]. But 
the mind has properly laid claim to this word so that not everything that is 
gathered together anywhere, but only what is collected and gathered together 
in the mind, is properly said to be “cogitated.” (ibid: 212, emphasis in the 
original.)
Where as Plato had described the faculty of memory in the Theaetetus, another of his 
dialogues, as being like a slab of wax in the mind or soul that received impressions and which 
retained its memories as long as those impressions remained secured in the wax (Plato 1997f: 
191c-d), Augustine presents it dynamically as being like the mind’s storehouse where its 
contents are collected, gathered and ordered – in short cogitated. The point, however, is not 
that the ontological divide of the internal subject and external object is simply continued, but 
that the divide is expanded so that the internal structure of organising and preserving thoughts 
is expressed in terms of the latest techniques and technologies of organising and preserving 
information externally. 
Another example of this tendency can be found in the work of Sigmund Freud who, in 
his short essay Note on the ‘Magic Notepad’, marked out that while the devices used to 
reinforce our sensory functions operate via similar procedures as the sensory organs they 
mimicked the same was not true, he thought, of our mnemonic devices (Freud 2006: 102). He 
argued that while the mental apparatus is able to be indefinitely receptive to new impressions 
it is also able to indefinitely preserve these impressions. Our external apparatuses on the 
other hand, such as the simple piece of paper, have to compromise between how many new 
traces they can receive with how much space there is available before old traces have to be 
destroyed to make room for new impressions. However, Freud noticed an inconspicuous 
piece of equipment available in the shops advertised as the ‘magic notepad’, which he saw as 
being better able to perform an analogy of the functioning of the perception and memory 
systems of the human mind. The magic or mystic notepad was a fairly simple device, 
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consisting as he described it as a board “of dark-brown resin or wax within a paper frame, 
with a thin, translucent sheet laid over it, firmly attached to the wax board at the top and 
lying flat at the bottom” (ibid: 102-103). He would go on to argue that “the pad not only 
provides a reusable receptive surface like a blackboard, but also lasting traces of writing like a 
normal paper notepad; it solves the problem of combining both functions by distributing them 
between two separate but connected components – systems” (ibid: 104, emphasis as in 
original).
As with Plato and Augustine, Freud used the technological development of a new 
external apparatus of inscribing, storing, organising, retrieving, and disseminating information 
to elaborate on his theoretical model of the functions of the human mind. It is not surprising 
that this tradition has continued with theoretical analogies of the mind as a computer. 
However, as Derrida argued in his essay Freud and the Scene of Writing, Freud remained with 
the Western philosophical tradition of ‘what-ness’ ontology (Derrida 1978: 246-291), as had 
Augustine and Plato before him. While they use these technological devices as powerful tools 
of analogy for considering the human mind, they retain in the final analysis a clear distinction 
between mind and body, mind and world, between the internal knower and the external 
known, and, furthermore, all these concepts are understood in terms of their ‘what-ness’. 
This internal and external division of the subject-knower-thing and object-known-thing is 
symptomatic of the ontological tradition, and its privileging of cognition in the formal 
ontology of existents and their relations.
The new account of the emergence of self-understanding in Classical Greece makes a 
reassessment of the definite differentiation of ‘classical’ realist ontology and ‘noetic’ idealist 
ontology necessary. Rather than a clear history of the emergence of the ‘classical’ 
understanding of ‘being’ which was later opposed or complemented by the emergence of the 
‘noetic’ understanding, there is now a degree of categorial indefiniteness apparent21. While we 
have noted the correlation of the development and maturation of idealist, nominalist, and 
sceptical philosophies in the ‘modern’ period with the rise of ‘noetic’ ontology, we have 
nevertheless tried to maintain a distinction between these two concepts. ‘Noetic’ ontology, 
we maintained, was predicated on an understanding of ‘being’ that privileged the ‘mind’ as the 
2 1 It could also be added that there is a greater degree of categorial indefiniteness apparent in the case of Plato as 
opposed to Aristotle. Ultimately, this kind of indefiniteness stems from exactly how someone chooses their 
definitions of the different types of the ontology of the ‘what-ness’ of existence. However, if an underlying 
structural analysis of these philosophical beliefs is conducted, a basic subject to object model of understanding 
existence can be found throughout all the possible permutations of this philosophical tradition. If the definition 
of the branches of ontology is chosen to be placed above this structural level, then clearer categorial distinctions 
can be made – one where there is the realist understanding that the ‘what-ness’ of entities is independent of how 
the ‘what-ness’ is known, and one where there is the idealist understanding that the ‘what-ness’ of entities is 
relational to how the ‘what-ness’ is known. However, if the model of ‘knowing’ or ‘cognition’ itself is included 
in the analysis of these ontological structures, then these distinctions develop a continuum of indefiniteness.
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primary entity for knowing existence. Idealism and its related philosophies, however, are 
predicated on various antirealist positions that question the epistemological possibility of 
knowing the ‘truth’ about entities and their ‘being’. It is now apparent that the underlying 
fundamental structure for understanding ‘being’ may not have had a radical overhaul in the 
time between Plato and Descartes and the other ‘moderns’. The Platonic – or Socratic – model 
has a ‘noetic’ component to its thesis, were the possibility of knowing  the ‘what-ness’ of the 
‘world’ is predicated upon the knowing of the ‘what-ness’ of the ‘self’. This is a proposition  
emphasised by the Delphic maxim of “know thyself” (see, for example, Plato 1997e: 230a) as 
the first stage of acquiring wisdom.
Previously we differentiated the ‘classical’ branch from the ‘noetic’ branch of the 
ontological tradition with the argument that ‘classical’ ontology was an exercise in analysing 
the structural relationships of entities in and of themselves, while stating that ‘noetic’ 
ontology introduced a turn towards understanding these entities as they are presented to the 
mind or to consciousness. This ‘noetic’ formulation, it was argued, was based on the subject-
object divide of understanding ‘being’. However, it is now apparent that the ‘classical’ branch 
of the ontological tradition had an inherent ‘noetic’ basis that arose with the development a 
reflexive sense of the ‘what-ness’ of the self. However, rather than be interpreted as a 
fundamental ontological principle of the understanding of ‘being’, this structural premise 
became an implicit feature of the ontological discourse. This implicitness enabled the premise 
to become overlooked and then ‘rediscovered’ as the Cartesian method: the process of “self-
examination with respect to thoughts in correspondence to reality” (Foucault 1988: 46). 
Nevertheless, this awareness of the categorial indefiniteness of the ontological 
tradition should not be dismissive of the philosophical changes instigated by the ‘modern’ 
period’s explicit engagement with the ‘noetic’ base of ‘what-ness’ ontology. While it did not 
constitute a radical revaluation of the underlying principles for the understanding of ‘being’, it 
did advance and adapt these principles. The rise in the ‘modern’ period of the explicit ‘noetic’ 
branch of the ontological tradition is not characterized by a fundamental shift in the 
understanding of the ‘what-ness’ of the ‘world’ in relation to the ‘what-ness’ of the ‘self’. 
This underlying object and subject ontology remained uncontested in the disputes between 
realist, nominalist, and idealist philosophy. These disputes over what can be said to exist 
were enabled by this structure and consequently do not characterize a radical divergence from 
the fundamental understanding of ‘being’. Instead they characterize a renewed focus on the 
nature of the relationship between ‘self-being’ and ‘world-being’, on the epistemological 
concerns that result from this relationship, and on clarifying the understanding of concepts 
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that emerged due to it. This is the subject-object model of understanding that underlies the 
question of the ‘what-ness’ of existence. The ‘modern’ period, from Descartes onwards, saw 
radical new methodologies developed to enable the systematic investigation of the ‘what-
ness’ of existence, but they all remained within the terms of the subject-object model that was 
established in the ancient Greek ontology. This was one of Heidegger’s central arguments in 
Being and Time, that the tradition of “Greek ontology and its history”, while having 
undergone “numerous filiations and distortions”, nevertheless determines “the conceptual 
character of philosophy even today” (Heidegger 1962: 43 [21-22]22). The importance that 
Heidegger attributes to critically analysing the ontological tradition to reveal such underlying 
structures as the subject-object model of understanding is addressed in sections 2.6 and 2.7. 
This analysis is what Heidegger calls the phenomenological destruction of the history of 
ontology. Heidegger’s critique of the subject-object model of understanding or cognition is 
presented in section 3.5, and this is where his alternative model of the referential totality of 
‘being-in-the-world’ is developed. However, before these arguments can be judged, a thorough 
understanding of Heidegger’s general critique of the ontology of ‘what-ness’ is required.
2 2 This Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time is a central text for this thesis. The 
dual pagination reference is for the English page number first and then the German page number in the square 
brackets.
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Chapter 2
Heidegger’s Phenomenological Method for Ontology
§2 – Guide to chapter two
In chapter two the outline of Heidegger’s alternative approach to ontology is presented. 
Rather than understand ‘being’ as ‘what-ness’, his alternative is described as seeing ‘being’ as 
‘how-ness’. This distinction is what Heidegger called the ‘ontological difference’. The chapter 
documents the heritage of this idea in the phenomenological and existentialist traditions of 
thought, and progresses to analyse Heidegger’s preliminary view of the ‘being’ of the human 
entity as self-interpretation. Moreover, an interpretation of Heidegger’s methodology for 
researching this idea of ‘being’ is presented, along with a critique of differing interpretations.
§2.1 – Naming ‘how-ness’ ontology
The third sense of ontology does not have a standardised name but it could be called 
‘phenomenological’ ontology or ‘existentialist’ ontology. However, these are as tricky a set of 
terms to apply as the earlier documented concept of postmodernism, as they share a similarly 
high level of categorial indefiniteness. In the case of ‘existentialism’, this indefiniteness is 
largely because the existentialist nomenclature was apparently first developed as a pejorative 
classification by Gabriel Marcel in the 1940’s to describe Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy, who 
then adopted and popularised it, resulting in a retrospective classification of certain other 
philosophers who shared similar concerns to Sartre (Polt 1999: 165). These philosophers 
typically include, though this list is not to be thought of as exhaustive, Søren Kierkegaard, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger, though each listed entry is open to 
debate depending on how wide a definition of existentialist is being utilised. While perhaps a 
more controversial suggestion than the others, a strong case could also be made for the 
inclusion of Blaise Pascal as an early existentialist or proto-existentialist (on this see Dreyfus 
2009: 140). 
On the other hand, some philosophers who are normally considered existentialists 
argued themselves that they were not. Heidegger is an example of such a philosopher, who in 
his Letter on Humanism regarded the name existentialism as an appropriate title for Sartre’s 
philosophy but believed that its basic tenets had “nothing at all in common” with his own 
philosophy (Heidegger 1993: 232). Nonetheless, the standard principle to define Sartre’s 
existentialism is his maxim that “existence comes before essence” (Sartre 1973: 26, emphasis 
as in original), which strikingly mirrors Heidegger’s earlier statement from Being and Time 
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that the “essence of Dasein [his term for human beings, which will be analysed later] lies in its 
existence” (Heidegger 1962: 67 [42], emphasis as in original). However, focusing on maxims to 
define existentialism is a shallow vein to mine, especially due to the hostility that many 
canonical existentialists had to systemisation23. Walter Kaufmann, in his story on the 
development of existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, opens with the description that 
existentialism “is not a philosophy but a label for several widely different revolts against 
traditional philosophy” (Kaufmann 1975: 11). This, more than any potential maxim, is 
closest to adequately providing a description of existentialism. Beyond this, tractability of the 
term can only be gained by examining its particular manifestations.
Heidegger’s philosophy, if understood as existentialist, is one such manifestation, and 
is of particular interest for our thesis as his unusually systematic treatment of the ontology of 
human existence in Being and Time is the beginning of the existentialist sense of ontology (for 
examples see Heidegger 1962: 32-33 [12], and Heidegger 1999: 1-3). However, it is important 
to remember that he did not describe his philosophy in terms of an ‘existential ontology’. 
Heidegger instead described his interest as ‘fundamental ontology’ (‘Fundamentalontologie’) 
(Heidegger 1962). Regardless, this version of ontology has become important due to the broad 
influence of Heidegger’s ideas on many currents of thought in the twentieth century, such as 
Sartre’s, and Being and Time arguably remains the single best example of this new sense of 
ontology in application. 
As noted, Heidegger did not call his philosophy ‘existential ontology’. Furthermore, 
he was not content with his work being referred to as any form of existentialism, which is 
what Sartre had labelled it (see Sartre 1973: 26, and Polt 1999: 165). Richard Polt analysed 
some of the possible reasons for Heidegger’s refutation of associating his work with Sartre’s 
and suggested one reason was due to a misunderstanding. Apparently Heidegger’s view of 
Sartre having a ‘traditional’ understanding of ‘human being’ came from reading only an essay 
of Sartre’s meant for popular consumption, Existentialism and Humanism, and not his full 
account from Being and Nothingness that Heidegger is said to have given up on reading after 
only the first few pages (ibid: 167). Had he kept reading, Polt argues, Heidegger would have 
realised that both philosophers were keen to argue that ‘human beings’ could not be 
understood in any essentialist terms. Whether or not it is correct that Heidegger would have 
been less hostile to the title of existentialism had he read more of Sartre’s work is an 
interesting concept for contemplation, though it is also one that is now beyond verification 
with both authors having passed away. It is also important not to overlook the many 
differences in their philosophies that remain regardless of other similarities. As Polt notes, 
2 3 With the notable exception of Heidegger in his early period.
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Sartre argued that ‘human beings’ – though he wrote in terms of consciousness, which 
Heidegger was keen to avoid – are free to create the meaning for their own existence, while 
Heidegger argued that because of our relationship to the past ‘human beings’ are constrained 
in their possible interpretations of existing in the world (ibid: 167). Another popular way of 
expressing the difference between Sartre and Heidegger is in terms of a separation between 
‘French existence-philosophy’ and ‘German existence-philosophy’ (see Tietz 2009: 162), the 
latter of which Heidegger was influenced through the 1919 publication of Karl Jaspers’ 
Psychology of Worldviews (Polt 1999: 166). This binary classification, however, is 
problematic.
Referring to Heidegger as an existentialist would be disingenuous if it was taken to 
mean that what is normally considered existentialist discourse was the only thread in his 
thought. Rather his early philosophy drew on a variety of disciplines which he wove together 
in Being and Time into a systematic theory of human existence. As well the existentialist 
aspect of his work, he combined ideas from phenomenology, hermeneutics, as well as from 
the traditional areas of ontology. Because of this it would be fair to call Heidegger’s 
radicalised development of ontology not only ‘existential ontology’ or ‘fundamental 
ontology’, but also ‘hermeneutic ontology’ and ‘phenomenological ontology’. An example of 
the use of the latter term is Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, which bears the subtitle An essay 
on phenomenological ontology. However, as with existentialist philosophy in general, these 
categorial variations share a high degree of indefiniteness, and so a fixed or agreed upon 
meaning does exist in order to conclusively disambiguate them from each other. 
The formation of the categorial indefiniteness between phenomenology and 
existentialism stems from the aforementioned separation of ‘French existence-philosophy’ 
and ‘German existence-philosophy’. The problem is that the French and German distinction 
is misleading as they suggest a straight comparison is possible between two schools of 
thought. In his chronicle of The Phenomenological Movement, Herbert Spiegelberg observes 
how the emergence of existentialism in France coincides with that of phenomenology, in such 
a manner that the meaning of the two terms frequently overlapped (Spiegelberg 1976b: 408-
413). This is in contrast to their development in Germany where they became segregated as 
antagonistic philosophies (ibid). This segregation is particularly evident between the idea of 
phenomenology as a methodology with scientific rigour, as developed and espoused by 
Edmund Husserl, and the Kierkegaardian ‘Existenzphilosophie’ of Karl Jaspers who argued 
that existence could not be grasped rationally (Tietz 2009: 163). This division may also have 
had a personal element, as Spiegelberg points out that “Jaspers resented Husserl’s early 
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opposition to German speculative philosophy, especially to Schelling, as came out in a 
momentous conversation at Husserl’s request in 1913, when Husserl may well have sought 
Jaspers’ support for his new yearbook” (Spiegelberg 1976b: 409). 
The connection between existentialism and phenomenology derives largely from the 
work of Heidegger, who was a student of Husserl and his phenomenology. Heidegger regarded 
his philosophy of the analysis of existence in Being and Time as a phenomenological ontology 
with hermeneutical modifications that produced transcendental knowledge (Heidegger 1962: 
62 [38]). However, because Heidegger in his later work dropped the use of these terms, and 
just referred to his philosophy as “thinking” (Polt 1999: 38), and because Husserl later 
denounced Heidegger’s philosophy as a form of phenomenology as he had intended it (see 
Spiegelberg 1976a: 154, and Spiegelberg 1976b: 410), this link between existentialism and 
phenomenology ended in Germany. The French use of phenomenology and existentialism as 
complimentary concepts came from the adoption of the stance used in Being and Time before 
the extent of this break in the German tradition became fully understood in France 
(Spiegelberg 1976b: 410). This nevertheless led to advancement of what is sometime called 
‘existential phenomenology’, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception 
(see Wrathall 2009: 31). However, just as Heidegger never called himself an existentialist, 
Merleau-Ponty never called himself an existential phenomenologist (ibid: 31). Moreover, it is 
important not to overlook the hermeneutical and ontological tendencies that are significant in 
many of the aforementioned philosophers. The consequence of this collective indefiniteness is 
that while many twentieth century philosophers’ have had an interest in the new sense of 
ontology it has nevertheless had no stable referent. However, it can be understood and named 
within the frameworks of these philosophers individually. Consequently, the philosophy of 
Heidegger has been selected in order to critical demonstrate an alternative to characterising 
ontology as the study of ‘being’ as the ‘what-ness’ of entities. This is not an arbitrary 
selection, as Heidegger’s systematic critique of the tradition of characterising ‘being’ as ‘what-
ness’ is the pre-eminent philosophical investigation of ‘being’ of the twentieth century. For 
Heidegger ‘being’ is not the ‘what-ness’ of an object or of ‘reality’. He states this in the 
epilogue of his essay The Thing.
“Being” is in no way identical with reality or with a precisely determined 
actuality. Nor is Being in any way opposed to being-no-longer and being-not-
yet; these two belong themselves to the essential nature of Being. Even 
metaphysics already had, to a certain extent, an intimation of this fact in its 
doctrine of the modalities – which, to be sure, has hardly been understood – 
according to which possibility belongs to Being just as much as do actuality 
and necessity. (Heidegger 1971b: 181)
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Nor for Heidegger is ‘being’ the representation of existence found in the mental activity of a 
subject (ibid: 181). Instead, to characterise his understanding of ‘being’, Heidegger develops 
his own systematic alternative to the Western tradition of ontology. This alternative begins 
with the concept of the ontological difference.
§2.2 – Heidegger and the ontological difference
A more detailed explication of the new sense of ontology is now required. One way of 
expressing its meaning is that rather than maintaining the ontological tradition’s view that 
‘being’ is the ‘what-ness’ or ‘quiddity’24 of an entity, it is interested in characterising ‘being’ 
as the ‘how-ness’ of an entity. For Heidegger, ‘being’ does not name the ‘what’ of the entity 
“like a chair in contrast to a house” (Heidegger 1992a: 153), ‘being’ is not the “class or genus 
of entities; yet it pertains to every entity” (Heidegger 1962: 62 [38]). This should not be 
interpreted as a statement that the ‘things’ in existence do not have a ‘what-ness’, what 
Heidegger called the ‘ontical’ characteristic of entities. The ‘brute facts’ of an individual’s 
existence is the totality of their ontical characteristics. For example, an individual’s genetic 
structure is such an ontical characteristic, just as being made of wood is an ‘ontical’ 
characteristic of a wooden chair. In this sense Heidegger can be described as a realist, in as far 
as he as he agreed that scientific knowledge was possible in a way that dogmatic idealism can 
not. The ‘ontical’ (ontisch) aspect of the world represented for Heidegger the matters of fact 
about existence, and these matters of fact are studied by science. His preliminary description 
of science is that it “in general may be defined as the totality established through an 
interconnection of true propositions” (ibid: 32 [11])25.
In general terms Heidegger’s modal ontology of ‘how-ness’ could be understood as a 
type of ‘meta-ontology’. It seeks the ways of ‘being’ that give rise to, from human disclosure, 
2 4 And the associated concept of the ‘this-ness’ (haecceity) of entities.
2 5 Heidegger is largely silent on the scientific structure of investigating ontical ‘truths’ (see section 69b of Being 
and Time as an example of what he does say). This is because his main concern is addressing the ontological 
question of the ‘being’ of entities, which he feels has normally been ignored in favour of analysing the 
problems of determining the ‘what-ness’ of entities. My interpretation of Heidegger’s distinction between the 
ontical and the ontological is that in both cases we can only strictly state that we are discussing the phenomenal 
in the Kantian sense. Heidegger’s interest in ‘being’ is phenomenological, that is, in how ‘being’ is disclosed to 
‘human beings’. The noumenal of existence remains that which exists independently of any structure of 
disclosure, and consequently cannot be identified through any methodology. This interpretation accepts the 
Kantian transcendental argument, that the noumenal must exist necessarily, even though we can say nothing 
about it. This does not mean that the noumenal is to be regarded as the sole ‘truth’ of existence, the 
phenomenal world is the ‘true’ disclosure of the ‘being’ of intra-worldly entities. Within this interpretation, a 
scientific explication of the ‘what-ness’ of existence is consequently characterised as the ontical investigation of 
the phenomenal realm. An ontological investigation is, on the other hand, an investigation into the structure of 
the ‘how-ness’ of existence as disclosed to ‘human being’. This ‘how-ness’ of ‘being’ is the existential structure 
of how the world matters in term of the referential totality of involvement and significance. This is to say, as 
Heidegger argued, that the ‘how-ness’ structure of ‘human being’’ is ‘care’ (Heidegger 1962: 227 [182]), and 
‘care’, as will be shown, is made possible by temporality. The phenomenological uncovering of this structure is 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of the ‘how-ness’ of ‘being’.
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the structures that govern the context of understanding the ‘what-ness’ and ‘this-ness’ of 
entities. This also means that this ontology can be confused with what was earlier termed 
‘noetic’ ontology, and there is a degree of indefinite overlap. However, the two forms of 
ontology can be distinguished because the ‘how-ness’ version typically rejects that the sole 
structure of ‘how-ness’ is in the mind or these structures are necessarily personal structures. 
As stated there is a degree of indefiniteness between these categories, such as in Sartre’s 
philosophy which maintained a ‘noetic’ character from its Husserlian influence. This is 
despite its other Heideggerian influences, which makes a synthesis that commentators such as 
Hubert Dreyfus consider as Sartre’s major mistake, regarding Being and Nothingness as a 
“brilliant but misguided reformulation of Being and Time into a theory of consciousness” 
(Dreyfus 1991: 13). However, the relationship between the philosophy of Husserl and 
Heidegger is complicated. 
Husserl and Heidegger are two of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth 
century, and their respective philosophies share both powerful similarities as well as quite 
extraordinary differences. For a period of time Husserl was Heidegger’s mentor in the 
development of a new philosophical movement referred to as ‘phenomenology’, and a 
knowledge of their contributions to phenomenology remains a vital source for a rich 
understanding of the emergence and later development of this movement. The divergence of 
their thought became apparent after the publication of Heidegger’s Being and Time in 1927, 
and this rupture in their thinking has since remained an active topic for scholarly analysis. 
One analysis of their diverging understanding of phenomenology suggests that whereas 
Husserl had an epistemological goal for his philosophy, Heidegger’s goal was ontological; he 
wanted to develop the phenomenological techniques to address the ‘question of being’. This 
is the interpretation that can, for example, be found in Hubert Dreyfus’ excellent commentary 
Being-in-the-World (ibid: 3). However, an alternative interpretation exists in the analyses of 
other scholars, who argue that there are more similarities between their thinking than are 
conventionally agreed. Søren Overgaard is an example of such a scholar, who argues in his 
comparative text Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World that “what appears as a clear-
cut example of an epistemological problematic in fact turns out to be essentially ontological: 
what Husserl’s phenomenology eventually wants is to understand the being of the world, or 
not just that, but rather being as such” (Overgaard 2004: 68, emphasis as in original).
To determine to what extent Husserl’s phenomenology is an ontological exercise in a 
manner similar to Heidegger’s, it is necessary to understand the ontological pursuit of the 
‘question of being’ found in Being and Time. The ‘question of being’ can either appear 
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obvious, self-evident, and unnecessary, or inexplicable and mysterious, but according to 
Heidegger an analysis of these presuppositions only reveals the necessity of explicitly asking 
the ‘question of being’ (Heidegger 1962: 21-24 [2-4]). He argues that an adequate answer for 
the question has never been reached, that the presuppositions about it have precluded any 
attempt to answer them, and even that there has never been a proper way of formulating the 
question (ibid: 21-24 [2-4]). Part of this problem is evident within the grammar of the word 
‘being’, which operates as a gerund – a verb used as a noun. As a noun ‘being’ refers to the 
infinitive verb ‘to be’, and so a statement that something ‘is’ becomes a statement that 
something that has the characteristic of existence does so through ‘doing’. An analysis of this 
reveals a circularity about a basic statement of existence – something has existence if it is 
existing. This lack of clarity of the meaning of this fundamental word, however, is greater than 
a grammatical problem. But as a grammatical problem it makes addressing the meaning of 
‘being’ frequently appear inelegant and cumbersome. So that this trouble is not overlooked, 
this text will retain the use of ‘being’, when used as a noun, in single quotation marks.
Heidegger gave a substantial two part introduction to Being and Time, which in the 
first half covers the case for prioritising the ‘question of being’ as a matter of inquiry. He 
develops this case and then argues that the task of interpreting the meaning of ‘being’ should 
begin by analysing the particular ‘being’ that can understand ‘being’ (ibid: 19-35 [1-15]). This 
is what he called an “existential analytic of Dasein” (ibid: 34 [13]). Both ‘existential’ and 
‘Dasein’ are technical terms that Heidegger presents in his introduction along with several 
others in order to facilitate his inquiry into ‘being’. An analysis of these terms will have to be 
postponed until later in this text, but the thrust of his argument is that an inquiry into “the 
question of Being requires that the right way of access to entities shall have been obtained” 
(ibid: 26 [6]). For Heidegger, an ‘entity’ (Ein Seiendes) is different from ‘being’ (Sein). An 
entity has its ontical facts that can be studied by science such as mass, atoms, DNA, and so 
forth. But ‘being’ is not such an ontical characteristic, rather ‘being’ for Heidegger, is a feature 
that is different, sui generis, from any such ontical facts. It is from this distinction that the 
more general description of an ontology of ‘how-ness’, rather than ‘what-ness’, is derived. In 
Heidegger’s terminology, the word ‘ontology’ is reserved exclusively in relation to 
characterising this idea of ‘how-ness’ and its modal structures.
The separation of ‘being’ and ‘entity’, ‘being’ and ‘a being’, ‘being’ and ‘beings’, 
where the first is ‘ontological’ and the second ‘ontical’, is what Heidegger later called the 
ontological difference in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, a lecture course that he gave 
in 1927 which expanded on some of the topics from Being and Time. In it he outlines the 
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significance of the ontological difference as such:
The possibility of ontology, of philosophy as a science, stands and falls with 
the possibility of a sufficiently clear accomplishment of this differentiation 
between being and beings and accordingly with the possibility of negotiating 
the passage from the ontical consideration of beings to the ontological 
thematization of being.... Being and its distinction from beings can be fixed 
only if we get a proper hold on the understanding of being as such. But to 
comprehend the understanding of being means first and foremost to 
understand that being to whose ontological constitution the understanding of 
being belongs, the Dasein. (Heidegger 1982: 227, emphasis as in original)
‘Dasein’ is Heidegger’s chosen designation for the entity that is conventionally called the 
‘human being’, though it has a special emphasis that will need further elaboration in section 
3.2. His argument is that to understand ‘being’ in general, the particular ‘being’ of Dasein 
should first be examined as a preparatory analytic. This is because, Heidegger argues, it is the 
structure of Dasein’s way of ‘being’ that makes ‘being’ in general intelligible. And the way of 
‘being’ that Dasein possesses is ‘existence’ (Existenz) (Heidegger 1962: 32 [12]).
§2.3 – Existence as self-interpretation
‘Existence’ is Dasein’s self-interpreting way of ‘being’, its ‘how-ness’. For Dasein “its 
ownmost being is such that it has an understanding of that being, and already maintains itself 
in each case in a certain interpretedness of its being” (ibid: 36 [15], alternate translation from 
Dreyfus 1991: 15). ‘Existence’ is the way of ‘being’ of Dasein, which is how Dasein, in its 
‘being’,  comports itself to its ‘being’ (ibid: 67 [41-42]). “Dasein always understands itself in 
terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself” (ibid: 33 [12]). This also means, as 
Dreyfus points out, that ‘existence’ is not used  by Heidegger to indicate ‘existing’ in the 
conventional sense, rather it means that only “self-interpreting beings exist” (Dreyfus 1991: 
15). This is not to be understood as a statement that entities that do not self-interpret are not 
‘here’ in the world. Such entities can have many ontical attributes, just not the ontological 
way of ‘being’ that Heidegger reserved the term ‘existence’ to designate. It is from the use of 
the term ‘existence’ to designate the way of ‘being’ of Dasein that Heidegger then derives his 
use of the terms ‘existentiell’, ‘existential’, ‘existentiality’, and ‘existentiale’. This extract 
from Being and Time explains the first three of these terms:
Only the particular Dasein decides its existence.... The question of existence 
never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding 
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of oneself which leads along this way we call “existentiell”. The question of 
existence is one of Dasein’s ontical ‘affairs’. This does not require that the 
ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. The 
question about that structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes 
existence. The context of such structures we call “existentiality”. Its analytic 
has the character of an understanding which is not existentiell, but rather 
existential. (Heidegger 1962: 33 [12], emphasis as in original)
Finally, ‘existentiale’, plural ‘existentialia’, is reserved as a term whose equivalent is 
‘category’ for entities other than Dasein:
All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by 
considering Dasein’s existence-structure. Because Dasein’s characters of 
Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them “existentialia”. These 
are to be sharply distinguished from what we call “categories” – 
characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. 
(ibid: 70 [44], emphasis as in original)
The existentialia are the structures of the possible ways, the ‘how-ness’, of entities whose 
‘being’ is a ‘who’, and not a ‘what’. This does not mean that an entity that is a ‘who’, 
Dasein, does not have ‘what-ness’. 
The human entity has many ‘what-ness’ categories, just as any entity can be studied 
and accounted for in terms of ‘what’ it ‘is’. Yet these are categories of its ontical properties, 
not its ontological ways and structures of ‘being’. Consequently, the human entity, Dasein, 
cannot be characterised as only a ‘what’. Furthermore, Heidegger argued that as the traditional 
ontology of Western philosophy had interpreted all ‘being’ in terms of ‘what-ness’, the 
manners of ‘being’ which are not ‘what-ness’ had to be investigated before an attempt to 
analyse their interrelation could be made.
Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of 
Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of 
primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a “who” (existence) or 
a “what” (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). The connection between 
these two modes of the characters of Being cannot be handled until the 
horizon for the question of Being has been clarified. (ibid: 71 [45], emphasis 
as in original)
For example, there are spacial categories which can describe a Dasein’s location. However, 
this would only be an ontical characterisation of where that Dasein’s body was located. The 
ontology of distance is different to this ontical understanding. “That which is presumably 
‘closest’ is by no means that which is at the smallest distance ‘from us’” (ibid: 141 [106-
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107]). Someone speaking in Britain on the phone to their brother in Australia is ontologically 
distanced in a different way than they are ontically distanced. The ontical distance between 
the brothers would be great, and could be measured mathematically. But ontologically the two 
brothers could be very close – though this would depend on a further analysis of the context 
of their situation, their ‘world’. Heidegger described this ontology of spatiality in terms of the 
existentiale of ‘de-severance’ (Entfernung) (ibid: 138-144 [104-110]). “‘De-severing’ amounts 
to making the farness vanish – that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, 
bringing it close” (ibid: 139 [105]). Being able to talk on the phone to his brother is not the 
only way their distance could be ‘de-severed’, what matters is that by ‘dealing with’ 
(Umgang)26 his brother as something that ‘matters’ he was brought ‘close’ to him. “With the 
‘radio’, for example, Dasein has so expanded its everyday environment that it has 
accomplished a de-severance of the ‘world’ – a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, 
cannot yet be visualized” (ibid: 140 [105]). Being and Time was published in 1927, when the 
modern telecommunications industry was only in its infancy. Yet Heidegger here showed 
considerable foresight on how the ontology of information technology would prove an 
important subject for future phenomenological research. For example, Hubert Dreyfus and 
Charles Spinosa analyse the phenomenology of the Internet in their essay Heidegger and 
Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology (Dreyfus and Spinosa 2003: 315-326)27.
However, it remains to be demonstrated just how having the character, or way of 
2 6 See section 3.5 for the phenomenology of ‘dealing with’ (Umgang) the world.
2 7 Heidegger also returned to the issues of technology and ‘nearness’ in his later period. This period, post Being 
and Time, is characterised by a less systematic and more poetic style of discourse. An example of his thought 
from this period is his essay The Thing. In The Thing, Heidegger analyses the ontology of a ‘thing’ qua 
‘thing’. The question he asks is “What in the thing is thingly? What is the thing in itself?” (Heidegger 1971b: 
165). Heidegger is in this essay differentiating ‘thing’ from ‘object’ in a manner similar to how he differentiates 
between a ready-to-hand entity and a present-at-hand entity in Being and Time. In The Thing, Heidegger coins 
the description of a ‘thing’ ‘thinging’, by which he means the way in which a ‘thing’ brings forth or discloses 
the world as something that is ‘near’. “Thinging is the nearing of the world” (ibid: 179). This ontological 
‘nearness’ is different from physical or perceptual distance. This is a clarification of his phenomenology of ‘de-
severance’ from Being and Time, as it emphasises that using modern information communication technology 
does not necessarily make other entities ‘near’. 
All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man now reaches overnight, by plane, places 
which formerly took weeks and months of travel. He now receives instant information, by 
radio, of events which he formerly learned about only years later, if at all. The germination 
and growth of plants, which remained hidden throughout the seasons, is now exhibited 
publicly in a minute, on film. Distant sites of the most ancient cultures are shown on film as 
if they stood this very moment amidst today’s street traffic. Moreover, the film attests to 
what it shows by presenting also the camera and its operators at work. The peak of this 
abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by television, which will soon 
pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication. (ibid: 163)
Modern telecommunication technology de-severs distance by abolishing remoteness, but it does not also 
necessarily bring what it shows ‘near’. Rather, ‘nearness’ is the ‘mattering’ of entities in someone’s world. This 
is the world of their concern. In section 3.5 this phenomenology of intra-worldly entities is analysed in greater 
depth, though the terminology from Heidegger’s earlier, systematic period of Being and Time is retained. 
Consequently rather than ‘thing’ and ‘object’, the discourse will be in terms of the ready-to-hand and the 
present-at-hand.
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‘being’, of ‘existence’ makes the ‘existential analytic of Dasein’ the method for addressing the 
‘question of being’. If Dasein has the way of ‘being’ of ‘existence’, Heidegger argued, the 
analysis of Dasein has three priorities for the development of a ‘fundamental ontology’. The 
first is an ontical priority, which is that it is a fact that Dasein has “the determinate character 
of existence” (Heidegger 1962: 34 [13]). The second is an ontological priority, which is 
because, as ‘existence’ is determinative for it, Dasein is in itself ‘ontological’ (ibid: 34 [13]). 
“But with equal primordiality Dasein also possesses – as constitutive for its understanding of 
existence – an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. 
Dasein has therefore a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the 
possibility of any ontologies” (ibid: 34 [13]). It is because of these priorities that Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology requires the aforementioned ‘existential analytic of Dasein’. It is such 
an “analytic of Dasein in general [that] makes up fundamental ontology, so that Dasein 
functions as that entity which in principle is to be interrogated beforehand as to its Being” 
(ibid: 35 [14], emphasis as in original).
However, if an analysis of what pertains to the ‘being’ of Dasein is to function as a 
means of access to the ‘question of being’, what remains to be explained is how such an 
analysis can be undertaken. To address this question Heidegger develops in the second part of 
the introduction to Being and Time several interrelated methodological techniques: 
hermeneutics, phenomenology, and the ‘destruction’ (Destruktion) of the history of ontology. 
Before these techniques can be unpacked we must clarify the recursive nature of Heidegger’s 
analysis of ‘being’. Understanding this recursive structure that is used in Being and Time 
helps develop an understanding of Heidegger’s concern with methodology.
A recursive characteristic does not simply represent the process of repetition. More 
specifically it is the repeated application of parts of a procedure in relation to successive 
results from the whole of the procedure, so that the final interpretation of the procedure is 
dependent on an indefinite, though not necessary infinite, number of successive cycles. This 
form of recursion is evident in Heidegger’s development and characterisation of hermeneutics 
in Being and Time. This recursive quality of hermeneutics has been called the ‘hermeneutic 
circle’ and the ‘hermeneutic spiral’. Aside from recursion, hermeneutics in general represents 
the process of interpretation, and has developed from a number of historical contexts, most 
notably as a method the interpretation of texts. Heidegger’s development of hermeneutics, 
however, is twofold. Firstly he uses hermeneutic recursive interpretation as a technique for 
the analytic of the ‘being’ of Dasein, and secondly he reveals hermeneutic recursion to be a 
structure of the “existential constitution of Dasein” (ibid: 195 [153]). This second point is 
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partly already evident in Heidegger’s initial characterisation of the way of ‘being’ of Dasein as 
‘existence’, that is, self-interpretation, which he later elaborates in terms of a circular structure 
of understanding and interpretation (ibid: 195 [153]). Heidegger discussed interpretative 
circularity in the context of comments on virtuous circles and vicious circles (ibid: 194-195 
[152-153]), but as the goal set out in Being and Time was to eventually reach an 
understanding of ‘being’ in general, the structural technique he deployed is better represented 
as an unfinished process of recursion rather than formal circularity.
Furthermore, Heidegger argued that the existence of Dasein is itself hermeneutic. This 
means that how Dasein gives meaning to its ‘being’ is through a recursive or circular process 
of understanding and interpretation, and this is a temporal structure. Heidegger asks “how is 
the totality of that structural whole which we have pointed out to be defined in an existential-
ontological manner?” (ibid: 225 [181], emphasis as in original). His reply, via an extended 
definition of Dasein, is that “Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and 
projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being 
alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with Others” (ibid: 225 [181],  emphasis as in original). 
This is to say that Dasein is ‘care’ (Sorge) (see section 3.3) – existentiality is an issue for it – 
which discloses its world through a hermeneutic recursion that is structured by the 
temporality of Dasein. Heidegger was critical of those who accused this process of being 
‘mere’ circularity.
When one talks of the ‘circle’ in understanding, one expresses a failure to 
recognize two things: (1) that understanding as such makes up a basic kind of 
Dasein’s Being, and (2) that this Being is constituted as care [Sorge]. To deny 
the circle, to make a secret of it, or even to want to overcome it, means finally 
to reinforce this failure. We must rather endeavour to leap into the ‘circle’, 
primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we 
make sure that we have a full view of Dasein’s circular Being. (ibid: 363 
[315])
Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein is recursive because he interprets the constitution of Dasein’s 
‘being’ as having this very structure.
§2.4 – Preliminary analysis of Heidegger’s methodological techniques
Nevertheless, it is Heidegger’s hermeneutic recursion as a methodological technique that 
currently matters for explicating his existential analytic of Dasein. Throughout Being and 
Time Heidegger develops the analytic of the ‘being’ of Dasein, only to later reinterpret that 
analytic as part of his recursive technique. ‘Existence’ is Heidegger’s opening characterisation 
of the self-interpreting way of ‘being’ of Dasein, but the explanation of this way of ‘being’ is 
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periodically reinterpreted as Heidegger progresses in his analytic. This process begins when 
Heidegger observes the relationship the ‘world’ has with Dasein’s self-interpretation.
The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in 
understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity 
towards which it comports itself proximally and in such a way which is 
essentially constant – in terms of the ‘world’. In Dasein itself, and therefore 
in its own understanding of Being, the way the world is understood is, as we 
shall show, reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself 
gets interpreted. (ibid: 36-37 [15-16])
From this observation, Heidegger will develop an interpretation of the ‘being’ of Dasein as 
‘being-in-the-world’. The basis for this interpretation – which he stresses is only a 
provisional horizon for understanding the meaning of the ‘being’ of Dasein, so that the 
“preparatory analytic of Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and authentically 
ontological basis” (ibid: 38 [17]) – is derived from a phenomenology of Dasein’s 
‘everydayness’ (Alltäglichkeit). This is because everydayness possesses structures that are 
“determinative for the character” of Dasein’s ‘being’, and which, in outlining will “bring out 
the Being of this entity in a preparatory fashion” (ibid: 38 [17]).
The phenomenology of Dasein’s everydayness towards an interpretation of its ‘being’ 
as ‘being-in-the-world’ will be examined later in section 3.3. Presently the task is explicate 
Heidegger’s phenomenological technique in general. As previously stated his  phenomenology 
is highly interrelated with his hermeneutics, to such an extent that his methodology has been 
called hermeneutic phenomenology (for example in Dreyfus 1991: 30-39). But his 
phenomenology is also interrelated with his conception of ontology, as well as with the 
existential analytic of Dasein, and so an initial description of Heideggerian phenomenology 
should begin with Heidegger’s own preliminary conception. To what extent this preliminary 
conception of phenomenology is a radical appropriation or rejection of Husserl’s 
phenomenological designs, or a more nuanced shift in alignment, will as an analysis have to be 
postponed until a systematic comparison between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s ideas can be 
given proper attention. This systematic comparison will also include the aforementioned 
analysis of Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein’s ‘being’ as ‘being-in-the-world’.
Heidegger’s phenomenology is not an attempt to validate or prove statements about 
Dasein and the world, rather, it is a descriptive exercise (Heidegger 1962: 59 [35]). In this 
outward sense his phenomenology is the same as Husserl’s, even copying his motto for the 
method: “To the things themselves” (ibid: 58 [34]). The task of Heidegger’s phenomenology 
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is to let what is normally concealed or hidden, the ‘being’ of entities, be revealed. “This Being 
can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or 
its meaning” (ibid: 59 [35]). Furthermore, this ‘covering-up’ of ‘being’ can occur, either 
because the phenomena has never been discovered, or because it was once discovered but has 
since deteriorated and become ‘buried over’ (ibid: 60 [36]). While the latter raises the problem 
that phenomena may be deliberately ‘disguised’, the task of phenomenology remains to make 
the phenomena show themselves, so that by the phenomenology of phenomena “what one 
has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meanings, its modifications 
and derivatives” (ibid: 60 [35]). Consequently, “phenomenology is the science of the Being of 
entities – ontology” (ibid: 61 [37]). For Heidegger, ontology and phenomenology are not two 
distinct disciplines. Rather these “terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its 
object and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, 
and takes it departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein” (ibid: 62 [38]).
Heidegger’s identification of phenomenology with ontology requires further 
clarification. While Heidegger does introduce the formal concept of the ‘phenomenon’ as “that 
which shows itself in itself” (ibid: 51-55 [28-31]), the meaning of this statement can be 
misleading. In Heidegger’s usage phenomenology is not to be thought of as an exercise in the 
description of entities as they appear to the perceiver. As he points out, there is a valid 
rejoinder to the maxim “to the things themselves” when it is interpreted in the first sense, that 
it is “abundantly self-evident, and it expresses, moreover, the underlying principle of any 
scientific knowledge whatsoever” (ibid: 50 [28]). The question that arises in Heidegger’s usage 
of phenomenology is how he correlates the investigation of something that is normally 
‘hidden’ with what has been preliminarily explained as that which ‘shows itself in itself’. One 
way of interpreting this is that Heidegger was not interested in describing the self-evident 
qualities of an entity, but instead in what structured the self-evidence of that entity – the 
‘being’ of that entity. Thus he writes: 
What is it that phenomenology is to ‘let us see’? What is it that must be 
called a ‘phenomenon’ in a distinctive sense?... [I]t is something that lies 
hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show 
itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows 
itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its 
ground.
Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or that which relapses 
and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only ‘in disguise’, is not just 
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this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities... (ibid: 59 [35], emphasis 
as in original)
Consequently, the methodological descriptive phenomenology that Heidegger outlined was a 
“way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology” (ibid: 60 [35]). This is not to be 
mistaken as a way of access to the entirety of ontology, that is, to an understanding of ‘being’ 
in general. Rather, it is the methodological access to the specific or ‘fundamental’ ontology of 
Dasein in terms of its everydayness. Part of why ‘being’ is ‘hidden’, as revealed by the 
phenomenology of everydayness is because of Dasein’s character of ‘falling’ into the world 
(see section 3.3 for the full analysis of ‘everydayness’ and ‘falling’). This is where we 
interpret our ‘being’ as having the same ‘being’ as the other entities of the world, which are 
interpreted as ‘presence’ in terms of ‘the Present’ (ibid: 42 [21], 47 [25]). The 
phenomenological access to the everydayness of the interpretation of ‘being’ enables the 
hermeneutic analytic of Dasein as self-interpreting , its ‘existential’ way of ‘being’, which is 
then reinterpreted first as ‘being-in-the-world’, then as ‘care’ or ‘concern’ (Sorge), and then 
again as ‘time’. This ultimately leads to Heidegger re-expressing his ontology as an 
‘existential-temporal analytic of Dasein’ (ibid: 486 [436]).
It should not be overlooked that the goal that Heidegger introduced was not solely to 
understand the ‘being’ of Dasein, but to enable an understanding of ‘being’ in general by 
means of understanding the ‘being’ of Dasein. This step was necessary because, he argued, it 
is the ontological constitution of Dasein that makes understanding ‘being’ possible. As he 
states at the end of Being and Time, the “distinction between the Being of existing [self-
interpreting] Dasein and the Being of entities, such as Reality, which do not have the 
character of Dasein, may appear very illuminating; but it is still only the point of departure 
for the ontological problematic; it is nothing with which philosophy may tranquillize itself” 
(ibid: 487 [437], emphasis as in original). This caution against a fixation on his point of 
departure for the analysis of ‘being’ should not be surprising if the representation of 
Heidegger’s philosophy as a recursive exercise is accepted. Nonetheless, it would also be a 
mistake to interpret Heidegger’s hermeneutic recursive technique as a process of dismissing 
superseded analyses, and methods of analysis, of ‘being’. So while Heidegger argued that the 
analysis of the ‘being’ of Dasein was first a way of access to addressing the question of 
‘being’ in general, he also maintained that ‘being’ was relational to Dasein’s ‘being’. “But 
Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an 
understanding of Being belongs” (ibid: 228 [183]). However, there is a problematic region 
within the recursive characterisation, which is in relation to the unfinished attribute of Being 
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and Time. The text could be regarded as characterising a case of circular reinterpretation, as it 
lacks the ‘true end’ that should ultimately characterise recursiveness. Nevertheless, an 
analysis into the context of this incompleteness will both support a description of Being and 
Time as representing an unfinished process of recursion, and provide a tool for describing 
Heidegger’s other major methodological technique in the text: the ‘destruction’ of the history 
of ontology.
§2.5 – Heidegger’s concern with temporality
As stated, Being and Time is an unfinished work. A reason for this is Heidegger’s later ‘turn’ 
(Kehre) in his philosophy, which can be characterised in several ways. One includes his 
disenchantment with the possibility of providing a systematic account of ‘being’ in general 
and human existence in particular, and the use of a technical vocabulary similar to Husserl’s 
project for phenomenology as a scientific discipline. Instead he moved to a more poetic style 
of discourse from around 1930 onwards. Consequently he did not return to finish Being and 
Time, which had been written in his systematic phase, and which was only one third 
complete. Heidegger did, however, outline the structure and design of how the complete work 
was to be realised, with a corresponding description of why this structure was to be 
employed in the second part of his substantial introduction. This in particular included the 
aforementioned ‘destruction’ of the history of ontology. Before this technique is analysed it 
is helpful first to introduce Heidegger’s description of the design of his treatise.
We shall proceed towards the concept of Being by way of an Interpretation 
of a certain special entity, Dasein, in which we shall arrive at the horizon for 
the understanding of Being and for the possibility of interpreting it; the 
universality of the concept of Being is not belied by the relatively ‘special’ 
character of our investigation. But this very entity, Dasein, is in itself 
‘historical’, so that its ownmost ontological elucidation necessarily becomes 
an ‘historiological’ Interpretation.
Accordingly our treatment of the question of Being branches out into two 
distinct tasks, and our treatise will thus have two distinct parts:
Part One: the Interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the 
explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being.
Part Two: basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of 
ontology, with the problematic of temporality as our clue. (ibid: 63 [39], 
emphasis as in original)
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Furthermore, these two parts were both composed of three divisions, of which the first two 
divisions of part one represent the only material of Being and Time to appear. The three 
divisions of part one are, in order: “the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein”, “Dasein 
and temporality”, and “time and Being”; and the three of division two: “Kant’s doctrine of 
schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of Temporality”, “the 
ontological foundation of Descartes’ ‘cogito sum’, and how the medieval ontology has been 
taken over into the problematic of the ‘res cogitans’”, and finally “Aristotle’s essay on time, 
as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and limits of ancient ontology” 
(ibid: 64 [39-40]).
There is a wide range of points that arise from the preceding quotations, but perhaps 
the first that should be addressed relates to the trouble of translating Heidegger and providing 
a textual exegesis. For example, in the preceding quotations on Heidegger’s planned design for 
the structure of Being and Time, the word ‘temporality’ was sometimes written as 
‘Temporality’, and in a manner that demonstrates no apparent grammatical coherency with 
the project as outlined in these quotations. However, this is not a case of a syntactical slip 
and is an accurate replication of the translators’ English rendering of Heidegger’s German. 
Whereas ‘temporal’ and ‘temporality’ are the translations for Heidegger’s zeitlich and 
Zeitlichkeit, he also used the Latinate equivalent words temporal and Temporalität which the 
convention for translating has become to capitalise the ‘T’, rendering the words as ‘Temporal’ 
and ‘Temporality’. Heidegger used the Latinate equivalents of the standard German when he 
was referring to the role of ‘temporality’ as the condition of possibility, or ‘horizon’, for 
understanding ‘being’. 
The problem for English translation is that the English language already uses the 
Latinate ‘temporal’ for its conventional usage. Albert Hofstadter, as translator of the English 
version of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, analyses this problem in his lexicon to that 
book (Heidegger 1982: 384-385). This analysis shows how the typographic difficulty of 
rendering two different concepts through only capitalisation of the first letter as a 
“recollective index” (ibid: 385) has conventionally been found preferable to other ways of 
translating Temporalität. Such alternatives might include using Greek, so to express 
‘Temporality’ as  ‘chronality’, or write ‘Temporality’ as c-temporality to indicate that this is 
temporality functioning as the aforementioned ‘condition of possibility’ for understanding 
‘being’. Nevertheless, Hofstadter argues that ‘chronality’ is too distant from the normal usage 
of ‘temporal’ in English and has connotations of ‘chronic problems’ like chronic disease and 
so on, and ‘c-temporal’ is found to be too awkward for comfortable reading (ibid: 385).
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There are a further two possible alternative renderings of ‘Temporality’. One would 
be to call it transcendental temporality, as the usage reflects the Kantian inheritance of 
discussing ‘conditions’ and ‘possibilities’ for understanding. But aside from the questionable 
legitimacy of using a two word translation of a single word, there is also the fact that 
Heidegger develops his own use of the word ‘transcendental’ which makes this option 
untenable. The final alternative to ‘Temporality’, that occurs to this commentator, would be 
to render Temporalität as meta-temporality. This would avoid the semantic confusion that 
occurs when a sentence needs to begin with either ‘temporality’ or ‘Temporality’, and does 
not seem to have any major drawback – other than contributing to the extensive and 
idiosyncratic corpus of words that already use the ‘meta’ prefix. ‘Meta-temporality’ could be 
considered an appropriate term because the prefix permits a grasp of temporality as the 
condition of possibility. Similarly, ‘metadata’ is used to indicate extra data about the original 
data, and ‘metanarrative’ is used to indicate an overarching narrative of narratives. In this 
context translating Temporalität as ‘meta-temporality’ is appropriate as Heidegger states in 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology that the “most original temporalizing of temporality 
as such is Temporality [Temporalität]” (ibid: 302).
Another example, perhaps more minor, of problems inherent in translating Heidegger 
involve his use of ‘being’ [Sein]. In the standard Macquarrie and Robinson translation ‘being’ 
is rendered as ‘Being’, but this is challenged by scholars such as Dreyfus who find that the 
capitalisation of the ‘b’ adds inappropriate connotations of an ultimate entity or Supreme 
Being (Dreyfus 1991: 11). A possible objection to this criticism is that dose not matter how 
Sein is translated as long as the rule for the translation has been made clear, is implemented 
consistently, and the meaning of the interpretation is transparent. It is beyond the scope of 
the present text to analyse all the problems of translating Heidegger and to offer a 
comprehensive alternative choice of vocabulary. Unless specifically necessary the original 
translation of a particular text will be maintained, and any required comments on the language 
noted at the time. Nevertheless, the analysis of the problem of translating Temporalität was 
not just a case, to paraphrase Husserl, of “empty word analysis” (quoted in Overgaard 2004: 
1). Aside from helpfully introducing Heidegger’s concepts of ‘temporality’ and ‘meta-
temporality’, it also provides a useful template for discussing Heidegger’s methodological 
‘destruction’ of the history of ontology, and a related methodology called ‘formal indication’.
§2.6 – The phenomenological destruction
As stated, the ‘destruction’ of the history of ontology is part of Heidegger’s 
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phenomenological method, where ‘ontology’ is the object of Heidegger’s philosophy and 
phenomenology is the way of treating that object (Heidegger 1962: 62 [38]). But the question 
remains about what kind of ‘treating’ a ‘destruction’ of ontology might be. Heidegger’s 
Destruktion is normally translated as this ‘destruction’, but this has an overly negative sense 
that he explicitly rejected (ibid: 44 [22]). Because of this, in an alternative version of Being 
and Time to the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, Joan Stambaugh translates Destruktion 
as ‘destructuring’ (Heidegger 1996: 17 [19]). Another option arises from the fact that 
Heidegger sometimes used the word Abbau instead of Destruktion. Abbau translates as 
‘dismantling’ or ‘de-construction’, some forty years before Jacques Derrida popularised his 
version of ‘deconstruction’. However, the best way of understanding the most suitable word 
for the rendering of Destruktion or Abbau is to understand the argument of why Heidegger 
believed Destruktion was needed. 
As has already been introduced, Heidegger believed that phenomenology was required 
to reveal ‘being’ as it is normally ‘hidden’, and could be ‘hidden’ for a variety of reasons. 
Furthermore, an essential part of Heidegger’s representation of ‘being’, both in relation to the 
‘being’ of Dasein and to the question of ‘being’ in general, was that it is fundamentally related 
to ‘time’. Because of this “historicality is a determining characteristic for Dasein in the very 
basis of its Being” (Heidegger 1962: 42 [20]). But ‘historicality’ is not the phenomenon of a 
Dasein having a history. Rather, it describes how Dasein “‘is’ its past in the way of its own 
Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its future on each occasion” (ibid: 41 [20], 
emphasis as in original). Consequently:
Whatever the way of being it may have at the time, and thus with whatever 
understanding of Being it may possess, Dasein has grown up both into and in 
a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself 
proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the 
possibilities of its Being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past – and this 
always means the past of its ‘generation’ – is not something which follows 
along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it. (ibid: 41 
[20], emphasis as in original)
Dasein’s existence, its self-interpretation, has a historical structure for the disclosure of its 
possibilities for that interpretation. This structure provides Dasein with a “stock of prior 
self-interpretations”, as Polt describes, so that, for example, “we have learned to interpret 
ourselves as rational animals, as sinful creatures, as egos in conflict with the id and the 
superego, or as evolving bearers of DNA” (Polt 1999: 36). Yet, as will be analysed in greater 
75
detail in section 3.3, this historical structure is part of the temporality, and meta-temporality, 
of ‘being’ and cannot be thought of in terms of the normal, ontical, understanding of ‘past’ 
and ‘history’. 
As Dasein’s ‘being’ has this ‘historical’ constitution, Heidegger argues that the study 
of ‘being’ in general is “itself characterised by historicality” (Heidegger 1962: 42 [20]). He 
maintains that
The ownmost meaning of Being which belongs to the inquiry into Being as an 
historical inquiry, gives us the assignment of inquiring into the history of that 
inquiry itself... The question of the meaning of Being must be carried through 
by explicating Dasein beforehand in its temporality and historicality... (ibid: 
42 [20-21])
However, this explication of the historicality of Dasein – via the phenomenology of Dasein’s 
everydayness – shows that while historicality discloses the possibilities for understanding 
‘being’, it also contributes the sources for the misinterpretation of ‘being’. This occurs 
because of Dasein’s tendency to ‘fall’ (see section 3.3) into “the tradition of which it has 
more or less explicitly taken hold”, which hides itself as the source of our understanding of 
‘being’ and “blocks our access” to developing ontological understanding (ibid: 42-43 [21]). 
“When tradition becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so 
inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed” (ibid: 43 
[21]). It is because of this, Heidegger alleges, that the question of ‘being’ has fallen from being 
an active matter of inquiry, despite not having been adequately formulated in its history (ibid: 
43 [21]). 
The original source of our understanding of ‘being’, and by ‘our’ Heidegger was 
always referring to the Western tradition, was ancient Greek ontology. This ontology, despite 
becoming distorted over the course of history, has determined that the understanding of 
‘being’ has been the traditional self-evidence of the ontical characteristics of entities, or, put 
another way, entities “are grasped in their Being as ‘presence’; this means that they are 
understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the ‘Present’” (ibid: 47 [25], emphasis as 
in original). This interpretation of ‘presence’ as the root of Western understanding has since 
proven  particularly influential in ‘Continental’ philosophy, as characterised by subsequent 
criticisms of the ‘metaphysics of presence’. For example, Derrida wrote, in Writing and 
Difference, that the matrix of the history of Western metaphysics and ontology “is the 
determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word... [that it has always] designated 
an invariable presence – eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, 
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subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth” (Derrida 1978: 
353, emphasis as in original). However, to understand how Heidegger used and understood 
his interpretation of ‘presence’ as the origin of Western ontological understanding, it is 
essential not to strip his ideas from the context of his phenomenological description of 
everydayness and the ontological analysis of the temporality, and meta-temporality, of 
‘being’. The former reveals the structure of understanding ‘presence-at-hand’ (Vorhandenheit) 
and the ‘present-at-hand’ (Vorhanden), as opposed to ‘readiness-to-hand’ (Zuhandenheit) 
and ‘ready-to-hand’ (Zuhanden)28, while the latter is central to Heidegger’s concern 
throughout Being and Time. What is important is not to mistakenly conclude that Heidegger 
was proposing some sort of ontology of ‘absence’, set-up in opposition to ‘presence’, as this 
would be a misleadingly oversimplification.
Heidegger traces the original ontological understanding of ‘being’ from ancient Greece, 
through what he considers the decisive historical stages of philosophical engagement with 
ontology (Heidegger 1962: 44 [23]). His argument is that:
In the course of history certain distinctive domains of Being have come into 
view and have served as the primary guides for subsequent problematics: the  
ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, the “I”, reason, spirit, person. But these 
all remain uninterrogated as to their Being and its structure, in accordance with 
the thoroughgoing way in which the question of Being has been neglected. It is 
rather the case that the categorial content of traditional [ancient Greek] 
ontology has been carried over to these entities with corresponding 
formalizations and purely negative restrictions... (ibid: 44 [22], emphasis as in 
original)
This means that the history of understanding ‘being’, which from its outset failed to identify 
the ontological difference between entities and ‘being’, has had a decisive impact on 
subsequent ontology and on Dasein’s capacity for self-interpretation. Consequently, a careful 
analysis of the history of ontology is central both for the existential-temporal analytic of the 
‘being’ of Dasein and for the inquiry into question of ‘being’ in general. This is consistent 
with his argument, which we noted earlier, that while the analysis of Dasein’s ‘being’ was 
only a starting point for Heidegger’s planned inquiry into the meaning of ‘being’ in general, he 
nevertheless maintained that ‘being’ is relational to the disclosure of ‘being’ (ibid: 228 [183]).
It is important to remember that the possibilities for Dasein’s self-interpretation, its 
existence, is disclosed to it by its historical-temporal structure. The reason this is important 
2 8 See section 3.5 for a detailed discussion of these terms, their use, their meaning, and for their role in the 
phenomenological architecture that Heidegger constructs.
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relates to why practising a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology should be 
understood as part of the methodological core of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time. As 
we argued earlier, either Destruktion or Abbau should be translated in the context of the 
phenomena which it describes. This structure is what, borrowing a term from Husserl’s later 
historical interest, can be called the ‘sedimentation’ of meaning over time. This 
‘sedimentation’, what Heidegger calls ‘tradition’, is two-sided in terms of its influence on 
Dasein’s capacity for ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’ existence. This question of ‘authenticity’ is 
the important question for Division Two of Being and Time, and which we will also leave for 
detailed analysis until section 3.3. In summary, ‘tradition’ represents a mode of ‘inauthentic’ 
historical-temporal existence, while ‘heritage’ is the ‘authentic’ equivalent. The problem is 
how tradition’s disclosing of an inherited understanding of ‘being’ becomes hidden in Dasein’s 
‘falling’ (see section 3.3). This leads to an unquestioning continuation of the ontological 
understanding of ‘being’ as ‘presence-at-hand’. Nevertheless, because the disclosure of ‘being’ 
to Dasein has a relational quality to ‘being’ in general, an inquiry into ‘being’ requires that the 
phenomenological method take into account the developing ‘variable’ that is presented by the 
historical-temporal structure of the disclosure of ‘being’. Dasein is only Dasein because of its 
tradition/heritage, and an existential-temporal analytic of Dasein has to understand this 
tradition if it is to progress. This is also why calling this part of the analytic ‘destruction’ can 
be misleading because it seems to imply a negative function.
Heidegger was at pains to dispel the idea of his ‘destruction’ as a negative criticism of 
the past, which is why we shall refer to it hereafter always as ‘phenomenological destruction’ 
in order to emphasise its methodological goal29. This goal of phenomenological destruction 
was to make transparent the concealment of the understanding of ‘being’ that occurs in the 
sedimentation of tradition “until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we 
achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being” (ibid: 44 [22]).
But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking 
off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive 
possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its 
limits; these in turn are given factically in the way the question [of ‘being’] is 
formulated at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is 
thus bounded off. (ibid: 44 [22], emphasis as in original)
2 9 This, admittedly, uses a two word reference to Heidegger’s single word, which was a practice we previously 
questioned in terms of how to render Temporalität. However, as the unpublished second half of Being and 
Time was given the title “basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the 
problematic of Temporality [meta-temporality] as our clue” (Heidegger 1962: 63 [39], my emphasis), it is 
appropriate to reiterate the ‘destruction’ in the phenomenological terms Heidegger intended.
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This additional point about the historical possibilities of the field of inquiry means not only 
that Heidegger accepts that the field of ontology and its phenomenological investigation is 
limited, but it also means that he accepts that his own perception of the question of ‘being’ is 
contingent. As he repeats in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, even “the ontological 
investigation which we are now conducting is determined by its historical situation and, 
therewith, by certain possibilities of approaching beings and by the philosophical tradition” 
(Heidegger 1982: 22). Heidegger even accepts that his argument that ‘being’ be understood 
temporally and meta-temporally is contingent in this way. 
Faulty interpretations, misunderstandings, put much more stubborn obstacles 
in the way of authentic cognition than a total ignorance. However, these 
faulty interpretations of transcendence, of the basic relationship of the Dasein 
to beings and to itself, are no more defects of thought or acumen. They have 
their reason and their necessity in the Dasein’s own historical existence. In the 
end, these faulty interpretations must be made, so that the Dasein may reach 
the path to the true phenomena by correcting them. Without our knowing 
where the faulty interpretation lies, we can be quietly persuaded that there is 
also a faulty interpretation concealed within the Temporal [meta-temporal] 
interpretation of being as such, and again no arbitrary one. (ibid: 322, 
emphasis as in original)
Yet this historical contingency of interpretations of ‘being’ is the very reason why the 
phenomenological destruction is necessary, as a “process in which the traditional concepts, 
which at first must necessarily be employed, are de-constructed down to the sources from 
which they are drawn. Only by means of this destruction can ontology fully assure itself in a 
phenomenological way of the genuine character of its concepts” (ibid: 23). The 
phenomenological destruction carefully analyses how the understanding of ‘being’ has been 
sedimented in traditional concepts to reveal their contingency and so enables the 
progressively recursive development of the question of ‘being’. “Construction in philosophy 
is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a de-constructing of traditional concepts carried out 
in a historical recursion to the tradition” (ibid: 23).
It is because the phenomenological destruction’s recursive or hermeneutic 
characteristic is overlooked that it has sometimes been considered as peripheral, even 
inessential for Heidegger’s phenomenological method in Being and Time. In a carefully 
nuanced piece, Overgaard presents this argument that the destruction does not belong to the 
“thematic core” of Heidegger’s basic phenomenology (Overgaard 2004: 100). The argument 
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can be summarised in the claim that the destruction is a task that occurs after the 
‘phenomenology’, that “it is only when we have already learned to ‘see’ something like 
modes of being that we can begin the destructive appropriation of the tradition” (ibid: 98, 
emphasis as in original). He argues that one “cannot begin a destruction of the handed-down 
stock of classical ontology without first recognizing the handed-down as handed-down... [and 
thus] the only sensible task left for that destruction becomes that of discovering what ‘truth’, 
after all, there is in the handed down interpretation” (ibid: 99). Overgaard continues this 
argument to conclude that “the problem of ‘destruction’ is not of crucial importance in a 
discussion of an explicit posing of the question of being, however crucial it might eventually 
become in Heidegger’s actual ontological investigation” (ibid: 99, my emphasis). 
While I will argue against Overgaard’s interpretation of the phenomenological 
destruction as a subsequent investigation of the question of ‘being’ that occurs after what 
might be called the initial ‘phenomenological phase’, it is important to understand that 
Overgaard was not advocating that the phenomenological destruction had no role in 
Heidegger’s project for Being and Time. He elaborates his ‘middle position’ regarding 
orientations to Heidegger’s phenomenological destruction in an extensive footnote.
Against my interpretation that the destruction has some positive task within 
the framework of [Being and Time], one could argue that in fact it has no task 
left to perform within that framework... [that it is] perfectly possible to 
practice phenomenological ontology without having set the destruction in 
motion, and therefore the destruction is no longer needed within the project 
defined by the analytic of Dasein [this is an argument that Overgaard 
attributes to Thomas Schwarz Wentzer]. Certainly, the task left for it to 
perform is no longer crucial to the Heideggerian undertaking – indeed, the 
conclusion of the present section is that the destruction does not belong to the 
methodological “core” of Heidegger’s phenomenological project. I am not 
convinced, however, that there is absolutely no task for it to perform within 
the framework of that project.... I shall be happy to grant that the destruction 
has more functions within the program of fundamental ontology [but not, 
note, within phenomenology] than explicitly acknowledged in this section. 
However, I still believe that the main argument is essentially correct: a 
destruction am Leitfaden der Seinsfrage only makes sense if a lot of work is 
already done. Obviously, we must already be able to formulate the question 
of being – we must already see that being is questionable – if this question is 
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to function as our “guide” or “clue” in our destruction confrontation with the 
tradition. (ibid: 100, emphasis as in original)
Overgaard’s position is correct in rejecting the interpretation that the phenomenological 
destruction has no role in Heidegger’s project. He also grants the possibility that it has a  
positive function in the wider ontological framework, that it might be the destructive 
“confrontation with tradition that makes Heidegger so attentive to the possible implicit 
ontological commitments in our philosophical concepts” (ibid: 100).
§2.7 – The recursive unity of the phenomenological destruction
My criticism of Overgaard’s analysis, while it is very clearly thought through and is careful 
not to reject the destruction out of hand, is that nevertheless he does regard the destruction as 
part of Heidegger’s phenomenological methodology. I disagree with this conclusion, and 
regard the ‘destruction’ as the being the ‘phenomenological destruction’. As Overgaard sees it, 
Heidegger’s phenomenology precedes the role of destruction in addressing ‘being’, and that 
accordingly “it is perfectly reasonable that in the context of the planned work on [Being and 
Time], Heidegger places the problem of the destruction in the (never published) second part... 
rather than in the beginning of the work” (ibid: 99-100). This is partly correct, as it was part 
two of Being and Time that was entitled “basic features of a phenomenological destruction of 
the history of ontology, with problematic of Temporality [what we have been calling meta-
temporality] as our clue” (Heidegger 1962: 63 [39], my emphasis). Yet, as that title should 
indicate, Overgaard is mistaken in interpreting the phenomenological destruction as not being 
part of Heidegger’s ‘core’ phenomenological methodology. First, though this is a relatively 
minor issue compared to the next, there are elements of the phenomenological destruction 
within division one of the first part of Being and Time, and so the analysis that it does not 
occur in the published material is not entirely convincing. Chapter three of the first division, 
on “The Worldhood of the World”, contains much in the character of the phenomenological 
destruction in sections comparing Heidegger’s analysis of ‘world’, ‘worldhood’ or 
‘worldliness’ [Weltlichkeit], and ‘being-in-the-world’, against the tradition of the Cartesian 
understanding of these phenomena. This can be seen, for example, in these sections from the 
third chapter: “[18]B. A Contrast between our Analysis of Worldhood and Descartes’ 
Interpretation of the World”; “19. The Definition of the ‘World’ as res extensa”; “20. 
Foundations of the Ontological Definition of the ‘World’”; and “21. Hermeneutical 
Discussion of the Cartesian Ontology of the ‘World’”. These sections should not be 
dismissed, as they, as part of chapter three as a whole, are amongst Heidegger’s most 
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insightful analyses. We will analyse Heidegger’s view of the ‘world’ in section 3.4, but what 
is needed to be understood is that these sections contribute to a phenomenological destruction 
of the ontological tradition’s conceptual inheritance of the ‘worldless-I’. This is required, as 
Heidegger later objects in division two, as if “in the ontology of Dasein, we ‘take our 
departure’ from a worldless “I” in order to provide this “I” with an Object and an 
ontologically baseless relation to that Object, then we have ‘presupposed’ not too much, but 
too little” (ibid: 363 [315-316], emphasis as in original).
However, while these sections show that elements of the phenomenological 
destruction are present fairly early on in Being and Time, this by itself does not disprove 
Overgaard’s interpretation of the destruction as being after the ‘phenomenological phase’ of 
Heidegger’s methodology. Overgaard’s analysis of Heidegger’s methodology in Being and 
Time results in this interpretation because he overlooks the overall recursive structure of the 
methodology, and this is because he excludes historicity and temporality from his analysis. 
This occurs not through ignorance, as Overgaard explicitly states that historicity and 
temporality are not part of his analysis in his comparative text Husserl and Heidegger on 
Being in the World. 
Furthermore, a number of important issues are not dealt with in any detail in 
this study, including the problems of temporality and historicity. In both 
Husserl and Heidegger, temporality is absolutely central to an understanding 
of subjectivity and of being.... Fully recognizing the importance of the 
problems of temporality and historicity for any exhaustive account of the 
Husserl-Heidegger relation, the present study leaves these issues for other 
studies to address.... Temporality and historicity, crucially important as these 
topics are, thus fall outside its scope. (Overgaard 2004: 8, emphasis as in 
original)
Overgaard’s text does not overlook temporality and historicity because he believes these 
phenomena to be unimportant, or that Heidegger’s and Husserl’s treatment of these topics is 
trivial, rather, he recognises the opposite, that because they are so important to these authors 
that a separate study was required to analyse them. However, while this is a robust rational,  
bracketing Heidegger’s concern with temporal phenomena in Being and Time, and instead 
concentrating on division one, distorts the overall analysis of the book. In the case of 
Overgaard’s work, a misinterpretation of the phenomenological destruction has resulted.
As has been observed, the structure of Being and Time is recursive. Heidegger begins 
investigating the question of ‘being’ through an interpretation of the ‘being’ of the entity that 
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understands ‘being’, this he calls Dasein. Heidegger then provides a phenomenological 
analysis of the modal structures of Dasein’s way of existence, first in terms of its 
everydayness. He then progressively reinterprets his initial formulations of Dasein’s ‘being’ 
on the basis of the preceding insights. Heidegger discusses this in terms of circularity, but as 
he differentiates between vicious and virtuous circles (Heidegger 1962: 194 [152-153]), and 
has a final if unrealised objective in understanding ‘being’ in general, this circularity can be 
better understood in terms of the recursiveness of understanding and interpretation. 
Moreover, this recursiveness is not just a feature of the design of his treatise for the analytic 
of Dasein and ‘being’, but an existential structure of Dasein’s ‘being’. “The ‘circle’ in 
understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the 
existential constitution of Dasein – that is, in the understanding that interprets. An entity for 
which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular 
structure” (ibid: 195 [153]). In Overgaard’s interpretation of Heidegger’s methodology his 
phenomenology is viewed as the way of initially posing the question of ‘being’, and the 
destruction will only later follow to see where the ontological tradition has stood in relation to 
this question, to provide what might be called a genealogy of the insights and mistakes of the 
tradition. This subsequent linear locating of the destruction as something after 
phenomenology overlooks the necessarily recursive nature of the analysis of Dasein’s ‘being’, 
a necessity that stems from the temporality of Dasein. Rather than a tool for investigating a 
different area of ontology, Heidegger’s destruction has to be understood as part of the 
phenomenological recursive process. While Overgaard acknowledges that the destruction   
may eventually become important “in Heidegger’s actual ontological investigation” 
(Overgaard 2004: 99), regarding it as non-phenomenological overlooks in fact that the 
Heidegger of Being and Time maintained that phenomenology is the “way of treating” 
ontology (Heidegger 1962: 62 [38]).
Overgaard’s linear interpretation of Heidegger’s methodology results in the mistaken 
view that the destruction is an activity that is separate from phenomenology. Rather, the 
phenomenological destruction is an indispensable stage in the recursive analysis of ‘being’. 
Regarding the destruction as non-phenomenological only makes sense when the ‘being’ of 
Dasein is regarded in the ontological tradition’s atemporal understanding of ‘being’, as that 
which is present-at-hand. This is what Heidegger means when he notes that if Dasein is 
understood as a kind of ‘being’ which is present-at-hand, then the recursive structure of 
interpretation and understanding is a phenomenon that must be altogether avoided when 
characterising “anything like Dasein ontologically” (ibid: 195 [153]). Yet presence-at-hand 
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and being present-at-hand are characteristics that can be attributed to Dasein only within the 
limited circumstances where Dasein’s ‘contextuality’, the hermeneutic structure of ‘being-in’, 
is completely disregarded (ibid: 82 [55]). Heidegger does acknowledge that such circumstances 
do occur, when only some ontical characteristic is the matter of inquiry. 
Determining the structure of the human anatomy provides a good example of the 
legitimacy of taking Dasein as present-at-hand. Such occasions represent what Heidegger 
meant when the positive possibilities of the ontological tradition are considered through the 
phenomenological destruction, to show how to analyse entities when it is appropriate to 
consider only their ontical characteristics. But part of the phenomenological destruction is to 
keep this tradition’s approach within its limits (ibid: 44 [22]), to show how, when, and why 
it is inappropriate to treat an entity, and Dasein in particular, as something present-at-hand in 
this manner. If all treatment of Dasein is conducted in a similar manner as the determining of 
the structure of the human anatomy, to continue the previous example, then it becomes 
‘medicalised’ in the manner that Michel Foucault later critiqued in his history of medical 
science The Birth of the Clinic. In this text Foucault notes that it “is understandable, then, that 
medicine should have had such importance in the constitution of the sciences of man – an 
importance that is not only methodological, but ontological, in that concerns man’s being as 
object of positive knowledge” (Foucault 2003: 244, my emphasis). Foucault’s argument was 
that not only is the human objectified in a manner similar to that as Heidegger’s argument 
about the present-at-hand, but that the medicalised understanding of ‘being’ was in terms of 
health and normality. This understanding, when speaking of people, does not “think first of 
the internal structure of the organised being, but of the medical bipolarity of the normal and 
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the pathological” (ibid: 41, emphasis as in original)30.
The phenomenological destruction is essential in the analytic of Dasein because 
Dasein’s ‘being’ is, out with a limited modality, not present-at-hand. Following the 
phenomenological destruction through is what transforms an initial existential analytic into 
the existential-temporal analytic. As Heidegger maintains in The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, all parts of the phenomenological method “belong together in their content 
and must receive grounding in their mutual pertinence” (Heidegger 1982: 23). This unitary 
structure of phenomenology has three components: reduction, construction, and destruction.
Apprehension of being, ontological investigation, always turns, at first and 
necessarily, to some being; but then, in a precise way, it is led away from that 
being and led back to its being. We call this basic component of 
phenomenological method – the leading back or re-duction of investigative 
vision from a naively apprehended being to being – phenomenological 
reduction.... For us [To interject, Heidegger is here distinguishing his version 
of the reduction from Husserl’s] phenomenological reduction means leading 
phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever 
may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the being 
of this being... 
[But this pure] aversion from beings is a merely negative methodological 
measure which not only needs to be supplemented by a positive one but 
expressly requires us to be led toward being; it thus requires guidance. Being 
does not become accessible like a being... it must always be brought to view in 
a free projection. This projecting of the antecedently given being upon its 
being and the structures of its being we call phenomenological construction.
But the method of phenomenology is likewise not exhausted by 
phenomenological construction. We have heard that every projection of being 
3 0 It should not be surprising that there is a relationship to Heidegger’s thoughts in Foucault’s. As Foucault 
stated in an interview when asked about his intellectual influences:
I was surprised when two of my friends in Berkeley wrote something about me and said 
Heidegger was influential [Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1982)]. Of course it 
was quite true. When I was a student in the 1950’s, I read Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. 
When you feel an overwhelming influence, you try to open a window. Paradoxically enough, 
Heidegger is not very difficult for a Frenchman to understand: When every word is an 
enigma, you are in a not-too-bad position to understand Heidegger. Being and Time is 
difficult, but the more recent works are clearer. (Martin 1988: 12)
It might be objected that Foucault never wrote anything about Heidegger, and consequently that if Heidegger 
had indeed influenced his thought then it was not a determinative influence. However, in another interview 
where Foucault addresses his Heideggerian influence this interpretation is dismissed. The following extracts of 
this interview are quoted from the introduction of Heidegger: A Critical Reader.
“Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher... I still have the notes I took 
while reading Heidegger – I have tons of them! – and they are far more important than the 
ones I took on Hegel or Marx. My whole philosophical development was determined by my 
reading of Heidegger.”... “But I’ve never written anything on Heidegger... I think it’s 
important to have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, 
but on whom one doesn’t write.” (Dreyfus and Hall 1992: 1)
Bearing in mind Heidegger’s influence on Foucault it is, therefore, very valuable when interpreting Foucault’s 
work.
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occurs in a reductive recursion from beings.... This commencement is 
obviously always determined by the factual experiences of beings and the 
range of possibilities of experience that at any time are peculiar to a factical 
Dasein, and hence to the historical situation of a philosophical investigation.... 
Because the Dasein is historical in its own existence, possibilities of access 
and modes of interpretation of beings are themselves diverse, varying in 
different historical circumstances.... It is for this reason that there necessarily 
belongs to the conceptual interpretation of beings and its structures, that is, to 
the reductive construction of being, a destruction... (ibid: 21-23, emphasis as 
in original)
While it is one function of the phenomenological destruction to reveal the influence of 
tradition’s conceptual structure on the understanding of ‘being’, it also functions to carry 
forward the phenomenological investigation. This investigation starts with a reductive 
recursion from an entity, Dasein, to its ‘being’. The analysis of ‘being’ is then constructed 
through careful attention to how the ‘being’ of Dasein, its existence, is constituted. This 
existence, in it is disclosure, is found to be historical-temporal, and so continued analysis 
requires a progressive dismantling of how Dasein’s ‘being’ has been constituted and 
sedimented over time. It is all these stages that form Heidegger’s phenomenology, not one 
alone. Furthermore, calling them ‘stages’ is misleadingly because, following Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic principles, his phenomenology ‘circles’ through them towards a progressively 
less inchoate understanding of the question of ‘being’. This ‘circling’ is a recursive process, 
with the ultimate aim to establish the ontology of ‘being’ in general.
It is a point of speculation, but it may be that reservations about regarding the 
destruction as phenomenological belong to concerns about access. In the standard 
interpretation, and this is the interpretation that Heidegger understood (ibid: 21), Husserlian 
phenomenology is the descriptive clarification of the essential or eidetic features of 
consciousness’s experience of entities (see, for example, Crowell 2009: 10-11). In this 
approach access to the understanding of experience is through reflecting on transcendental, a 
priori structures. This would mean the destruction has no place within the phenomenological 
method, serving only as an ancillary investigation into what tradition has got right and wrong 
in light of what the phenomenology has uncovered. However, if the structures of experience 
have a historical-temporal constitution, as described by Heidegger, then a phenomenological 
destruction is required because these structures will have been developing over time. A 
historical-temporal constitution of experience means that the entity which is experiencing, be 
it understood as a Husserlian consciousness or a Heideggerian Dasein, cannot be fully 
analysed in its temporal present. This does not necessarily indicate that all of Dasein’s 
existential structures have been changing, only that some of them have. For example, that 
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Dasein has a historical-temporal constitution has not changed, nor has its existential way of 
self-interpretation changed, because if the human entity lacked this structure it would cease to 
be Dasein. It could be argued though, that there was a period when a pre-Dasein entity 
developed into Dasein. To what extent the evolution of a Dasein entity was determined by 
either an ontical or an ontological emergence in its history, or by a subtler co-emergence, 
would be a matter of careful philosophical and archaeological investigation. Unfortunately, 
this is an investigation that cannot be pursued in this current study. However, some of 
Heidegger’s retrospective criticisms of Being and Time included concerns about the problem 
of the history of ‘being’ (see Dreyfus 1992: 173, 184), and these concerns may have 
contributed to Heidegger’s failure to complete Being and Time. 
§2.8 – Formal indication and Heidegger’s concern with language
There is one more element of Heidegger’s method that has not yet been analysed, though it 
has an important function within his phenomenology. This is his use of ‘formal indication’. 
This relates to how to use language in an existential-temporal analytic of Dasein and when 
formulating the question of ‘being’ in general. It also shows the unitary structure of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, as it aims to both point towards phenomena as a referent and to 
make critically evident tradition’s conceptual prejudices. Accordingly, it works for both the 
reduction-construction of phenomena, and for the destruction of phenomena. However, 
analysing the formal indication also provides insight into the manner in which Heideggerian 
methodology, while on the surface appearing alien, has structural similarities with Husserl’s 
original conceptions for phenomenology. This was noted by Daniel O. Dahlstrom in his 
paper Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indication when he points out 
that formal indication was “Heidegger’s way of appropriating the Husserlian epoché” 
(Dahlstrom 1994: 783n), and subsequently analysed as part of Overgaard’s comparative text 
on Husserl and Heidegger (Overgaard 2004: 82-90). 
Both the Husserlian epoché31 and the Heideggerian formal indication attempt to 
prevent a metabasis eis allo genos, a slipping from discussing one entity into that of the 
terms of another entity, rather than getting at the actual ontology of the original entity (ibid: 
38, 85). This can be restated in Heideggerian terminology as the criticism that an entity’s 
‘being’ cannot be ontologically analysed by reducing that entity to its ontical components. 
This reduction to ontical parts assumes that eventually there is an ontical foundation for an 
entity’s ‘being’, that there is, eventually, something  present-at-hand that can be uncovered. 
This is the example that Heidegger uses to make this critique in relation to looking for the 
3 1 See section 3.5 for a description of the epoché and its relation to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction.
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‘being’ of Dasein.
But if the Self is conceived ‘only’ as a way of Being of this entity, this seems 
tantamount to volatilizing the real ‘core’ of Dasein. Any apprehensiveness 
however which one may have about this gets its nourishment from the 
perverse assumption that the entity in question has at bottom the kind of 
Being which belongs to something present-at-hand, even if one is far from 
attributing to it the solidity of an occurrent corporeal Thing. Yet man’s 
‘substance’ is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence. 
(Heidegger 1962: 153 [117], emphasis as in original)
‘Existence’, to reiterate Heidegger’s anti-essentialist thesis inherent in his critique of 
traditional ‘what-ness’ ontology, is self-interpretation. Furthermore, existence as self-
interpretation is never worldless and is historically-temporally structured. Therefore, there is 
no ultimate ontical foundation that can be called ‘the self’. This is despite the ontological 
tradition’s linguistic-conceptual inheritance that prejudices an understanding of just such a 
reified self as a present-at-hand thing. Rather, the ‘being’ of Dasein must be analysed by 
phenomenology, a methodology which uses formal indication to signify ‘natural’ language’s 
inherited conceptual bias.
The problem for Heidegger that necessitated his use of formal indication originates in 
the criticism that the ontological tradition inculcates the tendency to understand ‘being’ in 
terms of it being present and consequently accessible only in terms of its presence. 
Consequently, Heidegger’s formal indication is an attempt to use language in a manner that 
will avoid reification in his own ontology. This is not an easy task because our normal or 
‘natural’ language has been set up in the ontological tradition’s ontical framework. As 
Overgaard describes it, the ‘natural’ language “is the language with which we refer to mundane 
entities, processes, relations, and so forth. In Heideggerian terminology this means that our 
language is basically ‘ontic’: we have many words for entities, for relations between them, but 
it seems concepts (and especially the grammar) are lacking for the enterprise of describing the 
being of entities” (Overgaard 2004: 86, emphasis as in original). However, formal indication 
cannot escape this problem directly, rather it attempts to subvert it. It introduces a way of 
talking about an entity, which is ontical, in such a way as to lead towards considering the 
ontology of that entity. The word ‘Dasein’ is perhaps the best example of this process, as 
Overgaard also notes (ibid: 89). On the one hand, it is simply a substitute ontical word for the 
same entity as ‘human being’, but by slightly distorting the ‘natural’ language for discussing 
humans it attempts to provoke reflection on the way of ‘being’ of these entities. 
This use of language is one reason why Heidegger’s work is, notoriously, difficult to 
read, as it deliberately wants to emphasise that access to understanding ‘being’ is not normal 
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in the vernacular. He defends this difficulty as necessary, stating in History of the Concept of 
Time that if “we are forced here to introduce ponderous and perhaps inelegant expressions, it 
is not a matter of personal whim or a special fancy for my own terminology, but the 
compulsion of the phenomena themselves” (Heidegger 1992a: 151). And he reiterates this in 
Being and Time:
With regard to the awkwardness and ‘inelegance’ of expression in the analyses 
to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell 
about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task 
we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’.
(Heidegger 1962: 63 [38-39], emphasis as in original)
Heidegger’s use of language is not to be unnecessarily obscure, rather, in the context of 
tradition’s conceptual legacy, it is an attempt to express what is normally obscured by 
language. Heidegger’s formal indications serve as a “warning that authentic access to what 
they point to is not common” (Dahlstrom 1994: 785). Furthermore, they are nothing other 
than indications; they are signifiers for considering the ontology of ‘how-ness’, rather than the 
‘what-ness’ or the ‘this-ness’. As Heidegger states about an early definition of ‘Dasein’ in 
terms of a state of its ‘who-ness’, “[t]his definition indicates an ontologically constitutive 
state, but it does no more than indicate it” (Heidegger 1962: 150 [114], emphasis as in 
original). However, while Heidegger’s use of language, and his methods for inquiring into 
‘being’, are original, they do nevertheless have a complex provenance from the heritage of 
hermeneutics. Consequently, an introduction to the history of hermeneutics begins the next 
chapter, which furthers the analysis of Heidegger’s understanding of ‘being’.
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Chapter 3 
Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Time and Technology
§3 – Guide to chapter three
This chapter begins by considering the influence on Heidegger’s understanding of ‘being’ from 
the hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey. This documents the 
movement of the idea of hermeneutics as a discipline for the interpretation of texts to 
Heidegger’s view that human existentiality, or Dasein, is inherently hermeneutic. This 
hermeneutic nature of Dasein, it is shown, is structured by the temporal architecture of 
‘being’. An interpretation of Dasein’s temporality is then presented, with attention to its 
structure as ‘being-in-the-world’. This covers the analysis of Heidegger’s concepts of the 
‘who-ness’, the ‘there-ness’, and the ‘world-ness’ of Dasein. The chapter then concludes by 
demonstrating how this interpretation of the phenomenological architecture that Heidegger 
has presented enables the explication of the temporality of Dasein’s technological 
existentiality.
§3.1 – Heidegger’s hermeneutic heritage
The main principle of the hermeneutic circle is that the universal can only be known through 
knowledge of the particular and that the particular can only be understood through knowledge 
of the universal. This idea of the hermeneutic circle correlates to what the philosopher Ian 
Hacking has characterized in another context as the process of ‘historical ontology’. He 
described this as the study of “how our practices of naming interact with the things we 
name”, and as the study of the “interactions between what there is (and what comes into 
being) and our conceptions of it” (Hacking 2004: 2). As with Heidegger’s philosophy in 
general, this indicates that we should not only be concerned with ‘what’ is named, but also 
with ‘how’ it is named. This dynamic between the historically developing understanding of 
existence and the naming of concepts raises the challenge of how to finalise a body of 
knowledge on a subject. However, as we have seen, Heidegger’s argument about this is that 
“[w]hat is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way” 
(Heidegger 1962: 195 [153]). The point is that the hermeneutic circle is not to be perceived as 
a vicious spiral in which nothing is resolved, but rather as a virtuous process of recursion in 
which greater degrees of understanding are achieved. However, the challenge remains regarding 
the right way to enter it. For example, what degree of understanding is required to begin 
interpreting a text?
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Various degrees of pre-understanding may be distinguished: first of all a reader 
of  a text must be familiar at least to some extent with the linguistic code, that 
is the actual language in which the text is composed, and be able to decipher 
the linguistic signs, that means the words. But a mere knowledge of signs does 
not yet disclose the world of a text. The process of such disclosure can only 
start once the reader has some kind of existential connection with what the 
text speaks about. (Jeanrond 1991: 6, emphasis as in original)
It should be asked how the idea of hermeneutics that leads to Heidegger’s usage in Being and 
Time can be brought into the hermeneutic circle for interpretation and explication in the right 
way so as to provide a virtuous cycle for understanding Heidegger’s thought. The answer is 
to treat the history of hermeneutics no differently than its own theories of historically 
attentive interpretation demands of other bodies of knowledge. This means that an 
understanding of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of Dasein can be developed through chronicling 
the emergence and divergence of hermeneutic theory.
As stated, Heidegger’s phenomenology has a hermeneutic dimension. However, his 
phenomenology and his hermeneutics are not merely two separate but related methodologies, 
rather they are unified extensions of his analytic of ‘being’. Heidegger argued that the 
“phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, 
where it designates this business of interpreting” (Heidegger 1962: 62 [37], emphasis as in 
original). It is because of this that his technique is sometimes termed hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Dreyfus, for example, calls it this, characterising it as the “interpretation of 
human beings as essentially self-interpreting” (Dreyfus 1991: 34). Consequently, Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics is not only a way of interpreting ‘being’, but it is an analysis of Dasein as an 
interpreting ‘being’. The meaning of the term ‘hermeneutics’ has diverged over the history of 
its use, though all of these uses have been related to the idea of interpretation. Richard Palmer 
identifies six of these meanings, presenting them in the rough chronological order in which 
they emerged. “(1) the theory of biblical exegesis; (2) general philological methodology; (3) 
the science of all linguistic understanding; (4) the methodological foundation of 
Geisteswissenschaften; (5) phenomenology of existence and of existential understanding; and 
(6) the systems of interpretation, both recollective and iconoclastic, used by man to reach the 
meaning behind myths and symbols” (Palmer 1969: 33, emphasis as in original). These six 
meanings can be generalised further into three. Hermeneutics began as an exegetical theory for 
interpreting the meaning of texts, develops into a set of methodological principles for the 
interpretation of human existence across the humanities, and diverges with Heidegger to 
become a phenomenological description about the structure of human existentiality. These are 
the three general senses of hermeneutics.
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1) A set of principles for the interpretation of texts and symbols.
2) A methodology for acquiring social-cultural knowledge about humanity.
3) An ontological thesis about human existentiality.
The emergence of these senses can be chronicled by considering the works of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, and then Heidegger who brought about the third sense. 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, it can be seen, has it heritage in the works of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey. However, chronicling the development of hermeneutics through 
its senses not only reveals how and why these changes of meaning have occurred, it also 
shows what aspects of the idea of ‘hermeneutics’ have remained unchanged. This is its 
attentiveness to the historical contingency of human understanding, which, as will be shown 
in section 3.3, leads to Heidegger’s concern with temporality as the framework for Dasein’s 
existentiality, and ultimately as the horizon for the understanding of ‘being’ in general.
Arguably, the first systematic inroad towards developing a coherent structure for a 
non-traditional understanding ‘being’ can be found in the work of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century scholar Friedrich Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher was a biblical and 
classical scholar, theologian, and philosopher, and who was trained in a specific hermeneutic 
tradition; in how to appropriately translate religious texts by analysing historical and 
linguistic difficulties that arise in interpreting their meaning across cultural shifts in 
understanding. Alongside this special hermeneutic of theological understanding there were 
other special hermeneutic fields for classical philology and for legal interpretation. In his 
prize-essay on Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey describes the history and 
origins of hermeneutics in depth. In it he acknowledges that textual exegesis and reflection had 
existed long before a science of hermeneutics. For example, there are:
hermeneutical passages in Origen and in the writings of the Antioch School, as 
well as the seven rules of Tyconius. Even more extensive discussions can be 
found in the third book of Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine and in the 
second book of Junilius’s well-known work, Instituta regularia divinae legis 
(Rules for the Divine Law). (Dilthey 1996: 33)
However, Dilthey argued that these scattered examples lacked any disciplinary coherence and 
that the form of hermeneutics, as it is now generally understood, did not arise until the clash 
between how to interpret biblical Scripture occurred between Catholicism and Protestantism, 
beginning with the Council of Trent (ibid: 33-35). From the mid sixteenth century 
hermeneutic theory developed onwards from this event, so that a systematisation occurred 
for various specialised hermeneutics such as for the philological, the theological, and the legal; 
into theories of interpretation for different types of text.
92
Schleiermacher, however, believed that hermeneutics should be more than a group of 
distinct theories of interpretation. He believed that in order to understand any particular text, 
regardless of its field, required that the general act of understanding had to be studied as well. 
He wanted to form a general hermeneutics, the study of understanding itself, rather than 
maintain the fragmented status quo of hermeneutics. He lamented in his manuscripts that at 
“present there is no general hermeneutics as the art of understanding but only a variety of 
specialised hermeneutics” (Schleiermacher 1977: 95). It is argued that Schleiermacher’s intent 
to create a general hermeneutics characterizes the beginning of a systematic concern with the 
acts of interpretation and understanding (see Palmer 1969: 94 for example). 
Of his theory in general, there are two important contributions that Schleiermacher 
makes to hermeneutics. First, he distinguished two different structures of interpretation that a 
general hermeneutics must take into account: the grammatical and the technical. As he wrote 
in his 1809-10 manuscript on General Hermeneutics, these two structures of interpretation 
are not self-sufficient, both structures must be fully analysed to achieve a complete 
interpretation (Schleiermacher 1998: 229).
The grammatical side puts the utterer in the background and regards him just 
as an organ of the language, but regards language as what really generates the 
utterance. The technical side, on the other hand, regards the utterer as the real-
ground of the utterance and language merely as the negative limiting principle.
(ibid: 230)
On why the second form of interpretation is termed ‘technical’ Paul Ricoeur suggested that it 
was because it held the project of a Kunstlehre, a ‘technology’ (Ricoeur 1977: 186). While the 
grammatical structure holds the negative characteristic of limiting how an utterance could have 
been made, the technical structure holds the positive characteristic of creativity, the 
individual’s artifice in an utterance. Because of this Schleiermacher suggested that in “the 
same way as the grammatical sides of hermeneutics relate to the theory of language, so the 
technical sides relate to the theory of art” (Schleiermacher 1998: 268). As Ricoeur notes, one 
consequence of this structure of hermeneutics is that an overemphasis on grammatical 
interpretation produces a pedantic analysis, while an overemphasis on technical interpretation 
produces a nebulous analysis (Ricoeur 1977: 186).
Schleiermacher’s second major contribution to the idea of a general hermeneutics was 
his thoughts on the circularity of the hermeneutic act. This is what is now famously termed 
the hermeneutic circle. It is this idea of the hermeneutic circle that we documented Heidegger 
as having drawn upon in the previous section. Examples of Schleiermacher’s engagement with 
the idea of the hermeneutic circle include these two principles from his Hermeneutics and 
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Criticism manuscript that state:
20. The vocabulary and the history of the era of an author relate as the whole 
from which his writings must be understood as the part, and the whole must, 
in turn, be understood from the part.
1. Complete knowledge is always in this apparent circle, that each particular 
can only be understood via the general, of which it is a part, and vice versa. 
(Schleiermacher 1998: 24, emphasis as in original)
and
23. Even within a single text the particular can only be understood from out of 
the whole, and a cursory reading to get an overview of the whole must 
therefore precede the more precise explication. (ibid: 27, emphasis as in 
original)
In his earlier General Hermeneutics manuscript he also makes this circularity point about 
understanding, but includes a few more comments on the structure of the process of  
understanding the whole and understanding the particular.
28. The whole is provisionally to be understood as an individual of a genus, 
and the intuition of the genus, i.e. the formal understanding of the whole, must 
precede the material understanding of the particular.
One can admittedly also come in the first place to the knowledge of a genus 
via knowledge of an individual case which belongs under it; but then [one] also 
[comes] historically [to that knowledge] via knowledge of the earliest genera, 
and in these one also sees the genus arise as a new genus from a familiar older 
sphere. (ibid: 232)
The open question that this argument leaves regards what the first genus of understanding 
might be considered. We might, with reference to our earlier arguments about the formation of 
personal ontologies, regard the original genera of understanding as the foundational, or 
fundamental, ontological structure that a human being generates. This assertion would not, I 
believe, be alien to Schleiermacher, as he himself suggests that much “is therefore to be learned 
for hermeneutics from the procedures of childhood” (ibid: 235).
Schleiermacher developed hermeneutics – or at least presented the foundations for its 
development – from a series of specialised theories to a general theory for the interpretation 
and understanding of texts. This, however, was not the end of the development of the idea of 
hermeneutics. Dilthey, who we previously mentioned, is arguably the next most important 
theorist in the history of hermeneutics. Dilthey had high ambitions for his hermeneutics, and 
conceived it as his life project. Yet it was a project he never finished, one consequence of 
which was that his students referred to him as “the man of first volumes” (Makkreel and Rodi 
1989: 3). The motivation for his unfinished project was to find an epistemological foundation 
for the study of the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’. 
The German term ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ is usually translated as the human sciences 
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and encompasses such fields as history, sociology, and anthropology. It represents a body of 
knowledge that is comprehensive and systematically obtained in areas related to the 
humanistic tradition of scholarship. The history of the name ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ itself 
presents a revealing irony in this translation though, one which did not escape the attention of 
the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer.
The word Geisteswissenschaften was made possible chiefly by the translator 
of John Stuart Mill’s Logic. In the supplement to his work Mill seeks to 
outline the possibilities of applying inductive logic to the “moral sciences”. 
The translator calls these Geisteswissenschaften. Even in the context of 
Mill’s Logic it is apparent that there is no question of acknowledging that the 
human sciences have their own logic but, on the contrary, of showing that the 
inductive method, basic to all experimental science, is the only method valid in 
this field too. (Gadamer 2006: 3)
The term ‘Geisteswissenschaften’, however, developed quite considerably from this origin. 
Dilthey was well aware of the provenance of the word from Mill’s System of Logic, but chose 
to use it because it seemed “the least inappropriate among the various from which we can 
choose” (Dilthey 1989: 57-58). 
To Dilthey the Geisteswissenschaften could not be thought of using the scientific 
method of the ‘Naturwissenschaften’ – the natural sciences – but, rather, required an 
epistemologically sound method of their own. To quote:
In my own work I was troubled by questions which face every thoughtful 
historian, student of law, or political theorist. Thus there arose in me both a 
need and a plan for the foundation of the human sciences. What is the system 
of principles which provide a basis for the judgements of the historian, the 
conclusions of the political economist, and the concepts of the jurist, and 
which at the same time assures their certainty? Must such a system be rooted 
in metaphysics? Is a system of natural law or a philosophy of history 
supported by metaphysical concepts possible? But if it can be shown that 
they are not possible, then where is the firm support for a system of 
principles that connects the particular sciences and provides them with 
certainty?
The answers given to these questions by Comte and the positivists and by J. 
S. Mill and the empiricists seemed to me to truncate and mutilate historical 
reality in order to assimilate it to the concepts and methods of the natural 
sciences. (ibid: 49)
While this statement clearly shows Dilthey’s distrust of applying the methods of the natural 
sciences to the human sciences, it also shows his adoption of the Kantian critique of the 
traditional conception of metaphysics/ontology (see section 1.3). His dual interest was in 
laying a foundational theory for the Geisteswissenschaften that not only opposed the use of 
the methodology of the natural sciences, but that would also circumvent any reliance on 
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metaphysical speculation. The unfulfilled ambition he held throughout his academic career for 
his systematic hermeneutic theory for the human sciences was exemplified by his unrealised 
desire to produce a ‘Critique of Historical Reason’ as a supplement to Immanuel Kant’s three 
critiques.
Dilthey could be best described as a historian and philosopher of culture. He took 
Schleiermacher’s general theory of textual hermeneutics and applied it one step further. He 
did not only want a systematic theory for the interpretation and understanding of texts, he 
wanted one for the interpretation and understanding of human social reality. This systematic 
study of human social reality, the Geisteswissenschaften, was needed as he argued that the 
human sciences  formed “an independent whole alongside the natural sciences” (Dilthey 1989: 
56). He compared the need to develop the basis of a systematic approach to the human 
sciences to the impact that Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620) had on generating work 
on method in the natural sciences (ibid: 55). In relation to this influence of Bacon’s work he 
states in the opening chapter of his Introduction to the Human Sciences: “For those concerned 
with history, political theory, jurisprudence and economics, theology, literature and art, there 
is also a need for someone to perform a similar service” (ibid: 55). However, while he was a 
prolific writer, producing many valuable books and essays, he never completed his desire to 
systematise his various ideas. In a sense Dilthey’s philosophy stands as the non-actualised 
possibility for a hermeneutic theory of human existence. 
If one central argument of Dilthey’s was taken above any of his others, in order to 
demonstrate both his originality and the subsequent influence of his ideas on later 
hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential theorists, such as Heidegger, the following 
would be paramount. It was his critique of abstracting human existence32 .
Apart from a few beginnings, such as those of Herder and Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, which were not scientifically developed, previous epistemology— 
Kant’s as well as that of the empiricists—has explained experience and 
cognition in terms of facts that are merely representational. No real blood 
flows in the veins of the knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, and 
Kant, but rather the diluted extract of reason as a mere activity of thought. ... 
[Consequently] I will relate every component of contemporary abstract 
scientific thought to the whole of human nature as it is revealed in experience, 
in the study of language, and in the study of history, and thus seek the 
connection of these components. The result is that the most important 
components of our picture and knowledge of reality—our own personality as 
a life-unit, the external world, other individuals, their temporal life and their 
interactions—can be explained in terms of this totality of human nature. In 
the real life-process, willing, feeling, and thinking are only different aspects. 
3 2 ‘Existence’ is here used outside of Heidegger’s technical meaning for term.
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The questions which we all must address to philosophy cannot be answered 
by the assumption of a rigid epistemological a priori, but rather only by a 
developmental history proceeding from the totality of our being. (ibid: 50-51,  
my emphasis)
This statement of Dilthey’s philosophy contains many of the concepts that Heidegger would 
bring to maturity in his ontology of Dasein. Particularly important is Dilthey’s criticism of 
the philosophical constructs of Locke, Hume, Kant and so on, regarding their abstraction of 
humanity to the point where ‘no real blood flows in the veins’ of human existence. It is by 
bearing this criticism in mind that the central reason for Heidegger’s use of the word ‘Dasein’ 
becomes evident, to emphasis that human ‘being’ [sein] is ‘here/there’ [Da].
§3.2 – Hermeneutics and Dasein
In his History of the Concept of Time lecture course that preceded Being and Time, Heidegger 
documented Dilthey’s work as an influence on his own work. As he put it, Dilthey sought to 
“regard ‘life’ itself in its structures, as the basic reality of history” (Heidegger 1992a: 17). 
While Schleiermacher developed hermeneutics into a general discipline of the interpretation of 
texts, and Dilthey took it further forward into the method for the interpretation of human 
existence, Heidegger, leading from this, made hermeneutics an inherent characteristic of human 
existence in-and-of itself. This is because, as we have seen, Heidegger regarded ‘existence’ as 
Dasein’s interpretation of itself, and this is because “Dasein is an entity for which, in its 
Being, that Being is an issue” (Heidegger 1962: 236 [191]). This self-interpretation occurs as a 
wider hermeneutic structure of world disclosure. This is Dasein’s ‘worldhood’33. Dasein can 
never be understood in terms of a ‘worldless-self’, rather, it has the state of ‘being’ called 
‘being-in-the-world’. Heidegger also makes this argument in the History of the Concept of 
Time:
It is a deception, which is connected with ignorance of the genuine structure 
of Dasein, to think that there is a separate understanding of a bare world or of 
an alien Dasein. This structure of understanding, which is grounded in Dasein 
itself and which defines understanding as the enactment of the being of 
discoveredness, provides crucial orientation points for all problems of 
hermeneutics. Such a hermeneutics is possible only on the basis of the 
explication of Dasein itself, the kind of being to which understanding belongs.
(Heidegger 1992a: 258, emphasis as in original)
“The compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ indicates in the very way we have coined it, 
that it stands for a unitary phenomenon” (Heidegger 1962: 78 [53], emphasis as in original). It 
is a unitary phenomenon because “subject and Object [sic] do not coincide with Dasein and 
the world” (ibid: 87 [60]). This also means it is important not to interpret being-in-the-world 
3 3 A full analysis of ‘worldhood’ (Weltlichkeit) is undertaken in section 3.4.
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in terms of ontic spatiality. The ‘being-in’ component of being-in-the-world does not signify 
that Dasein is inside a world. This would be an ontic category of ‘insideness’, understood as 
the relationship of a present-at-hand entity with another present-at-hand entity (ibid: 82 
[56]). ‘Being-in’, on the other hand, is Dasein’s structural ‘contextuality’, its hermeneutic 
‘there-ness’. It emphasises that Dasein’s ‘being’ is always disclosed in its worldliness, and, 
importantly, ‘Dasein is it disclosedness’ (ibid: 171 [133]).
However, Heidegger had already formally indicated this thesis of the ‘(t)here-ness’ of 
‘being’ by his adoption and appropriation of the word ‘Dasein’. The ‘Da’ of Dasein means 
either ‘here’ or ‘there’, which is an emphasis that continues Dilthey’s critique of abstraction 
in the Geisteswissenschaften. “By its very nature, Dasein brings its ‘there’ along with it. If it 
lacks its ‘there’, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this 
entity at all” (ibid: 171 [133]). As a formal indication this use of the word ‘Dasein’ is not to 
be thought of as an explanation. It is a phenomenological device for signifying the question of 
the ‘being’ of the entity ‘Dasein’. As Heidegger states in text from 1938–9 called Mindfulness, 
Dasein “is incomparable in every respect; it is not an object of a ‘doctrine’ (in [Being and 
Time] ‘investigation’ means fundamental questioning, not ‘explaining’ the extant)” (Heidegger 
2006: 123, emphasis as in original). The use of term ‘Dasein’ is at once to critique, as with 
Dilthey, the tradition of abstracting the human entity in order to explain it, and to pose the 
question of the meaning of ‘being’ of this entity. This means that the term ‘Dasein’ is not to 
be mistaken as an answer to the question of the ‘being’ of human entity, instead it opens up 
this ‘being’ to phenomenological description. “In no respect is Da-sein a determination of a 
being, neither of an object nor of a subject, nor of a being as such that is somehow thought... 
‘Da-sein’ is to be thought ‘hermeneutically’” (ibid: 289). The term ‘Dasein’, as a formal 
indication, opens up the ‘being’ of this entity to interpretation.
Because Dasein names an entity that is neither a subject nor an object, it is possible to 
interpret Dasein as a collective people, rather than as an individual. However, as Heidegger 
states in Mindfulness, this is mistaken. “Because the question of being and along with it Da-
sein is not yet grasped, because one still takes Dasein as the ‘subject’, one arrives at the 
ridiculous demand that now the individual subject (in [Being and Time]) would have to be 
replaced by people as subject” (ibid: 123). Dasein has existence, it self-interprets. “Dasein is 
an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In 
saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists.” 
(Heidegger 1962: 78 [53]). However, if this was Dasein’s only trait then it might be arguable 
that Dasein could be considered a collective entity, rather than an individual. But existence is 
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not Dasein’s only trait. It also has ‘mine-ness’ [Jemeinigkeit]. “Dasein is an entity which in 
each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the 
condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible” (ibid: 78 [53]). Furthermore, 
because “Dasein has in each case mineness, one must always use a personal pronoun when 
one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you are’” (ibid: 68 [42], emphasis as in original). Dasein is the 
human entity; it “is the entity which we ourselves are” (Heidegger 1992a: 148, emphasis as in 
original). 
However, existence and mine-ness are “both ways in which Dasein’s Being takes on a 
definite character”, but it is necessary that they “be seen and understood a priori as grounded 
upon that state of Being which we have called ‘Being-in-the-world’” (Heidegger 1962: 78 [53], 
emphasis as in original). Being-in-the-world signifies the unitary structure of Dasein’s 
existentiality. It is derived as a critique of the ubiquitous subject-object ontological divide that 
abstracts ‘being’. Instead the term emphasises the lived totality of human existence. The 
traditional ‘what-ness’ ontologies, for Heidegger, have been an obstacle for understanding 
‘being-in-the-world’ because our “vague average understanding of Being may be so infiltrated 
with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain hidden as sources of the 
way in which it [‘being’] is prevalently understood” (ibid: 25 [6]). This is the critique of 
tradition analysed by the phenomenological destruction. To reiterate our previous analysis, 
Heidegger argues throughout the Being and Time that ‘human being’ cannot be thought of as a 
worldless bearer of properties, which is the traditional ontological understanding. 
Conventional language, he found, is unable to express this fact as it draws its terminology 
from the traditions of ontology that have characterized ‘being’ as a thing, a substance, or some 
other similar type of entity. This is the attempt to make our ‘being’ present-at-hand, the kind 
of ‘being’ which it is inappropriate to characterize Dasein as having for the most part (ibid: 
67 [42]). It is only in a very limited set of circumstances when the ‘what-ness’ of Dasein is 
the matter of concern, which we previously addressed in section 2.6, that taking Dasein as 
present-at-hand is applicable. Only entities other than Dasein can be understood in terms of 
the way of ‘being’ of presence-at-hand, and the alternative called readiness-to-hand34.
These modes of ‘being’ can only be understood by first understanding the state of 
‘being’ that humans have, which Heidegger called being-in-the-world. The being-in-the-world 
of Dasein has a hermeneutic structure. Dasein understands and interprets the world from 
amidst it. Furthermore, the ontological structure of the world, “that to which Dasein assigns 
itself” (ibid: 119 [86]), is the ‘worldhood’ of the world. The ‘worldhood’ of the world is, in 
summary, the unified meaning of the world for Dasein. This meaning is understood in terms 
3 4 There is also the unready-to-hand manner of ‘being’ of entities, which we will described in section 3.5.
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of a referential totality of involvement and significance35. The unitary connection of Dasein, 
being-in-the-world, the referential totality of equipment, and the occurrentness of objects in 
the world is described by Heidegger in this passage from The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology.
World exists – that is, it is – only if Dasein exists, only if there is Dasein. 
Only if world is there, if Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, is there 
understanding of being, and only if this understanding exists are intra-worldly 
beings unveiled as extant [present-at-hand] and handy [ready-to-hand]. 
World-understanding as Dasein-understanding is self-understanding. Self and 
world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not 
two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are 
the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of 
being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1982: 297)
The phenomenological exploration of this structure marks the middle three chapters of the 
first division of Being and Time. Chapter three of the text deals with the worldhood of the 
world, its ‘world-ness’, in terms of the structure of ‘concern’ (Besorgen). Chapter four deals 
with the ‘who-ness’ of Dasein, in terms of the structure of ‘solicitude’ (Fürsorge). Chapter 
five deals with the ‘there-ness’ of Dasein, in terms of structure of its ‘being-in’ or 
‘disclosedness’. Chapter six of division one of Being and Time then unifies these 
phenomenological constitutions of Dasein’s being-in-the-world as ‘care’ (Sorge), the ‘how-
ness’ of Dasein. In division two of Being and Time the care structure of being-in-the-world,  
the ‘how-ness’ of Dasein, is reinterpreted in terms of the temporality of ‘being’. As this 
thesis is a phenomenological analysis of the temporality of the ‘being’ of technology, 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the ‘world-ness’ structure of concern (Besorgen) is our primary 
interest. However, as all these structures are interdependent in terms of the unity of the 
‘how-ness’ of being-in-the-world, it is necessary to maintain an architectonic understanding of 
this phenomenology.
§3.3 – Temporality, ‘das Man’, and the ‘who-ness’ of Dasein
The question of the ‘who’ of Dasein is controversial. It is because Dasein has a unique  
structure for encountering other entities with the character of Dasein that it is sometimes 
interpreted as a collective entity. Yet as we previously emphasised  Dasein has the 
characteristic of ‘mine-ness’ [Jemeinigkeit], and is always addressed by a personal pronoun. 
Consequently, it is necessary to have a studied understanding of solicitude in order to avoid 
confusion over the ‘who-ness’ of Dasein. First, it must be understood that while Dasein has 
the character of ‘mine-ness’, this character should not be taken as fully constitutive of the 
3 5 This structure is also analysed in section 3.5.
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‘who’ of Dasein.
The answer to the question of who Dasein is, is one that was seemingly given 
in Section 9, where we indicated formally the basic characteristics of Dasein. 
Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case 
mine. This definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state, but it does 
no more than indicate it. At the same time this tells us ontically (though in a 
rough and ready fashion) that in each case an “I” – not Others – is this entity. 
The question of the “who” answers itself in terms of the “I” itself, the 
‘subject’, the ‘Self’. (Heidegger 1962: 150 [114], emphasis as in original)
As was analysed in section 2.8, Heidegger’s ‘formal indications’ have to be understood as a 
way of approaching phenomena that aids perceiving their ontology, and not as strict 
definitions. Heidegger makes this argument in a lecture course from 1923 , titled Ontology – 
The Hermeneutics of Facticity.
A formal indication is always misunderstood when it is treated as a fixed 
universal proposition and used to make deductions from and fantasized with 
in a constructivistic dialectical fashion. Everything depends upon our 
understanding being guided from out of the indefinite and vague but still 
intelligible content of the indication onto the right path of looking. (Heidegger 
1999: 62, emphasis as in original)
A consequence of the formal indication of Dasein in terms of its ‘mine-ness’ is that the ontical 
characterisation of the ‘who’ of Dasein is given by such terms as ‘I’ or ‘the self’. However, 
these are ontical characterisations, not ontological ones, and as Heidegger stated in the earlier 
quotation they are only rough characterisations even in the ontical sense. Ontologically, 
Heidegger suggests, it “could be that the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein just is not the ‘I myself’” 
(Heidegger 1962: 150 [115], emphasis as in original).
Heidegger uses the word ‘I’ “only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator” 
(ibid: 152 [116] emphasis as in original), one which references a rough ontical characterisation 
that can be used to phenomenologically address the ontology of the ‘who-ness’ of Dasein. 
Heidegger’s use of the term  ‘others’ is to be understood in this manner too. “By ‘Others’ we 
do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are 
rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among 
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whom one is too” (ibid: 154 [118], emphasis as in original). ‘Being-with’ (Mitsein) others36  is 
not an ontical categorial statement, one which could mean being in the presence of others. 
Rather, ‘being-with’ is an existentiale which constitutes the ‘with-world’ (Mitwelt)37  of 
entities with the ‘being’ ‘Dasein-with’ (Mitdasein).
By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one 
that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is 
Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-
with. (ibid: 155 [118], emphasis as in original)
This is not an ‘intersubjective’ understanding of Dasein. An intersubjective understanding 
would only be modification of the traditional subject-object model of ‘what-ness’ ontology. 
‘Being-with’ “cannot be conceived as a summative result of the occurrence of several 
‘subjects’” (ibid: 163 [125]). Dreyfus argues Heidegger’s account of ‘Being-with’ should be 
interpreted as the shared social activity (Dreyfus 1991: 144) that constitutes the ‘with-world’ 
of ‘Dasein-with’ entities. It is this ‘with-world’ that makes Dasein’s everyday activities 
intelligible, and which makes ‘others’ matter. This ‘mattering’ of ‘others’ is the way in which 
Dasein, with the structure of ‘being-with’, directs itself towards other entities with the 
character of Dasein and is called ‘solicitude’ (Fürsorge) (ibid: 157 [121])38. 
An enhanced understanding of Heidegger’s phenomenology of ‘being-with’ can be 
obtained by comparing it with the more traditional model of intersubjectivity. A 
phenomenology of intersubjectivity can be found in the work of Husserl. As Husserl’s 
phenomenology is characterised by the intentional relation of the (transcendental) subject to 
objects (see section 3.5 for a more detailed description), Husserl found it necessary to make a 
3 6 The ‘others’ in Heidegger’s sense, represents those ‘others’ with which a Dasein is familiar. The text Being 
and Time Heidegger is not concerned with phenomenologically analysing how ‘alien others’ are encountered. 
By ‘alien’ I mean encountering ‘others’ who Dasein has no familiarity with at all. Heidegger was sceptical about 
the possibility about Dasein being able to understand the world of an alien Dasein, but he did venture in later 
works to examine the possibility. In A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer Heidegger 
critically examines the attempt to “consider the nature of Japanese art with the help of European aesthetics” 
(Heidegger 1971a: 2). Heidegger was concerned that this exercise was unsatisfactory for revealing the ‘being’ of 
Japanese art because “the way in which” (ibid: 4, emphasis as in original) it did so precluded the possibility of 
an authentic account. A Dialogue on Language was not a long treatise, and was not in the systematic model of 
Being and Time, but while it raises Heidegger’s concern about understanding one ‘world’ in the language and 
concepts of another, it also demonstrates the questionable nature of a truly ‘alien’ other. An ‘alien’ other would 
lose its ‘alien-ness’ by being encountered. By the very engagement in a dialogue, a degree of ‘being-with’ is 
demonstrated between the two agents of the discussion, one which suggests the ‘being’ of a ‘with-world’. These 
concerns relate to modern questions about ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘globalisation’, and indicates a way of 
addressing these questions not in terms of the traditional ontology’s concern with ‘what’ a culture might ‘be’, 
but rather in terms of ‘how’ a ‘with-world’ is constituted. However, while this direction of phenomenological 
research promises to yield important results, a sustained analysis on this subject is not within the scope of this 
thesis.
3 7 See section 3.4 for an explanation of the different senses of ‘world’. The ‘with-world’ is used in the 
ontological-existential sense of the ‘being’ of the world.
3 8 ‘Solicitude’ does not represent any particular emotional state or type of ‘mattering’ of ‘others’, it is used 
solely as technical term that describes the non-cognitive directionality of Dasein’s involvement with other 
Dasein. 
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rejoinder to the accusation that his phenomenology entailed a solipsistic39 attitude. This 
rejoinder can be found in the fifth meditation of his Cartesian Meditations, which he describes 
as the “uncovering of the sphere of transcendental being as monadological intersubjectivity” 
(Husserl 1970a: 89). In this account Husserl provides a phenomenology of others that is 
similar in some respects to Heidegger’s interpretation of ‘being-with’. It is unlike Heidegger’s 
though, as it is thought through in terms of the subject-object model of understanding that 
Heidegger critiques in Being and Time. However, Husserl’s account of the phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity does include an analysis of the individual’s embodiment in this 
intersubjective structure, which is one noteworthy aspect that is missing in Heidegger’s 
interpretation in Being and Time40. Husserl argues that the ‘ego’ and the ‘alter ego’, the ‘I’ and 
the ‘other’, know each other through a passive synthesis that he called ‘pairing’ (Paarung).
Pairing, occurrence in a configuration as a pair and then as a group, a 
plurality, is a universal phenomenon of the transcendental sphere (and of the 
parallel sphere of intentional psychology)...[P]airing first comes about when 
the Other enters my field of perception. I, as the primordial psychophysical 
Ego, am always prominent in my primordial field of perception, regardless of 
whether I pay attention to myself and turn towards myself with some 
activity or other. In particular, my live body is always there and sensuously 
prominent; but, in addition to that and likewise with primordial originariness, 
it is equipped with the specific sense of an animate organism. Now in case 
there presents itself, as outstanding in my primordial sphere, a body “similar” 
to mine – that is to say, a body with determinations such that it must enter 
into a phenomenal pairing with mine – it seems clear without more ado that, 
3 9 Solipsism is the philosophical belief that only one’s self can be said to exist. It is a common trouble with the 
epistemology that is based on a subject-object ontology, such as Cartesianism. If one’s understanding of 
existence begins with the cogito of the self and the necessary certainty that the ego must exist if it is thinking, 
then there is no equal certainty that anything other than the ego cogito exists. In the absolute truth of ‘I think, 
therefore I am’, the existence of all other entities is only attested to in terms of probability. It is this inability to 
confirm the existence of other subjects that can lead subject-object ontology into epistemological solipsism. 
Consequently, those who wish to deny solipsism while also defending a Cartesian subjectivism frequently 
develop models of intersubjectivity. Sartre’s existentialism, for example, develops such an intersubjective 
understanding in order to avoid solipsism.
Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that of Kant, when we say “I think” we 
are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just as certain of the other 
as we are of ourselves. Thus the man who discovers himself directly in the cogito also 
discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own existence. He 
recognises that cannot be anything (in the sense that one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or 
jealous) unless others recognise him as such. I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about 
myself, except through meditation of another. The other is indispensable to my existence, 
and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself.... Thus, at once, we find ourselves in 
a world which is, let us say, that of “inter-subjectivity.” (Sartre 1973: 45, emphasis as in 
original)
Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity has a similar motivation to Sartre’s existential variation, in that 
both attempt to defend a subjective account of consciousness against the accusation of solipsism. Both Husserl 
and Sartre extend a subjectivist account of cognition into the terms of intersubjectivity.
4 0 The only concession to this absence in Being and Time is a note in parentheses where Heidegger writes “(This 
‘bodily nature’ hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here.)” (Heidegger 1962: 143 
[108]).
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with the transfer of sense, this body must forthwith appropriate from mine 
the sense: animate organism. (ibid: 112-113, emphasis as in original)
Husserl then uses this phenomenological account of how two ‘psychophysical’ individuals, 
or what he calls monads in an explicit and direct reference to Leibniz’s metaphysics (ibid: 
150), apperceive and pair with each other and thus constitute themselves as a “unity of 
similarity” (ibid: 112), to explain how communities of intersubjective monads are produced 
(ibid: 120). For Husserl, the constitution of an intermonadic community is something that 
exists in an “intentional communion with something else that exists. It is an essentially unique 
connectedness, an actual community and precisely the one that makes transcendentally 
possible the being of a world, a world of men and things” (ibid: 129, emphasis as in original). 
The most universal intermonadic community is what Husserl calls the ‘life-world’ 
(Lebenswelt), which is the intersubjective transcendental sense of the world in its “full 
concreteness” (ibid: 136). Husserl’s conception of the ‘life-world’ has been very influential, 
and has been described as one of Husserl’s most significant legacies (Jay 2009: 95)41. Husserl 
greatly expanded his conception of the life-world in his last work The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. In it he describes how the fundamental ego 
constitutes the “horizon of transcendental others as cosubjects within the transcendental 
intersubjectivity which constitutes the world” (Husserl 1970b: 184). In this text Husserl also 
further clarifies his phenomenology of the body, distinguishing in terms of perception 
between the physical body (Körper) and the living body (Leib) (ibid: 107), a distinction 
similar to Heidegger’s differentiation between the onticality and ontology of an entity. These 
concerns with the ‘life-world’ and the body, the latter of which is a distinct lacuna in 
4 1 An example of a theorist who takes up and deploys the concept of the life-world is the scholar Walter Ong, 
who uses it in his studies of how the development of technology has been involved in the development of 
consciousness. Ong’s theory about the development of the technologies of orality, literacy, print, and the 
‘secondary orality’ of electronic age on the formation of culture and consciousness was introduced in section 
1.4. Further to this is that Ong described these structures in terms of how they are related to the ‘human 
lifeworld’.
In the absence of elaborate analytic categories that depend on writing to structure knowledge 
at a distance from lived experience, oral cultures must conceptualize and verbalize all their 
knowledge with more or less close reference to the human lifeworld, assimilating the alien, 
objective world to the more immediate, familiar interaction of human beings. A chirographic 
(writing) culture and even more a typographic (print) culture can distance and in a way 
denature even the human, itemizing such things as the names of leaders and political 
divisions in an abstract, neutral list entirely devoid of a human action context. An oral 
culture has no vehicle so neutral as a list.... By keeping knowledge embedded in the human 
lifeworld, orality situates knowledge within a context of struggle. (Ong 2002: 42-44)
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the phenomenological validity of these descriptions, but what 
can be seen is that while Husserl’s concept of the life-world has been taken up by scholars such as Ong, 
Husserl’s intended meaning in description of the life-world has not been as closely followed. Ong uses the idea 
of the life-world to describe the realm of immediate and subjective interaction of human beings, as opposed to a 
realm of alleged neutral and objective information. However, Husserl’s concept of the life-world is not as a 
subjective realm of immediate knowledge. Rather, Husserl’s life-world is the transcendental intermonadic 
community that structures the intentional content of consciousness in terms of intersubjectivity. It is how the 
intentionality of cosubjects is directed to their shared noematic content.
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Heidegger’s Being and Time, were later taken up by other phenomenologists such as Merleau-
Ponty. Merleau-Ponty in particular made these phenomena central to his Phenomenology of 
Perception (see, for example, Merleau-Ponty 2002: 403-425).
However, Heidegger’s phenomenology of ‘being-with’, despite its omission of a 
phenomenological analysis of the body, provides a better account of collective ‘being’ than 
Husserl’s intersubjective understanding. As Heidegger does not use a subject-object model of 
intentionality, he is not required to defend his phenomenology against the charge of solipsism. 
Consequently, rather than have to argue that multiple people constitute a transcendental 
intermonadic community that culminates in the ‘life-world’, Heidegger only has to show how 
a group of people collectively socialise each other into a normative disclosure of the world. 
Thus Heidegger talks of a ‘with-world’ rather than a ‘life-world’. It is the everyday 
intelligibility of solicitous Dasein, developed by Dasein’s shared social ‘with-world’, that 
structures the ‘who-ness’ of Dasein as ‘das Man’. ‘Das Man’ is one of the hardest of 
Heidegger’s technical terms to translate. Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as ‘the they’ 
(Heidegger 1962: 164 [126]), Dreyfus as ‘the One’ (Dreyfus 1991: 152), Blattner as ‘the 
Anyone’ (Blattner 2006: 69). However, it may be best to leave it untranslated in the manner 
that the term ‘Dasein’ has normally been left untranslated. What is important is to attend to 
the phenomenon that it names. “The ‘who’ is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not 
some people, and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’ [das Man]” 
(Heidegger 1962: 164 [126], emphasis as in original). The  ontological ‘who-ness’ of Dasein is 
not a ‘what’. To an extent the concept of ‘das Man’, can be used as an alternative to 
questions such as ‘what is culture’, as it describes ‘how’ the ‘who’ of Dasein exists in the 
shared social roles and practices it has with ‘others’. But this equivalency with traditional 
concepts of ‘culture’ should not be overstated. Rather, ‘das Man’ is an existentiale of Dasein. 
It is not the ‘collective cultural subject’, a collective ‘what-ness’ of people.
Furthermore, the “they” [das Man] is not something like a ‘universal subject’ 
which a plurality of subjects have hovering above them. One can come to take 
it this way only if the Being of such ‘subjects’ is understood as having a 
character other than that of Dasein, and if these are regarded as cases of a 
genus of occurrents – cases which are factually present-at-hand. With this 
approach, the only possibility ontologically is that everything which is not a 
case of this sort is to be understood in the sense of genus and species. The 
“they” is not the genus to which the individual Dasein belongs, nor can we 
come across it in such entities as an abiding characteristic. That even the 
traditional logic fails us when confronted with these phenomena, is not 
surprising if we bear in mind that it has its foundation in an ontology of the 
present-at-hand – an ontology which, moreover, is still a rough one. So no 
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matter in how many ways this logic may be improved and explained, it cannot 
in principal be made any more flexible. Such reforms of logic, oriented 
towards the ‘humane sciences’, only increase the ontological confusion. (ibid: 
166-167 [129])
However, so far it has only been documented what ‘das Man’ is not, rather than ‘what’42 it is. 
Nevertheless, a final negative characterisation is required. ‘Das Man’, as an existentiale of 
Dasein, describes how in Dasein’s ‘being-with’ other Dasein a ‘with-world’ is constituted. 
This ‘with-world’ is not to be understood as a ‘we-world’. ‘Being’ one with ‘the they’ does 
not constitute an ontological collective,  anymore than an ontical collective. Dasein is ‘with’ 
other Dasein, but it ‘is’ not a plurality of Dasein.
However, what the existentiale of ‘das Man’ signifies has still be given a positive 
clarification. The ‘being-with’ ‘das Man’ of Dasein, Dasein’s ‘being-with’ ‘the they’, 
constitutes the ‘being’ of the ‘with-world’. The ‘with-world’ is disclosed to Dasein by ‘das 
Man’. This means that Dasein’s ‘being-with’ discloses to it an understanding of ‘others’ 
before a cognitive43 reflection. 
Being-with is such that the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of Others 
belongs to it; this means that because Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its 
understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This 
understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from 
knowledge44 about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which 
more than anything else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible. 
Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially. 
It operates proximally in accordance with kind of Being which is closest to us 
– Being-in-the-world as Being-with... Thus in concernful solicitude the Other 
is proximally disclosed. (ibid: 160-161 [123-124])
However, as the ‘who’ of Dasein’s ‘being-with’ is ‘das Man’, it is not only other Dasein that 
are disclosed in this solicitous structure. In its everyday going about its world, Dasein exists 
as ‘das Man’. ‘How’ we go about our everyday world, which is to say ‘how’ we go about 
‘being’, is also ‘how’ ‘das Man’ do it.
4 2 A statement about ‘what’ an existentiale ‘is’ is not in keeping with Heidegger’s critique of reducing 
statements about existence into terms of ‘what-ness’. However, as we earlier cited Heidegger when discussing 
formal indication, this is not a simple problem to resolve. As Heidegger argued, not only has the ontological 
tradition of ‘what-ness’ provided us with our basic words and concepts for discussing entities rather than 
‘being’, it has also provided us with a grammar that has a similar bias (Heidegger 1962: 63 [38-39]). The 
awkwardness of expression that the phenomenological analysis of ‘being’ has to endure is a result of this 
traditional bias. However, this need not be the final statement on the matter. As familiarity with the 
phenomenological heritage grows, there is the potential for the ontological ‘syntax’ to also become better 
conceived.
4 3 See section 3.5 for the explanation of how cognition is a derivative mode of understanding of Dasein’s being-
in-the-world.
4 4 As we describe in section 3.5, ‘knowledge’ is Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of ‘Erkennen’. However, 
it would be better to read this as ‘cognition’. See in this section the description of disclosure, as what 
Heidegger is arguing is that before an intentional cognitive understanding of ‘the self’ or ‘others’ is thought out, 
there is a solicitous disclosure of the ‘being-with’ of the entities.
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We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, 
see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink 
back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they 
find shocking. The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though 
not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (ibid: 164 [126-
127], emphasis as in original)
It is terms of ‘das Man’ that Dasein’s existentiell possibilities are given to it, and in its 
everyday ‘being’ this self is the ‘they-self’. ‘Everydayness’ (Alltäglichkeit) is, proximally, 
Dasein’s undifferentiated existential way of being-in-the-world, its normal behaviour that is 
disclosed to it through ‘being-with’ ‘das Man’. Consequently, ‘das Man’ is phenomenon that 
is closely related to Dasein’s temporality, historicity, tradition, heritage, and Dasein’s 
capacity for authentic (eigentlich) and inauthentic (uneigentlich) existence. 
‘Authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ are common concerns in existentialist treatises, and 
so it is important not to conflate Heidegger’s specific use of the terms with this general 
discourse. ‘Being’ inauthentic does not mean that Dasein is ‘being’ untrue to ‘what’ it really 
is. There is no base or fundamental ‘self’ to be true or untrue towards. Rather, authenticity 
and inauthenticity are the manners in which Dasein ‘owns’ or fails to ‘own’ its ‘being’. They 
are ‘how’ Dasein chooses the ‘mine-ness’ of its ‘who-ness’; ‘how’ it chooses, or fails to 
choose, its own possibilities of existence.
Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein 
has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each 
case mine. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, 
comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case 
Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a 
property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each 
case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself 
and win itself; it can can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to 
do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic 
– that is, something of its own – can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. 
As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have 
been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact 
that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the 
inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ 
degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein 
can be characterized by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when 
interested, when ready for enjoyment. (ibid: 68 [42-43], emphasis as in 
original)
The existentiality of authenticity and inauthenticity modally structures the existentiell self-
interpretations of Dasein. These modal possibilities of its ‘who-ness’ are characterised by 
Dasein’s ‘being-with’ ‘the they’. As an existentiell ‘they-self’, ‘the-they’ (das Man) have 
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prescribed the “way of interpreting the world and being-in-the-world” (ibid: 167 [129]) of the 
inauthentic Dasein. Furthermore, because the way of interpreting the world of ‘the they’ is 
the traditional ‘what-ness’ ontology of the subject-object model of understanding, it is 
responsible for the understanding of the ‘being’ of entities as presence-at-hand (ibid: 168 
[130]). Yet while ‘being-with’ ‘das Man’ is constant, it is an existentiale of Dasein, ‘being’ 
the ‘they-self’ existentiell is not constant. Dasein has the capacity for a mode of ‘being’ that 
Heidegger calls ‘authentic being-one’s-self’ or the ‘authentic-self’ (ibid: 168 [130]), where 
Dasein’s chooses to ‘own’ its ‘who-ness’. However, the ‘authentic-self’ “does not rest upon 
an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the ‘they’; it 
is rather an existentiell modification of the ‘they’ – of the ‘they’ as an essential existentiale” 
(ibid: 168 [130], emphasis as in original). When Dasein chooses to ‘be’ authentic is must still 
do so from within its ‘being-with’ ‘the they’, its choices of ‘being’ are disclosed to it from its 
‘cultural’ existence. But the authentic existence of Dasein has a different way of ‘being-with’ 
its ‘culture’ and ‘history’ than its way of ‘being’ inauthentically the ‘they-self’. Heidegger 
calls the inauthentic way of ‘being-with’ ‘the they’ ‘tradition’, and the authentic way of 
‘being-with’ ‘the they’ a matter of appropriating one’s ‘heritage’ (ibid: 435 [383-384]).
Heidegger argues that it was necessary to analyse historicity in terms of Dasein’s 
temporal unity, and its modalities of ‘being’ such as authenticity and inauthenticity. This is 
because historicity, or historicality, is not the character of having a history, though it does 
enable the capacity to have a historiography (Heidegger 1962: 434 [382]). Rather, historicity 
names the dynamic interplay of the totality of Dasein’s temporal existence, beginning with its 
authentic ‘being-towards’ the future. The authentic ‘being-towards’ the future of Dasein is a 
‘being-towards-death’. By ‘death’, Heidegger does not mean the ordinary conception of the 
ending of a life, which is what he calls ‘demise’. Rather, Heidegger’s use of ‘death’ refers not 
an ontical event but an existential condition (ibid: 284 [240]). For Heidegger, ‘death’ is the 
existential anxiety of running out of possibilities, what Blattner describes as a “limit-
situation... that reveals the limits of existence” (Blattner 2006: 149). The awareness or 
orientation to ‘death’ does not remove illusory existentiell interpretations of Dasein’s ‘being’, 
to reveal to it who it truly ‘is’. There is no ‘true’ ontological ‘self’, no real ‘what’ of Dasein’s 
existence that can be revealed. Rather, Dasein’s anxiety about its finality of possibilities, its 
ontological ‘death’,  “strips away ontological distortions and gets us in touch with how we 
are” (ibid: 160, emphasis as in original). 
Dasein’s ‘being-towards-death’ is how it orients itself to it potentialities for ‘being’ 
(Heidegger 1962: 354 [306]). This orientation towards its own existence can be either 
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authentic or inauthentic, as enabled by the structure of temporality and historicality. 
“Authentic Being-towards-death – that is to say, the finitude of temporality – is the hidden 
basis of Dasein’s historicality” (ibid: 438 [386]), emphasis as in original). Heidegger elaborates 
with this description:
Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its 
death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical “there” by shattering 
itself against death – that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is 
equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself 
the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the 
moment of vision for ‘its time’. Only authentic temporality which is at the 
same time finite, makes possible something like fate – that is to say, authentic 
historicality. (ibid: 437 [385], emphasis as in original).
There are many technical terms in this passage about the authentic way of existence, including 
‘futural’, ‘having-been’, ‘moment of vision’, each of which will require careful analysis and 
explanation. First the differentiation of inauthentic and authentic historicality must be 
understood, which can be explained by the concepts of ‘tradition’ and ‘heritage’. These terms, 
while seemingly relating only to the past, are actually ways of ‘being’ within Dasein’s 
temporal unity.
‘Tradition’ is the inauthentic way of ‘being-with’ ‘the they’ and its contingent past. 
“Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence” (ibid: 43 
[21]). By ‘being’ traditional, by existing within the possibilities set forth by ‘the they’ 
uncritically, Dasein does not open itself to owning its self-interpretation. It understands itself 
and the world as being self-evident, as a ‘what’ that it does not need to question. Within the 
tradition Dasein “has been submitted to a ‘world’, and exists factically with Others” (ibid: 
435 [383]). The consequence of this is that proximally “and for the most part the Self is lost 
in the ‘they’. It understands itself in terms of those possibilities of existence which ‘circulate’ 
in the ‘average’ public way of interpreting Dasein today” (ibid: 435 [383]). The alternative to 
this is to recognise one’s existential contingency and to ‘resolutely’45  choose one’s own 
existential possibilities that have been inherited. By doing so, the contingency of one’s 
contingent, or ‘thrown’, existence becomes ‘heritage’ rather than ‘tradition’.
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current 
factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the 
heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one’s coming back 
resolutely to one’s thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of 
4 5 ‘Resoluteness’ is the authentic modality of disclosedness (Heidegger 1962: 343 [297]).
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the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as having 
thus come down. If everything ‘good’ is a heritage, and the character of 
‘goodness’ lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down 
of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness. The more authentically Dasein 
resolves – and this means that in anticipating death it understands itself 
unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility – the more 
unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the 
less so by accident. (ibid: 435 [383-384], emphasis as in original)
A resolute relation to one’s contingency is relation to one’s heritage rather than one’s 
tradition. This not to be interpreted as tradition and heritage naming different ‘whats’ of 
Dasein’s ‘thrown’ existence, its contingency. Rather, they name different modalities of ‘how’ 
Dasein chooses to ‘own’, or nor to ‘own’, its own existence. This structure is not simply a 
‘directional’ relation to one’s past, as is also structured by Dasein’s ‘being-towards-death’. 
Tradition and heritage are part of Dasein’s non-linear historicality. It is “how we designate 
Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein 
hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has 
chosen” (ibid: 435 [384]).
‘Heritage’ and ‘tradition’ are structures of Dasein’s ‘historicity’ or ‘historicality’. 
Historicality, for Heidegger, is an existential structure of Dasein that means more than the 
ontical condition of having a past. Rather, “the Interpretation of Dasein’s historicality will 
prove to be, at bottom, just a more concrete working out of temporality” (ibid: 434 [382]). 
Furthermore, it the structure of temporality that enables Dasein’s ways of existence possible, 
its ways of ‘being’ such as the authentic and the inauthentic. “Temporality has different 
possibilities and different ways of temporalizing itself. The basic possibilities of existence, 
the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein, are grounded ontologically on possible 
temporalizations of temporality” (ibid: 351-352 [304], emphasis as in original). Heidegger 
emphasised the importance of this phenomenological interpretation of temporality as he 
believed that the phenomenon of time was the central problematic of all ontology (ibid: 40 
[18]). He thought that time “must be brought to light – and genuinely conceived – as the 
horizon for all understanding of Being and for anyway of interpreting it” (ibid: 39 [17]), and 
that “the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined 
primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its “Temporal” [interjection, this is 
temporal in the meta-temporal sense] determinateness. Thus the fundamental ontological task 
of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality of Being” (ibid: 40 [19], 
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emphasis as in original). 
To understand Heidegger’s concepts of temporality and historicality it is useful to 
compare his philosophy with the existential philosophy of Sartre. Their philosophical 
difference is not that Heidegger analysed temporality while Sartre did not. Sartre grants an 
entire subsection of Being and Nothingness to his ‘phenomenological ontology’ of  
temporality (Sartre 2003: 130-193). Both Heidegger and Sartre are keen to argue that time 
should not be understood only in terms of its linear sequentiality, but also that the lived 
dimensions of past, present, and future as they are experienced are important to understand. 
The difference between them is the importance ascribed to the role of historicity in this 
overall temporal structure of being-in-the-world. While these similar but differing ‘existential 
ontologies’ interpret the ‘human being’ to be a ‘world maker’, giving meaning to an otherwise 
meaningless existence, the tension that arises from historicity is the degree to which they are 
also ‘self makers’. The problem of ‘historicity’ is the contingency of human existence.
Sartre maintained that the absurdity of ‘being’ human is that we are completely free in 
choosing the meaning of our own existence and so ‘make ourselves’ (Sartre 2003: 503). He 
argued against the belief that the facts of our existence represented a ‘network of 
determinism’, a view which holds that:
Much more than he appears “to make himself,” man seems “to be made” by 
climate and the earth, race and class, language, the history of the collectivity 
of which he is part, heredity, the individual circumstances of his childhood, 
acquired habits, the great and the small events of his life. (ibid: 503)
Examples of specific factual structures of human existence that Sartre analysed in detail are 
‘my place’, ‘my past’, ‘my environment’, ‘my neighbour’, and ‘my death’ (ibid: 511-573). 
The arguments he employs to argue against the determinacy of these structures use a similar 
design, and can be generalised to an extent. While he does not deny that we have no freedom 
to choose whether or not we are born with, as potential examples, two arms or brown hair, 
we nevertheless have no choice but to choose the meaning of these factual situations. For 
Sartre, our own existence is as a ‘being-for-itself’, rather than a ‘being-in-itself’, and so the 
ontical facts of our existence only have the meaning that we give them. 
However, Heidegger viewed the contingency of human existence to be a vital part of 
what makes being-in-the-world possible. He argued that a person has “grown up both into 
and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally 
and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its Being are 
disclosed and regulated” (Heidegger 1962: 41 [20]). This contingency of human existence is 
111
part of ‘being-with’ ‘the they’ (das Man). But Heidegger argues that our ‘who-ness’ as a 
‘they-ness’ is constituted by our temporal ‘how-ness’. Another philosopher with a similar 
concern with this understanding of historical-existentiality was Pascal who wrote this simple 
fragment in his Pensées: “Custom is our nature” (Pascal 1995: 125). This is a very useful 
statement, as it combines two different temporal meanings about human existence. In one 
sense ‘custom’ is a synonym for ‘culture’ and so the statement could be interpreted as 
indicating the importance of tradition and heritage for interpretations of humanity. But 
‘custom’, in this statement, can also be interpreted as ‘habit’, reflecting a more personal 
statement about individual ‘human beings’. Other philosophers that mirror Pascal’s sentiment 
include Dilthey’s assertion that “what man is, only his history tells” (Dilthey 1959: 43), and 
José Ortega y Gasset’s statement that “Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is ... 
history” (Ortega 1959: 61). The common attribute of these statements is that they present a 
non-essentialist understanding of ‘human being’ combined with a concern with historical 
existence. This is similar but different to what is sometimes called ‘historicism’, which 
typically argues that the ‘truth’ of reality, or the ‘essence’ of humanity, is determined by 
history. However, it is in the work of Heidegger that the problematic of the essentialist 
understanding of human ‘nature’ is phenomenological revealed to be an inheritance of the 
ontological tradition of ‘what-ness’. The ‘is-ness’ of humans can be understood by the 
scientific inquiry into the ontical properties of ‘Homo sapiens’, but it is the hermeneutic 
phenomenology of the ‘how-ness’ of Dasein which reveals its existentiality. And the ‘how-
ness’ of Dasein is its temporality.
Temporality for Heidegger is time in an ontological rather than ontical sense. Time in 
this ontological sense, as temporality, does not reference either the conception of time as the 
passing of events or the mental structure of experiencing change, it is neither ontical world-
time nor the ‘noetic’ structure of internal time-consciousness. Heidegger’s conception of 
ontological time is as an existential structure The temporality of inauthentic Dasein, in 
Heidegger’s terminology, is thrownness, falling, and projection (ibid: 264 [221-222]). 
Thrownness describes how Dasein is always already in the world, that the structure of its 
existence is contingent. In this sense thrownness relates to the past. Falling describes how 
Dasein acts in the world in the manner that it has been socialised too, when it is not choosing 
its own manner of ‘being’. This relates to the present. Alternatively, when Dasein is 
authentically choosing its own manner of ‘being’ it is projecting, choosing its own 
potentiality for ‘being’. This mode of temporality relates towards the future. This is 
Heidegger’s synthesis of a form of historicism, recognising that human existence is contingent 
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on the past, with an existentialist thesis on self ownership. Time, viewed as temporality, is 
the basic constitution for Dasein’s ‘being’ as ‘care’ (Sorge). Furthermore, time, when viewed 
as meta-temporality, is the foundational ontological structure that makes understanding 
‘being’ possible. Heidegger summarises this at the end of his History of the Concept of Time 
lecture course.
Not “time is” but “Dasein qua time temporalizes its being.” Time is not 
something which is found outside somewhere as a framework for world 
events. Time is even less something which whirs away inside in 
consciousness. It is rather that which makes possible the being-ahead-of-
itself-in-already-being-involved-in, that is, which makes possible the being of 
care. (Heidegger 1992a: 319-320, emphasis as in original)
It should not be surprising that Heidegger regarded time as a central concern for understanding 
human existence considering that the name of his text is Being and Time. The temporality of 
Dasein is the basis of its ‘being’ as ‘care’, and meta-temporality is what makes possible our 
understanding of ‘being’ in general. It “is as care that Dasein’s totality of Being has been 
defined” (Heidegger 1962: 370 [323]), and the “primordial unity of the structure of care lies in 
temporality” (ibid: 375 [327], emphasis as in original). For Heidegger, Dasein can only be 
understood “by reference to time” (Heidegger 1992a: 197, emphasis as in original).
‘Care’ (Sorge) is how Heidegger defines the structural whole of the ‘being’ of Dasein 
in its ‘everydayness’ (Alltäglichkeit), which is to say before he elaborates his interpretation of 
‘being’ in terms of temporal authenticity. Dasein is analysed in terms of everydayness in 
Division One of Being and Time because the initial analysis of its ‘being’ “should not be 
Interpreted with the differentiated character of some definite way of existing, but that it 
should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most 
part” (Heidegger 1962: 69 [43]). Heidegger argues that the “everyday way in which things 
have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a 
possibility of extraction. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, 
and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed” (ibid: 213 
[169]). However, when Heidegger progressively and recursively reinterprets his 
phenomenology of the modes of Dasein’s ‘being’, his description of the phenomenon of 
everydayness becomes ambiguous. Some commentators, such as Dreyfus, interpret 
everydayness as an undifferentiated modality of ‘being’ that is neither authentic nor 
inauthentic (Dreyfus 1991: 26-27). There is textual support that this is how Heidegger 
conceived the idea of everydayness. 
This undifferentiated character of Dasein’s everydayness is not nothing, but a 
positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being – 
113
and back into it again – is all existing, such as it is. We call this everyday 
undifferentiated character of Dasein “averageness” [Durchschnittlichkeit]. 
(Heidegger 1962: 69 [43], emphasis as in original)
‘Averageness’ is Dasein’s everyday familiarity with the world, as structured by ‘the they’ 
(das Man). “When entities are encountered, Dasein’s world frees them for a totality of 
involvements with which the ‘they’ is familiar, and within the limits which have been 
established with the ‘they’s’ averageness” (ibid: 167 [129]). However, Heidegger also 
frequently writes about Dasein’s average everydayness as if it were equivalent to existing 
inauthentically. This is an inconsistency that many scholars of Being and Time have noted, 
such as Polt who suggests that these inconsistencies “may reflect the fact that the text we 
know as Being and Time was finished in a rush, under the pressure of ‘publish or perish’” 
(Polt 1999: 45). 
In his analysis of Being and Time Blattner suggests an understanding of everydayness 
that follows Dreyfus’ interpretation. Blattner suggests, while noting that the text is 
ambivalent, that the everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein be interpreted as its 
‘unowned’ modality of ‘being’, as opposed to the authentically ‘owned’ and inauthentically 
‘disowned’.
If Dasein has an “undifferentiated” character that is neither owned nor 
disowned, that would indicate a third, and more plausible, description of 
Dasein’s average everydayness. Fortunately, the English words “owned” and 
“disowned” also suggest a nice third option: “unowned.” That is, we may 
characterise Dasein’s average everydayness as unowned, and then reserve 
“owned” and “disowned” for existentiell modifications of average 
everydayness. (Blattner 2006: 130)
The interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of everydayness is important. This is 
because he characterised the phenomenology of Dasein’s ‘being’ in Division One of Being and 
Time as an interpretation of it in its average everydayness. Heidegger does in sections appear 
to criticise everydayness and averageness, such as in his analysis of how the average 
everydayness of ‘the they’ (das Man) can strip Dasein of it capacity for authentic existence 
by appropriating the understanding of the world and depriving Dasein of the need to do this 
itself. 
Thus the “they” maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which 
belongs to it, of that which it grants success as valid and that which it does 
not, and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In 
this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be be ventured, it 
keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every 
kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is 
primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. 
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Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. 
Every secret loses it force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential 
tendency of Dasein which we call the “levelling down” of all possibilities of 
Being....
Thus the particular Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by the “they” . 
Not only that; by thus disburdening it of its Being, the “they” accommodates 
Dasein if Dasein has any tendency to take things easily and make them easy. 
And because the “they” constantly accommodates the particular Dasein by 
disburdening it of its Being, the “they” retains and enhances its stubborn 
dominion. (Heidegger 1962: 165 [127-128], emphasis as in original)
However, these excursions in Being and Time that critique ‘the they’ (das Man) and 
everydayness as ‘disburdening’ Dasein of its possibilities to own itself, are not consistent 
with his general characterisation of everydayness as being neither the authentic or inauthentic 
modalities of existence. Consequently, the argument by Blattner that everydayness be 
interpreted as an ‘unowned’ existence rather than a ‘disowned’ one, seems the most plausible 
understanding of the underlying phenomenological architecture that Heidegger was analysing. 
As Heidegger chooses to emphasize, his interpretation of everydayness should not be read as 
a moral critique of how Dasein finds itself in the world of ‘the they’. “In relation to these 
phenomena; it may not be superfluous to remark that our own Interpretation is purely 
ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, 
and from the aspirations of a ‘philosophy of culture’” (ibid: 210-211 [167]).
Interpreting Dasein’s average everydayness as its ‘unowned’ or undifferentiated 
manner of ‘being’ enables Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein’s unified structure of being-
in-the-world as ‘care’ (Sorge) to be understood. ‘Care’ does not name any individual structure 
of Dasein’s existentiality. “Care does not characterize just existentiality, let us say, as 
detached from facticity and falling; on the contrary, it embraces the unity of these ways in 
which Being may be characterized” (ibid: 237 [193]). The ‘care’ structure of being-in-the-
world is summarised by Heidegger as the totality of the way it temporally exists.
Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is itself an issue. 
Essentially ahead of it itself, it has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-
Being before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it 
reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been thrownly 
abandoned to the ‘world’, and falls into it concernfully. As care – that is, as 
existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown – this 
entity has been disclosed as a “there”. As being with Others, it maintains 
itself in an average way of interpreting... (ibid: 458 [406], emphasis as in 
original)
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As with all Heidegger’s technical terms for characterising the ontology of Dasein, it is 
important not to interpret ‘care’ in its normal ontical sense. It does not designate any 
particular psychological or emotional state, and within the phenomenological architecture it is 
removed by several degrees from any act of cognition. ‘Care’ does not signify any tendency 
“which one might have in mind ontically, such as worry or carefreeness” (ibid: 237 [192]). 
Within the ‘care’ (Sorge) structure of ‘being’, the way of Dasein’s ‘being-with’ other Dasein 
is solicitude (Fürsorge), which we have already analysed. But also deriving from the ‘care’ 
structure is Dasein’s way of encountering non-Dasein entities, a ‘dealing-with’ (Umgang) 
entities in terms of ‘concern’ (Besorgen). The concernful dealing with the world will be 
analysed in section 3.5. Solicitude and concern, both of which are not to be mistaken with 
their conventional ontical signification, derive from ‘care’ because ‘care’ is the structure of 
‘how’ Dasein makes itself an issue (Dreyfus 1991: 238). Thus the ‘how-ness’ of Dasein is 
‘care’. However, it is only the ‘how’ of our existence in our ‘unowned’ everyday manner of 
‘being’. Consequently, in order to ‘flesh out’ the phenomenology of Dasein’s ‘being’ it is 
necessary to understand how the authentic ‘owning’ and inauthentic ‘disowning’ of Dasein’s 
existence is structured by temporality. This is to say, ‘how’ does Dasein make an issue out of 
itself through its temporal unity.
As Dasein, in the caring state of being-in-the-world, we exist temporally because 
“Dasein itself... is time” (Heidegger 1992a: 197, emphasis as in original). To explain our 
existence as temporality Heidegger is less interested in what time is, and more interested in 
describing how we exist temporally. In The Concept of Time46 he states that:
Time is the ‘how’. If we wish to inquire into what time is, then one may not 
cling prematurely to an answer (time is such and such), for this always means 
a ‘what’. (Heidegger 1992b: 22E)
To reiterate, our ‘being’ is time, which is the ‘how’ of our existence. The basic ‘categories’ of 
Dasein’s temporal existence, what Heidegger calls its ‘ecstases’47  (Heidegger 1962: 377 
[329]), are thrownness, falling, and projection (ibid: 264 [221-222]). We are ‘thrown’ out of 
the past, ‘fall’ into the present, and ‘project’ into the future. These ecstases, the way our 
temporality ‘stands out’ are not to be thought of as a sequential linearity in the manner that 
time is normally understood, a linearity Heidegger calls “Weltzeit” or “world-time” (ibid: 467 
[414]). Rather the ecstases have a structural unity. In this unity our ‘projecting’ into the 
4 6 This was Heidegger’s lecture Der Begriff der Zeit, which he delivered to the theology department at the 
University of Marburg in July 1924. This lecture has been called the “original form” of Being and Time, and is 
also thought to be the basis for his 1925 course of lectures History of the Concept ot Time (Heidegger 1992a: 
xiv).
4 7 Heidegger did not use the term ‘categories’ as he has already reserved that term for the ontical regions of 
presence-at-hand, and the ‘existentialia’ are not the same as the ‘ecstases’.
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future, our ‘futural-ness’ has a certain primacy (ibid: 378 [329]), as it is the way in which our 
‘being’ is opened to possibility and meaning. Futural-ness gives Dasein its capacity to choose 
how it will be in the world, it is Dasein’s “potentiality-for-Being” (ibid: 373 [325]). But 
Dasein is also ‘thrown’, it is always already factically a ‘being-in-the-world’. The meaning of 
this ‘thrownness’ is provided by ‘projecting’ into possibilities, and so Heidegger can state 
that our character of ‘having been’, our ‘past-ness’, “arises, in a certain way, from the future” 
(ibid: 373 [326]). 
However, because the ecstases are not like sequential ‘world-time’ it is precarious to 
correlate ‘past-ness’ with what is our current past. “The future”, Heidegger argues, “is not 
later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present” (ibid: 401 [350], 
emphasis as in original). This is also a matter of the modal character of the ecstases, as Dasein 
exists both authentically and inauthentically. When Dasein is being inauthentic, it makes its 
world present-at-hand, by ‘falling’ and forgetting its character as a ‘thrown’ ‘being’ and 
merely ‘awaiting’ what will come next. This “awaiting which forgets and makes present is an 
ecstatical unity in its own right” (ibid: 389 [339], emphasis as in original). In this temporally 
inauthentic way of ‘being’, Dasein is existing by ‘making-present’ the world, where ‘present’ 
means both ‘present’ in the sense of ‘world-time’ sequentiality, and ‘present’ in the sense of 
being in attendance, the ‘what’ of the ontological tradition. When Dasein is behaving 
authentically, however, the ecstatic unity of its temporalizing of existence alters, and it is in 
this authentic mode of ‘being-in-the-world’ that Dasein’s ways of existing are opened to it 
and it can ‘own’ itself.
Dasein’s pressing into possibilities is not limitless, it has a finitude because of its 
mortality, and it is because of anxiety towards this mortal finitude that Dasein can behave 
authentically. When Dasein behaves in its authentic modality, its ecstases move from 
‘awaiting’, ‘forgetting’, and ‘making-present’, to ‘anticipation’, ‘repetition’, and the ‘moment 
of vision’. In anticipation Dasein stops merely awaiting, but, by recognising its finitude, 
begins to choose who it wants to be. Anticipation is how Dasein “lets itself come towards 
itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (ibid: 386 [337]). However, this anticipatory 
choosing of Dasein’s ‘potentiality-for-being’ can only come from retrieving, or ‘repeating’, 
the possibilities for ‘being’ that it has inherited from its thrownness. In this sense by “being 
futural Dasein is its past” (Heidegger 1992b: 19E), and because of this Heidegger can say that 
the past “is anything but what is past. It is something to which I can return again and again” 
(ibid: 19E). The anticipation and repetition of its potentiality allows Dasein its active 
existence in the ‘present’, its moment of vision, where it encounters the world as something it 
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cares about, rather than as something merely ‘present’ before it. This ecstatical temporality of 
Dasein is also what structures the hermeneutical disclosure  of being-in-the-world. Historicity 
is what Heidegger called the “first principal of all hermeneutics”, that the “possibility of 
access to history is grounded in the possibility according to which any specific present 
understands to be futural” (Heidegger 1992b: 20E, emphasis as in original). Heidegger 
provides this summary of ‘how’ Dasein’s everyday, authentic, and inauthentic, making an 
issue of itself is unified in by its temporally differentiated ‘care’ structure.
We have defined Dasein’s Being as “care”. The ontological meaning of “care” 
is temporality. We have shown that temporality constitutes the disclosedness 
of the “there”, and we have shown how it does so. In the disclosedness of the 
“there” the world is disclosed along with it. The unity of significance – that is, 
the ontological constitution of the world – must then likewise be grounded in 
temporality. The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world 
lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a 
horizon. (Heidegger 1962: 416 [364-365], emphasis as in original)
Furthermore, the ‘horizonal schemata of future, Present, and having been, is grounded in the 
ecstatical unity of temporality” (ibid: 416 [365]), and this unity determines the hermeneutic 
disclosure of the ‘there-ness’ of the world. However, we have not yet analysed this ‘there-
ness’ of Dasein.
§3.4 – The ‘there’ and the hermeneutic disclosure of the world
The phenomenological structure of solicitude, ‘being-with’, and ‘das Man’ is a constitutive 
part of the ‘care’ structure of Dasein’s temporalised being-in-the-world. In this temporal 
structure the world is hermeneutically disclosed to Dasein. This is the structure of ‘being-in 
as such’ (Heidegger 1962: 169 [131]), the constitution of Dasein’s hermeneutic-existential 
disclosedness. This is the phenomenology of the ‘there’, or the ‘Da’, of Da-sein (‘being-
there’). Heidegger argues that it is understanding this structure that paved “the way to 
grasping the primordial Being of Dasein itself – namely, care” (ibid: 169 [131]). By 
phenomenologically analysing the ‘there-ness’ structure of ‘being’, the constitution ‘world-
ness’ is uncovered. ‘World-ness’, also termed ‘worldhood’ or ‘worldliness’ (Weltlichkeit), is 
structured by Dasein’s concern (Besorgen) for intra-worldly entities, in a manner similar to 
how ‘who-ness’ is structured by Dasein’s solicitude. The ‘being’ of intra-worldly entities, 
which can be variously called ‘equipment’, ‘paraphernalia’, or ‘technology’, are constituted 
by the ‘world-ness’ of Dasein.
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However, before intra-worldly entities can be analysed it is required that both the 
structural constitution of ‘there-ness’ and the temporal-existential structure of care be 
phenomenologically uncovered. The hermeneutic structural composition of the ‘being’ of the 
Dasein is its ‘being-in’, its ‘there-ness’. This ‘there-ness’ or ‘disclosedness’, Dasein’s 
‘contextuality’, is constituted by the existentialia of ‘disposedness’ (Befindlichkeit), 
‘understanding, interpretation, and assertion’ (Verständnis, Auslegung, and Aussage), and 
‘discourse’ (Rede). These existentialia constitute “the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-
the-world” (ibid: 188 [148]). However, before these existentialia can be analysed a general 
understanding of the disclosedness of the ‘there’ is required. 
Disclosedness is Heidegger’s equivalent to concepts such as consciousness48 or the 
mind that can be found in the ‘what-ness’ ontological tradition. But to say that it is the 
equivalent risks simply replacing one term with another if the underlying phenomenon is not 
then clarified. The concept of disclosedness is required because of Heidegger’s rejection of the 
subject-object model of understanding that underlies ‘what-ness’ ontology49. Heidegger argues 
that Dasein’s ‘being-in’, its disclosedness of the ‘there’, “is not a characteristic that is 
effected, or even just elicited, in a present-at-hand subject by the ‘world’s’ Being-present-at-
hand” (ibid: 170 [132]). Nor is ‘there-ness’ a ‘between-ness’ of a “subject present-at-hand 
and an Object present-at-hand”, as this concept of ‘between-ness’ “splits the phenomenon 
asunder, and there is no prospect of putting it back together again from the fragments” (ibid: 
170 [132], emphasis as in original).
What is decisive for ontology is to prevent the splitting of the phenomenon – 
in other words, to hold its positive phenomenal content secure. To say that 
for this we need far-reaching and detailed study, is simply to express the fact 
that something which was ontically self-evident in the traditional way of 
treating the ‘problem of knowledge’ has often been ontologically disguised to 
the point where it has been lost sight of altogether. (ibid: 170-171 [132])
4 8 See section 3.5 for an account of Husserl’s phenomenology of intentional consciousness. In the Heideggerian 
alternative provided here, it can be seen that ‘cognition’ is a derivative mode or comportment of Dasein’s 
worldly ‘concern’ (Besorgen), and furthermore occurs as a privation of its normal comportment of dealing with 
(Umgang) entities.
4 9 Refer to section 1.3 to see how this model underlies the ‘classical’ realist and ‘noetic’ idealist branches of 
‘what-ness’ ontology.
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Rather than understood as an entity that is either a subject or an object50 , Dasein “which is 
essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world”, is to be understood as ‘being’ “itself in every 
case its ‘there’” (ibid: 171 [132]). Furthermore, Dasein’s ‘there-ness’ is its disclosedness. 
Dasein ‘is’, in the ontological-existential sense, its ‘there’, which is to say that Dasein is its 
disclosedness (ibid: 171 [133]). Every Dasein is its ‘there’, its disclosure of its world. 
Consequently, if “no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either” (ibid: 417 [365]). Furthermore, 
this disclosedness of the ‘there’, of Dasein’s world, is structured by the ecstatical unity of 
temporality.
The way in which Dasein’s contingency, its thrownness, is disclosed is its 
‘disposedness’ (Befindlichkeit). This terms is rendered as ‘state-of-mind’ by Macquarrie and 
Robinson. This translation is not appropriate however. One of the overriding themes of Being 
and Time is Heidegger’s consistent critique of reducing ways of experiencing the world to a 
mental model. Dreyfus instead translates the term as ‘affectedness’, after briefly considering 
‘where-you’re-at-ness’ (Dreyfus 1991: 168). Polt argues that ‘attunement’ is the best 
approximate of ‘Befindlichkeit’ (Polt 1999: 64-65), but it is Blattner’s ‘disposedness’ that I 
will use in my analysis of the phenomenon. (Blattner 2006: 76). ‘Disposedness’ is how 
Dasein finds itself amidst a world that has already been disclosed to it. This ‘already-there-
ness’ that is disposed to Dasein are its ‘moods’ (Stimmung). ‘Moods’ should not, in 
Heidegger’s usage, be interpreted as psychological states of minds. This conventional 
understanding of ‘mood’ refers to ontical ‘feelings’, which are derivative of Dasein’s more 
‘primordial’ ways of being-in-the-world. A mood is viewed as coming neither from a 
Cartesian ‘inside’ nor from a deterministic ‘outside’. “Having a mood is not related to the 
psychical in the first instance, and is not itself an inner condition which reaches forth in an 
enigmatical way and puts its mark on Things and persons” (Heidegger 1962: 176 [137). 
Rather, Heidegger resolves that a mood is that which first of all is what makes it possible to 
engage with the world as something that already matters. “The mood has already disclosed, in 
5 0 Heidegger was consistently opposed to subject-object model throughout his works, not only in Being and 
Time. For example, in the 1923 lecture course Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity Heidegger makes the 
following declaration.
This schema must be avoided: What exists are subjects and objects, consciousness and being 
– being is the object of knowledge – being in the authentic sense is the being of nature – 
consciousness is an “I think,” thus an ego, ego-pole, centre of acts, person – egos (persons) 
have standing opposite them: beings, objects, natural things, things of value, goods. The 
relation between subject and object needs to be explained and is a problem for epistemology.
This problem forms the basis of all those possibilities which are tried out over and over 
again and let loose on each other in endless discussions: the object is dependent on the 
subject, or the subject on the object, or both on each other in a correlative manner.... No 
modification of this schema would be able to do away with its inappropriateness. The 
schema itself has developed historically within the tradition from different constructions of 
each of its components (subject and object) which proceeded in isolation from one another 
and were then integrated in various ways. (Heidegger 1999: 62-63, emphasis as in original)
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every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself 
towards something” (ibid: 176 [137], emphasis as in original). Consequently, the existentiality 
of disposedness “implies a  disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter 
something that matters to us” (ibid: 177 [137-138], emphasis as in original). As 
‘disposedness’ is the structure that makes the world matter to us, it discloses to Dasein in its 
thrownness itself and the world, its being-in-the-world, as ‘already there’. Dasein finds itself 
disposed to existence, it ‘attunes’ to a way of ‘being’. 
An entity of the character of Dasein is its “there” in such a way that, whether 
explicitly or not, it finds itself in its thrownness. In [disposedness] Dasein is 
always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of 
coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in 
the mood that it has. (ibid: 174 [135])
For example, if Dasein is disposed in a nostalgic mood, its being-in-the-world is disclosed to it 
in a manner that structures its understanding of the world in sense of loss. Its ‘there’ matters 
to it as a no longer ‘there’. Dasein in its thrownness is understanding its world in terms of 
‘being’ nostalgic. Everything matters to it in terms of its nostalgia, so a house you are living in 
might not be disclosed as a home. By ‘being’ disposed to moods, Dasein’s world ‘always 
already’ matters to it. It is thrown into its ‘there-ness’.
However, as the ecstatical unity of temporality is non-linear, while Dasein is already 
disposed to the world in it thrownness, it is also understanding its world as it projects into its 
future possibilities. Understanding (Verständnis) is how Dasein gets around in its world. This 
conception of ‘understanding’ is not to be mistaken as a derivative act of cognising about 
something.
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression 
‘understanding something’ with the signification of ‘being able to manage 
something’, ‘being a match for it’, ‘being competent to do so something’. In 
understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is 
not a “what”, but Being as existing. The kind of Being which Dasein has, as 
potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding. (ibid: 183 [143], 
emphasis as in original)
Understanding is how the world is disclosed in terms of its potentialities for use. An intra-
worldly entity is not disclosed as simply a ‘present’ thing, but as something which Dasein 
may potentially use. In the unity of being-in-the-world the ‘there-ness’ of entities is 
‘understood’ by potentiality. Dasein does not ‘understand’ something in and of itself, but as 
something that is ‘towards’ something. Understanding is of potentialities rather than 
actualities. “Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and 
it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself  what its Being is capable of” (ibid: 184 
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[144], emphasis as in original). By projecting our possibilities we are able to understand 
things in terms of those possibilities. Things ‘matter’ differently to us depending on where 
our existence is headed. Dasein’s structure of understanding is a projection into possibility. In 
this way the ‘there’, which is also the ‘already-there’, is a ‘not-there-yet’. ‘Being’ is both a 
‘having been’ and a ‘becoming’.
Equiprimordial with understanding is what Heidegger calls ‘interpretation’ 
(Auslegung). Interpretation is the ‘as-structure’ of  the ‘there’. This represents that an entity 
for Dasein which is understood as an entity ‘for’ something, becomes interpreted ‘as’ 
something. Interpretation is not “the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is 
rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding” (ibid: 188-189 [148]). We 
treat entities ‘as’ something which we have interpreted, though this interpretation is before 
any thematic cognition of the entity (ibid: 190 [149]). Our interpretation of an entity is an act 
‘in advance’ of the entity, it has a ‘fore-structure’. Dasein ‘has’, ‘sees’, and ‘grasps’ (ibid: 
191 [150]) an entity ‘as’ something ‘for’ something within a pre-existing structure of ‘being’ 
involved in the world. “An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of 
something presented to us” (ibid: 191-192 [150]). A ‘pure intuition’ of a thing is not possible. 
It shows up as something ‘for’ something, and thus ‘as’ something, and only then can it be 
reflected upon as a ‘thing’. A tree, for example, is not disclosed outside of a world. It shows 
up ‘as’ part of a forest, or something to be cut down for timber, or as a home for insects and 
birds. But a ‘tree’ in and of itself is not disclosed. We can choose to make an assertion about 
the tree, in an attempt to explain the onticality of the tree. But this assertion (Aussage), a 
thematic, cognitive, explanation of an entity, is regarded as being derived from interpretations 
(ibid: 203 [160]). “Thus assertion cannot disown its ontological origin from an interpretation 
which understands” (ibid: 201 [158]).
The core principle of this hermeneutic phenomenology of the disclosure of the ‘being-
in’ of being-in-the-world regards the temporality of the formation of meaning for Dasein. This 
is an interpretation of the hermeneutic disclosure of the meaning of the ‘there’.
In so far as understanding and interpretation make up the existential state of 
Being of the “there”, “meaning” must be conceived as the formal-existential 
framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding. Meaning is 
an existentiale of Dasein, not a property attached to entities, lying ‘behind’ 
them, or floating somewhere as an ‘intermediate domain’. Dasein only ‘has’ 
meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be ‘filled in’ by 
the entities discoverable in that disclosedness. Hence only Dasein can be 
meaningful or meaningless. ...
The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as 
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the ‘ground’ which gives entities support; for a ‘ground’ becomes accessible 
only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness.
(ibid: 193-194 [151-152], emphasis as in original)
The ‘there’ has no inherent meaning, no ‘what-ness’ or core essence, only what Dasein 
discloses. Furthermore, this disclosive process is temporally unified by the structure of the 
hermeneutic circle. “Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must have 
already understood what is to be interpreted” (ibid: 194 [152]). However, as Heidegger points 
out, what “is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way” (ibid: 
195 [153]). That is, to begin an interpretative process in such a way so that it becomes a 
virtuous circle. 
However, there is one more structure in the constitution of how the ‘there’ is 
disclosed. As well as the ‘disposedness’ which attunes Dasein through moods to the ‘already-
there’, and ‘understanding’ which projects Dasein into the possibilities of the ‘there’, there is 
also the structure of ‘discourse’ (Rede). “Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with 
[disposedness] and understanding” (ibid: 203 [161], emphasis as in original). By ‘discourse’ 
Heidegger is indicating more than the phenomena of ‘a’ language. ‘A’ language is an ontical 
(though not physical) entity, while ‘discourse’ is the ‘being’ of that entity. “The existential-
ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk” (ibid: 203 [160-161], emphasis as in 
original). By ‘discourse’, Heidegger is indicating the basic structure that allows the world to 
be articulated. This structure of ‘discourse’ is what leads to language, what it constitutes is 
the ability to “deal with patterns of meaning” (Polt 1999: 74). Another translation of ‘Rede’ 
is ‘telling’. This is used by Dreyfus to emphasize that this structure also makes sense of 
statements such as “being able to tell the time” (Dreyfus 1991: 213). ‘Discourse’ is the 
capacity to put the ‘articles’ of the ‘there’ into an intelligible whole, to structure these 
‘articles’ so that they can be ‘articulated’. ‘Discourse’ is the disclosure of the ‘articulated 
there’, the articulation of intelligibility (Heidegger 1962: 203-204 [161]). The existential 
structures of the ‘there’ – ‘disposedness’, ‘understanding’, and ‘discourse’ – constitute the 
‘being-in’ of ‘being-in-the-world’. But being-in-the-world is a unified phenomenon, and 
‘being-in’ cannot be understood separately from what it is ‘in’, that is the ‘world’.
It is in chapter three of Being and Time, subtitled The Worldhood of the World, that 
Heidegger advances his analysis of how Dasein encounters intra-worldly entities as either 
present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. He does so through a phenomenology of ‘worlds’ that 
incorporates a critique of Cartesianism brought about by an initial phenomenological 
destruction of this part of the ontological tradition. This critique of Cartesianism has already 
been adumbrated by previous reference to Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with the ontological 
123
tradition’s object and subject conceptual structure for explaining how knowing the world is 
orientated. The critique of Descartes is that “he takes the Being of ‘Dasein’ (to whose basic 
constitution Being-in-the-world belongs) in the very same way as he takes the Being of the 
res extensa – namely, as substance” (Heidegger 1962: 131 [98]). Heidegger’s view is that 
Descartes took the idea of ‘being’ “as permanent presence-at-hand”, identified “entities 
within-the-world with the world in general”, and consequently failed to bring Dasein’s ways 
of existing into view “in a manner which is ontologically appropriate” (ibid: 130 [98]). 
Heidegger further alleges that Descartes’s philosophy “inevitably obstructed his view of the 
phenomenon of the world, and has made it possible for the ontology of the ‘world’ to be 
compressed into that of certain entities within-the-world” (ibid: 131 [98]). This critique of 
taking the ‘being’ of the corporeal, extended ‘thing’ as the “fundamental stratum upon which 
all the other strata of actuality within-the-world are built up” (ibid: 131 [98]), also dismisses 
the argument that this view of ‘being’ can be rounded out by adding qualities to the ‘thing’, 
which would be seen as “quantitative modifications of the modes of the extensio itself” (ibid: 
131 [99]).
These qualities, which are themselves reducible, would provide the footing for 
such specific qualities as “beautiful”, “ugly”, “in keeping”, “not in keeping”, 
“useful”, “useless”. If one is oriented primarily by Thinghood, these latter 
qualities must be taken as non-quantifiable value-predicates by which what is 
in the first instance just a material Thing, gets stamped as something good.... 
Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being 
of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-
at-hand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate 
characteristics which a Thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand. 
They would have their sole ultimate ontological source in our previously 
laying down the actuality of Things as the fundamental stratum. But even 
pre-phenomenological experience shows that in an entity which is 
supposedly a Thing, there is something that will not become fully intelligible 
through Thinghood alone. (ibid: 131-132 [99], emphasis as in original)
Heidegger’s critique is that “taking refuge in ‘value’-characteristics” (ibid: 133 [100]) provides 
no legitimisation for taking fundamental ‘being’ as present-at-hand substance. Furthermore, 
Heidegger was critical of both aspects of Descartes binary ontology. Taking Dasein’s ‘being’ 
as the res cogitans is as inadequate as taking the ‘being’ of other entities as the res extensa. 
This duality remains an ontical characterisation of the ‘what-ness’ of entities, where “again 
we are faced with the Being-present-at-hand-together of some spiritual Thing along with a 
corporeal Thing, while the Being of the entity thus compounded remains more obscure than 
ever” (ibid: 82-83 [56]).
However, a phenomenology of the ‘being’ of intra-worldly entities is not a reductive  
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analysis of ontical presence-at-hand, though it does uncover the structure that enables Dasein 
to understand entities in this manner. Rather, phenomenology reveals the ‘being’ of entities in 
terms of the referential totality of involvement and significance, which is an existentiale of 
Dasein’s constitution as being-in-the-world. The ‘world’, from the phenomenological 
perspective, has an ontological ‘how-ness’ that cannot be reduced to its ontical constituents. 
It is this way of understanding the ‘world’ that Heidegger called ‘worldhood’.
‘Worldhood’ is an ontological concept, and stands for the structure of one of 
the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world. But we know Being-in-the-
world as a way in which Dasein’s character is defined existentially. Thus 
worldhood itself is an existentiale. If we inquire ontologically about the 
‘world’, we by no means abandon the analytic of Dasein as a field for 
thematic study. Ontologically, ‘world’ is not a way of characterizing those 
entities which Dasein is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself. (ibid: 
92 [64], emphasis as in original)
Understanding the ‘world’ as an existentiale of Dasein, signified by the term ‘worldhood’, can 
lead to confusion due to the multiple manners in which the word ‘world’ can be utilised. Yet 
Heidegger carefully separated these meanings into four groups for use in his terminology. 
The first sense of ‘world’ described by Heidegger is for the ontical totality of all 
present-at-hand entities (ibid: 93 [64]). This is the meaning of ‘world’ that corresponds to the 
first sense of ontology that was introduced in section 1.1 of this thesis. ‘World’, in this sense, 
has been, and continues to be, revised by scientific progress, and so this use of ‘world’ is now 
equivalent to ‘the universe’. Dreyfus calls this sense of ‘world’ the ‘ontical-categorial’ sense 
(Dreyfus 1991: 89). Heidegger’s second sense of ‘world’ corresponds to the characterisation 
of ontology found in section 1.1 of this thesis, where quiddity or ‘what-ness’ is understood 
as the subject matter. Similarly, Dreyfus calls this sense of ‘world’ the ‘ontological-categorial’ 
sense (ibid: 89), as Heidegger did understand the term as functioning as an ontological term 
(Heidegger 1962: 93 [64-65]) but ‘ontological’ in its ‘what-ness sense’. In particular, this 
sense of ‘world’ corresponds to the understanding of regional ontologies that we outlined in 
section 1.2, and which Heidegger rather terms ‘realms’. “And indeed ‘world’ can become a 
term for any realm which encompasses a multiplicity of entities: for instance, when one talks 
of the ‘world’ of a mathematician, ‘world’ signifies the realm of possible objects of 
mathematics” (ibid: 93 [64-65]). It is unfortunate that Heidegger adopted the use of the word 
‘ontological’ uncritically in this important passage, as he uses it here in the sense that he has 
otherwise been careful to reattribute to onticality. This is why Dreyfus calls it the 
ontological-categorial sense, in order to distinguish from the first ontical-categorial sense of 
‘world’. But Heidegger’s first sense of the word ‘world’ does not signify the categories of the 
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old sense of ontology either. Consequently, the first two senses of the word ‘world’ 
identified by Heidegger would be better termed first the ‘ontical’ sense, and second the 
‘ontical-categorial’ sense.
The third sense of the word ‘world’ that Heidegger identifies is what Dreyfus calls the 
‘ontical-existentiell’ sense (Dreyfus 1991: 89), and this nomenclature is consistent with 
Heidegger’s description of the phenomena. However, the ‘existentiell’, while not ontological 
in Heidegger’s sense, is not an entirely ontical either. It corresponds to what Heidegger calls 
the ‘pre-ontological’. Ontology, for Heidegger, is the phenomenological investigation of how 
‘being’ exists, where existing relates to the structures of Dasein’s interpretative being-in-the-
world. This is why, as we said in section 2.2, in Heidegger’s usage the ‘existentialia’ are the 
structural equivalent for Dasein as the traditional concept of the ‘categories’ are for non-
Dasein entities (Heidegger 1962: 70 [44]). For example, it is vital to grasp the distinction 
“between Being-in as an existentiale and the category of the ‘insideness’ which things present-
at-hand can have with regard to one another” (ibid: 82 [56], emphasis as in original). The 
existentiell is a particular Dasein’s self-interpretation of who and what they are, but not an 
existential interpretation of the structures of how they are, which conforms to Heidegger’s 
ontological difference distinction between the ontological and the ontical. However, the 
existentiell is a special kind of ontical ‘what-ness’ as it is Dasein’s own self-interpreted 
‘what-ness’. As Heidegger states in section 63 of Being and Time, Dasein’s understanding of 
existentiality is based on its self existentiell understanding, and so unless “we have an 
existentiell understanding, all analysis of existentiality will remain groundless” (ibid: 360 
[312]). Consequently, Dasein’s existentiell understanding has a pre-ontological as well as an 
ontical dimension, where ‘pre-ontological’ “does not signify simply ‘being-ontical’, however, 
but rather ‘being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being’” (ibid: 32 [12]). This 
is why terming Heidegger’s third sense of the word ‘world’ the ontical-existentiell designation 
is partially misleading. The use of ‘ontical’ is accurate with Heidegger’s initial description of 
the ‘world’ in this sense, but his subsequent clarification demonstrates that it is not entirely 
adequate.
“World” can be understood in another ontical sense – not, however, as those 
entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-
the-world, but rather as that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to 
‘live’. “World” has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification. Here again 
there are different possibilities: “world” may stand for the ‘public’ we-world, 
or one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) environment. (ibid: 93 [65])
If the liberty is taken to remove hyphen from ‘pre-ontological’ and render it as 
‘preontological’, then the nomenclature ‘the preontological-existentiell’ better defines the 
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third sense of the word ‘world’. It is not ontological, but it is more than ontical. It does 
designate a ‘what’, but it is a ‘what’ of Dasein’s existentiell understanding. ‘World’ in this 
sense is not ‘the world’, but rather ‘worlds’, so that ‘a world’, ‘these worlds’, ‘his world’, 
‘her world’, and ‘their world’ are possible formations. Dreyfus provides the following good 
examples when he states that this “sense of world is reflected in such locutions as ‘the child’s 
world,’ ‘the world of fashion,’ or ‘the business world’” (Dreyfus 1991: 89-90).
However, while distinguishing between the ontical, ontical-categorial, and 
preontological-existentiell senses of the word ‘world’ is a necessity for a full explication of 
the idea of ‘the world’, it is the fourth sense of the word ‘world’ that is most important in 
terms of Dasein’s constitution as being-in-the-world. The fourth sense is what Dreyfus 
correctly terms the ‘ontological-existential’ sense of the ‘world’ (ibid: 91). “Finally, “world” 
designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood” (Heidegger 1962: 93 [65], 
emphasis as in original). It is this sense of the ‘world’ that Heidegger’s accuses the ontological 
tradition of ‘what-ness’ of Western philosophy as having neglected. “When it comes to the 
problem of analysing the world’s worldhood ontologically, traditional ontology operates in a 
blind alley, if, indeed, it sees this problem at all” (ibid: 94 [65]). In opposition to this, 
Heidegger’s ontological-existential analysis of the worldhood of the ‘world’, in terms of a 
referential totality of involvement and significance which is “constitutive for worldhood 
itself” (ibid: 107 [76]), enables an understanding of the ‘being’ of intra-worldly entities. This 
understanding is in terms of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, as disclosed to Dasein 
constituted as being-in-the-world.
§3.5 – The referential totality of the world and technology
Having affirmed that worldhood is an existentiale of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, the question 
remains how Heidegger can relate intra-worldly entities to the ‘being’ of Dasein. Heidegger is 
aware of the difficulty of this, stating that the “task of ‘describing’ the world 
phenomenologically is so far from obvious that even if we do no more than determine 
adequately what form it shall take, essential ontological clarifications will be needed” (ibid: 92 
[64]). Such clarifications include the aforementioned four senses of the word ‘world’. It also 
includes describing the modes of ‘being’ of intra-worldly entities in terms of Dasein’s 
worldhood. As previously mentioned, Heidegger understands worldhood as Dasein’s 
referential totality of involvement and significance. There is a lot of phenomenology 
compacted into the phrase ‘referential totality of involvement and significance’, and the 
interpretation of this description of Heidegger’s has to be meticulous in order to avoid 
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misrepresenting it. Heidegger is cautious to note that “in such formalizations the phenomena 
get levelled off so much that their real phenomenal content may be lost, especially in the case 
of such ‘simple’ relationships as those which lurk in significance” (ibid: 121 [88]). The 
underlying phenomenology of statements such as ‘the referential totality of involvement and 
significance’ must be meticulously analysed and interpreted in order to avoid an uncritical 
adoption of the phrase where its actual meaning is not understood. The first stage in this 
interpretation of the phenomena is to understand Heidegger’s concept of ‘concern’ 
(Besorgen).
Concern derives from Dasein’s ‘being’ as ‘care’ (Sorge). Concern is Heidegger’s term 
for the relation Dasein has with the entities in it is world, with the exception of entities that 
are other Dasein which are related to in terms of solicitude. As a technical term ‘concern’ 
should not be understood as it is in the ontical vernacular. For Heidegger, ‘concern’ is rather 
an existentiale, one which designates “the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world” 
(ibid: 83 [57]). Concern is our way of ‘being’ amidst intra-worldly entities. Heidegger 
develops this idea of our concernful relation to the world in terms of the ‘environment’ 
(Umwelt), ‘dealings’ (Umgang), ‘the in-order-to’ (das Um-zu), and ‘circumspection’ 
(Umsicht). As with the terms Sorge, Besorgen, and Fürsorge, the etymological relationship 
of these terms is unfortunately lost when translated from German into English. The German 
prefix ‘um-’ can mean either ‘about’ or ‘around’, or something like ‘in order to’. So for 
example Umwelt literally translates as ‘world about’ or ‘world around’, which is best 
expressed in English as ‘environment’, while Umsicht  can mean ‘looking around for a way to 
get something done’, which is normally translated as ‘circumspection’. Macquarrie and 
Robinson analyse these, and similar, difficulties in their translation of Being and Time and 
make many helpful footnotes about their observations throughout (see, for example, the 
footnotes in Heidegger 1962: 95-98 [66-69]).
Understanding how Heidegger used his etymological constructions to develop his 
phenomenological architecture of the ‘being’ of Dasein and the world is an aid to 
understanding his thesis in general. They help to formally indicate the unified, relational 
whole of the various structures he describes. This linguistic understanding of the relational 
whole of the analyses and descriptions in Being and Time is lost when it is translated. 
However, as long as the interpreter remembers this underlying structure of the text, the 
impoverishment of translation is not a decisive obstacle for making sense of the whole. 
Furthermore, Heidegger regularly groups his technical terms together when making a 
statement about the phenomenological architecture of existing, and these statements help 
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signify the unity of the structures he describes. For example, there is the phenomenological 
statement that what “is ready-to-hand in the environment is certainly not present-at-hand for 
an eternal observer exempt from Dasein: but it is encountered in Dasein’s circumspectively 
concernful everydayness” (ibid: 140 [106]).
The everyday world of Dasein, that “which is closest to it, is the environment” (ibid: 
94 [66], emphasis as in original). Furthermore, the worldhood of the environment can be 
understood through “an ontological Interpretation of those entities within-the-environment 
which we encounter as closest to us” (ibid: 94 [66], emphasis as in original). Heidegger’s 
phenomenological analysis of how Dasein encounters entities in the environment represents 
his decisive break from his mentor Husserl’s use of phenomenology, and this break is founded 
upon Heidegger’s critique of the subject-object model of human understanding. Heidegger 
argues that “no sooner was the ‘phenomenon of the world’ grasped than it got interpreted in a 
‘superficial’, formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of 
setting up knowing as a ‘relation between subject and Object’ [sic] – a procedure in which 
there lurks as much ‘truth’ as vacuity” (ibid: 86-87 [60]). This objection can be interpreted as 
a criticism of Husserl's method of phenomenology. Husserl had further developed the 
traditional subject-object model in terms of ‘intentionality’. However, before understanding 
how Heidegger’s ideas differed from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of 
intentionality, a brief account of the main points of Husserl’s theory is necessary.
It was seen in section 1.3 that Husserl’s ‘what-ness ontology’ can be characterized as 
the study of the essential types that structures existence51, understood in terms of the 
relationship between formal ontology and the regional ontologies. However, his formal 
ontology is not an account of the structure of existence in and of itself, rather it is what 
Husserl calls the universal structures of consciousness:
The realm of transcendental consciousness as the realm of what is, in a 
determined sense, “absolute” being, has been provided us by 
phenomenological reduction. It is the primal category of all being (or, in our 
terminology, the primal region), the one in which all other regions of being are 
rooted, to which, according to their essence, they are relative and on which 
they are therefore all essentially dependent. The theory of categories must 
start entirely from this most radical of all ontological distinctions – being as 
consciousness and being as something which becomes “manifested” in 
consciousness, “transcendent” being... (Husserl 1983: 171, emphasis as in 
original)
Husserl’s understanding of the phenomenological reduction will be analysed momentarily. 
5 1 ‘Existence’ is used here in the non-Heideggerian sense. In Heideggerian terminology this sense of ‘existence’ 
could be called the ontical totality.
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First it is needed to be understood that Husserl considered transcendental phenomenology the 
method for the study of the structure of consciousness. Husserl believed that the ontological 
possibility of determining ‘what is’ “as a science of being in the absolute and final sense, 
depends upon the success of this science [of phenomenology]” (Husserl 1999: 25). 
Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness is called ‘transcendental’ because it is a 
modification of Kant’s transcendental understanding of the necessary a priori structures of 
experience. In this manner Husserl situates himself within the philosophical tradition of 
Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant. As he states:
The striving toward phenomenology was present already in the wonderfully 
profound Cartesian fundamental considerations; then, again, in the 
psychologism of the Lockean school; Hume almost set foot upon its domain, 
but with blinded eyes. And then the first to correctly see it was Kant... 
although he was still unable to appropriate it or recognize it as a field of work 
pertaining to a strict eidetic science proper. (Husserl 1982: 142)
Husserl’s phenomenology operates within the Copernican revolution that Kant enacted, 
seeking to understand entities in terms of how they are structured and understood by the 
mind. His phenomenology attempts to describe the eidetic features – the essences – of 
entities as they are experienced by consciousness. His approach begins with the apodictic 
Cartesian position that what cannot be doubted about existence or reality is that there is 
someone who consciously experiences it, that in “every case of determinate doubt it is 
without doubt certain that I am so doubting” (Husserl 1999: 23). Husserl uses this Cartesian 
position that the conscious subject is beyond doubt to argue that this means that the subject 
is also necessarily perceiving entities in order to provide content for its experience of 
existence. “Descartes asked, as you will recall, after he had established the evidence of the 
cogitatio (or rather, in a phrase we have not adopted, the “cogito ergo sum”): What is it that 
assures me of this basic givenness? The answer: clear and distinct perception” (ibid: 37, 
emphasis as in original). Husserl argues that however “I might perceive, imagine, judge, infer – 
whether these acts are attended by certainty or uncertainty, whether they actually have 
objects or not – it remains absolutely clear and certain that with respect to perception I am 
perceiving this or that, that with respect to judgement, I am judging this or that, etc.” (ibid: 
23-24). Furthermore, Husserl argues that we can bracket questions about the ultimate reality 
of the entities perceived by a subject’s consciousness, and rather analyse the entities as 
contents of conscious awareness (Dreyfus and Magee 1988: 254-255). This argument leads to 
a central tenet in Husserl’s phenomenology, differentiating between consciousness and what 
appears to consciousness.
Husserl understood the existence of the conscious, transcendental subject as beyond 
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doubt, and used this Cartesian argument as the foundation for the formation of a science of 
the necessary structures of cognition52. This is his transcendental phenomenology. Important 
for this science was his idea of the epoché, the bracketing, parenthesizing, or indexing of 
judgements about entities. The epoché serves as a methodological device for his transcendental 
phenomenological reduction. As Overgaard is careful to document, it is important not to 
confuse or conflate the epoché and the Husserlian reduction (Overgaard 2004: 36-55). The 
epoché brackets the existence of the entities to be observed, so that the cognitive constitution 
of those entities can be phenomenologically described by the reduction without reference to 
those entities as an existing thing in the world (ibid: 43-44). This is not the same as regarding 
the parenthesized entities as ‘unreal’. “Figuratively speaking, that which is parenthesized is 
not erased from the phenomenological blackboard but only parenthesized, and thereby 
provided with an index” (Husserl 1983: 171). 
We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the 
natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses 
with respect to being; thus the whole natural world which is continually 
“there for us”, “on hand,” and which will always remain there according to 
consciousness as an “actuality” even if we choose to parenthesize it.
If I do that, as I can with complete freedom, then I am not negating this 
“world” as though I were a sophist; I am not doubting its factual being as 
though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the “phenomenological” 
[epoché] which also completely shuts me off from any judgement about 
spatiotemporal factual being. (ibid: 61, emphasis as in original)
For Husserl parenthesizing the existence of entities indicates that “the existence of all 
transcendent entities, whether I believe in them or not, does not concern me... this is not the 
place to pass judgement on the issue, to do so is entirely beside the point” (Husserl 1999: 
30). It is this ‘natural attitude’ about entities that is parenthesized by the epoché, the 
pragmatic belief in the ‘reality’ of entities. The epoché puts aside any questions about the 
existence of the entities.
Following their parenthesizing by the epoché entities are then ‘regressed’ or ‘traced 
5 2 Husserl’s transcendental subject is interchangeably called the transcendental ego. It is important to understand 
that while Husserl’s phenomenology was strongly influenced by his reading of Descartes’ philosophy, that his 
notion of the transcendental ego was not the same as the Cartesian cogito. Husserl does not try to prove the 
existence of the external world, what Descartes called the res extensa, on the basis of his understanding of the 
thinking subject. Rather, Husserl wants to understand the necessary a priori structures of the subject’s 
consciousness that determine how objects as mental entities are perceived, judged, and otherwise mentally 
processed. Another misunderstanding that should be avoided is confusing what can be called the ‘empirical ego’ 
with the transcendental ego. This is Robert Sokolowski’s argument that the “empirical and the transcendental 
egos are not two entities; they are one and the same being, but considered in two ways” (Sokolowski 2000: 
133). The empirical ego is the material, organic, substantial entity that is identified as an individual person. 
However, this idea of the empirical ego is not what Husserl’s phenomenology is primarily concerned with. 
Rather, Husserl’s intent is to analyse the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego, to reiterate, is the 
necessary a priori structure of the self-subject that determine the cognitive engagement with the world.
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back’ to how they were constituted by the transcendental subjectivity of the 
phenomenologist’s consciousness. This is Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological 
reduction, a return to the “transcendental ego, who constitutes within himself givenness-
beforehand and all modes of subsequent givenness” (Husserl 1970a: 136). The entities being 
phenomenologically analysed are therefore not the entities in and of themselves. Rather, it is 
the entities as objects of transcendental subjectivity that are being studied. Husserl called 
these objects of consciousness the noema, describing them as the contents for noesis, the 
transcendental acts of consciousness. It is the structure of noetic mental processes “to include 
in itself something such as a ‘sense’ and possibly a manifold sense on the basis of this sense-
bestowal... Such noetic movements are, e.g., directions of the regard of the pure Ego to the 
objects ‘meant’ by it owing to sense-bestowal, to <the object> which is ‘inherent in the 
sense’ for the Ego” (Husserl 1983: 213-214). These ‘senses’ are the noematic contents of the 
noetic processes.
Perception, for example, has its noema, most basically  its perceptual sense, 
i.e., the perceived as perceived. Similarly, the current case of remembering has 
its remembered as remembered, just as as its <remembered> [sic], precisely 
as it is “meant,” “intended to” in the <remembering> [sic]; again, the judging 
has the judged as judged, liking has the liked, and so forth. (ibid: 214, 
emphasis as in original)
By drawing upon and modifying the work of his teacher Franz Brentano (see Mohanty 2009: 
69-70), Husserl added the concept of intentionality to this model of how noematic entities are 
experienced by the consciousness of the transcendental subject. Husserl held that 
intentionality “names the fact that mental states such as perceiving, believing, desiring, 
fearing, and intending in the ordinary sense are always about something, that is, directed at 
some object under some description” (Dreyfus 1991: 48). Intentional content is thus 
construed as the self-contained meanings within consciousness which gives intelligibility to 
everything that people encounter (ibid: 2). Intentionality, the ‘directedness’ of consciousness 
towards an entity, is the link between noesis and noema. Therefore, intentionality can be 
understood as the cognitive structure of how the transcendental subject experiences entities.
Heidegger however, disagreed with regarding intentional cognition as the basic way in 
which Dasein as being-in-the-world encounters entities. This does not mean that Heidegger 
dismissed intentional cognition as a way in which entities can be encountered, rather he argued 
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that cognition53 “is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 1962: 90 
[62]). Furthermore, when this mode of cognition (Erkennen) is “possible as a way of 
determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it”, it is because there is a 
deficiency “in our having-to-do with the world concernfully” (ibid: 88 [61]). Within 
Heidegger’s phenomenological architecture, the intentional cognition of the world is not the 
fundamental structure of experiencing the world, it is a deficient mode of our concern 
(Besorgen). It is only when something interferes with Dasein’s normal way of disclosing 
intra-worldly entities that its concernful dealing with these entities operates as intentionality, 
disclosing them as present-to-hand. Heidegger calls these modes of concern Dasein’s way of 
‘comportment’ (Verhalten). One manner of comportment is cognition which discloses entities 
as present-at-hand. Another type of comportment is the aforementioned ‘dealing with’ 
(Umgang), which discloses entities as ready-to-hand.
Such dealings have already dispersed themselves into manifold ways of 
concern. The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a 
bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates 
things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of ‘knowledge’. (ibid: 
95 [67])
The world of everyday Dasein is its environment, and the concernful way in which entities in 
the environment are disclosed to Dasein as being-in-the-world is by its dealings. This ‘dealing 
with’ discloses intra-worldly entities as having the kind of ‘being’ of readiness-to-hand.
The ready-to-hand is encountered within-the-world. The Being of this entity, 
readiness-to-hand, thus stands in some ontological relationship with the world 
and towards worldhood. In anything ready-to-hand the world is always 
‘there’. Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been 
previously discovered, though not thematically. (ibid: 114 [83])
Furthermore, this ‘dealing with’ comportment to ready-to-hand entities in the world is 
Dasein’s habitual comportment. Thematic cognition, on the other hand, has to penetrate 
beyond this habitual mode. “To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition 
must penetrate beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern” (ibid: 101 [71], emphasis as in 
original). Normally, to “the extent that any entity shows itself to concern – that is, to the 
extent that it is discovered in its Being – it is already something ready-to-hand 
5 3 The German word that Heidegger uses is ‘Erkennen’, and I am translating this as ‘cognition’. Macquarrie and 
Robinson, however, normally translate it as ‘knowing’. My choice on this matter follows from Blattner’s 
argument about the translation, which is presented below.
“Erkennen” and “Erkenntnis” are often used in philosophy to mean knowledge, as in 
Erkenntnistheorie, which is theory of knowledge. They can also be used to mean cognition, 
however, which is the way in which Kant uses them most often. Recent translators of Kant’s 
writings have begun to use “cognition,” where the older and more established translations 
have used “knowledge.” Because Heidegger’s discussion of Erkenntnis in §13 of Being and 
Time does not focus on any of the special epistemological features of knowledge, such as 
justification or truth, but rather aims squarely at general aspects of intentionality, it is better 
to render the term as “cognition” here. (Blattner 2006: 46)
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environmentally; it just is not ‘proximally’ a ‘world-stuff’ that is merely present-at-hand” 
(ibid: 118 [85], emphasis as is original).
Humanity has developed an extensive knowledge of the ontical properties of present-
at-hand entities. The ongoing accumulation of this knowledge has been highly prioritised by 
civilization. Our knowledge of cognition has also grown, albeit more slowly than the objects it 
discloses. However, the ontological tradition that underlies these achievements has resulted in 
a deficient understanding  of ‘being’ when it is not present-at-hand. The paradox of this 
situation is that the way of ‘being’ of entities that is most familiar to us non-thematically, is 
thematically alien to our conventional reflections on the world. Consequently, to say that the 
‘being’ of entities is primarily disclosed to us as ready-to-hand requires meticulous attention. 
Heidegger calls the kind of intra-worldly entities that we encounter in concern ‘equipment’ 
(das Zeug) (ibid: 97 [68]). The phenomenology of this term serves to indicate that not only is 
the habitual mode of ‘being’ of intra-worldly entities something non-thematic, it is also 
something that is relational to other intra-worldly entities. It also incorporates an 
understanding of the ‘directionality’ of this ‘being’ that is similar to Husserl’s understanding 
of intentionality. This ‘directionality’ is structured as the referential totality of involvement 
and significance of ‘equipment’. However, before this phenomenological structure can be 
analysed in detail, it is first necessary to consider the ways in which the modes of ‘being’ of 
intra-worldly entities are encountered.
In the referential totality, which we have not yet analysed, entities are encountered 
that have several different forms or manners of ‘being’. This does not include encountering 
another Dasein. Heidegger argued that the phenomenological architecture of how another 
Dasein is encountered is different from the concernful way Dasein encounters other intra-
worldly entities. He called this alternative structure ‘solicitude’ (Fürsorge), which we have 
already analysed. Unlike the encountering other Dasein, the entities encountered in Dasein’s 
concernful experience of the world include readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, and 
unreadiness-to-hand. A ready-to-hand entity is available for use in that it is already 
understood. This ‘understanding’ is not the theoretical comportment of cognition; it is not 
reflected upon. Rather it is the non-thematic comportment of dealing from amidst the 
referential totality. Heidegger’s now classic example is of a hammer (Heidegger 1962: 98 [69]). 
The hammer is not merely known as a theoretical thing with a thematic quality and potential 
value predicates, it is encountered as an entity that is known in the way Dasein has been 
socialised to know it by ‘the they’ (das Man). Beyond this social structure the hammer is, 
ultimately, known kinaesthetically through hammering. 
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Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure 
(hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of 
this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the 
equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does 
not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but it 
has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more 
suitable. In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern 
subordinates itself to the “in-order-to” which is constitutive for the 
equipment we are employing at the time; the less we stare at the hammer-
Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does 
our relationship to it become and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that 
which it is – as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific 
‘manipulability’ [“Handlichkeit”] of the hammer. The kind of Being which 
equipment possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call 
“readiness-to-hand” [Zuhandenheit]. (ibid: 98 [69], emphasis as in original)
The way in which Dasein is aware of ready-to-hand entities such as the hammer in the above 
quotation is what Heidegger calls ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht) (ibid: 98 [69]). Circumspection 
is the non-thematic way of ‘seeing’ the ready-to-hand entity so that it can be used and 
manipulated. The theoretical awareness of entities, on the other hand, “is just looking, 
without circumspection” (ibid: 99 [69]). Furthermore, in circumspective awareness the ready-
to-hand entity ‘withdraws’ (zurückzuziehen) from observation in such a manner that it is the 
use to which the entity is being used for that is attended to. “That with which our everyday 
dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we 
concern ourselves primarily is the work” (ibid: 99 [69]). This is the ‘towards-which’ of the 
‘being’ of the entity.
An entity’s alternative mode of ‘being’ from readiness-to-hand is called presence-at-
hand. The present-to-hand is an entity whose ‘being’ is occurrent. In the hammer example, its 
‘being’ is present-to-hand if the Dasein encountering it does not recognise it in its existing 
referential totality of entities. This could be because hammers do not occur in that totality, or 
because the hammer is being theoretically analysed to establish its ontical characteristics. This 
is the familiar way of regarding ‘being’ prioritised by the ontological tradition. Heidegger uses 
this example to show the difference between experiencing ‘natural’ entities as ready-to-hand 
and experiencing them as present-at-hand.
The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is 
water-powered, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’. As the ‘environment’ is 
discovered, the ‘Nature’ thus discovered is encountered too. If its kind of 
Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, this ‘Nature’ itself can be discovered 
and defined simply in its pure presence-at-hand. But when this happens, the 
Nature which ‘stirs and strives’, which assails as and enthralls us as 
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landscape, remains hidden. The botanist’s plants are not the flowers of the 
hedgerow; the ‘source’ which the geographer establishes for a river is not the 
‘springhead in the dale’. (ibid: 100 [70])
Perceiving an entity, without it circumspectively withdrawing to be used and manipulated for 
work, or otherwise maintaining its role in the referential totality, is the cognitive comportment 
to an entity that is an intentional relation. In the hammer example, this way of ‘being’ enables 
the ‘what-ness’ of the hammer to be perceived. A present-at-hammer can be measured, 
weighed, or have its material composition analysed. As an occurrent entity, the hammer is 
decontextualised, it is made worldless in the ontological-existential sense. However, its 
context can be returned in the sense that the theoretical reflection on the hammer can lead to 
formal theories about the hammer being developed. The process of using the hammer can be 
reflected upon and described; the hammer as a worldless object can be assigned value 
predicates.
There is also a way of ‘being’ of intra-worldly entities like hammers that can be called 
unreadiness-to-hand. An unready-to-hand entity is one whose usability or role in the 
referential totality has become disturbed and has started to breakdown. The unready-to-hand 
entity has somehow become no longer ready-to-hand but is still understood within the 
referential totality of involvement and significance, and consequently its way of ‘being’ is not 
that of presence-at-hand either. The unready-to-hand entity is no longer circumspectively 
experienced, but it has not yet become an object detached from its world to be experienced 
through theoretical reflection. For example, an unready-to-hand hammer would be, in general, 
a hammer whose usability is impaired. The process of circumspective breakdown that leads 
to the unreadiness-to-hand of entities is phenomenologically very important. This is because 
it helps to reveal the underlying structure of the referential totality of intra-worldly entities. 
For example, when your pen runs out of ink its becomes unready-to-hand (in this case it 
would be conspicuously unready-to-hand, see below for details). The sudden unusability of 
the pen reveals the totality of assignments of intra-worldly entities required for writing, and 
their relational context. A more catastrophic example would be were one’s house and home 
burns down in the night. In this example, the sheer scale of entities suddenly removed from 
the referential totality may bring the unfortunate Dasein’s whole world into breakdown. This 
experience is captured in the existentiell proto-phenomenological phrase, uttered by someone 
in such a situation, that ‘their world has fallen apart’. What this phrase captures is that there 
are situations which reveal the phenomenological architecture of Dasein’s existence which are 
normally inconspicuous. Suddenly deprived of their house, many of the everyday activities of 
that Dasein’s life become either impossible, impractical, or irrelevant. ‘Rebuilding their 
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world’, as such, becomes the central matter of that Dasein’s concern. A similar phrase to ‘my 
world has fallen apart’ in this situation would be ‘I just fell apart’. The phenomenological 
unity of being-in-the-world is consequently made apparent in this case of extreme breakdown 
of someone’s referential totality, where the ‘being’ of Dasein and the ‘being’ of the world 
(worldhood) are inseparable.
However, as the broken pen example demonstrates, it does not need to be an extreme 
case of equipmental breakdown for the phenomenological visibility of being-in-the-world to 
be made manifest.
When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment 
of the “in-order-to” to a “towards-this” has been disturbed. The assignments 
themselves are not observed; they are rather ‘there’ when we concernfully 
submit ourselves to them. But when an assignment has been disturbed – 
when something is unusable for some purpose – then the assignment becomes 
explicit....
Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its 
everyday presence [Zugegensein] has been so obvious that we have never 
taken any notice of it, this makes a break in those referential contexts which 
circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, 
and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand 
with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. (ibid: 105 [74-75], emphasis as in 
original)
Consequently, by analysing the structure of the circumspective breakdown of entities into the 
mode of ‘being’ of unreadiness-to-hand, the underlying structure of the referential totality of 
involvement and significance becomes accessible for phenomenological inquiry. This inquiry 
reveals Dasein’s concernful being-in-the-world. This is because concernful being-in-the-world 
“amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments 
constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment” (ibid: 107 [76]). In Being-in-
the-World Dreyfus provides an excellent analysis of the circumspective breakdown of 
unreadiness-to-hand, which he translates as ‘unavailableness’ (Dreyfus 1991: 70-83, 124-
125). However, there is an interpretation in Dreyfus’ account with which I disagree, and a 
critique of this disagreement will help with comprehending Heidegger’s understanding of the 
unready-to-hand. 
Heidegger identified three ways in which an entity can be unready-to-hand, which he 
called its modes (Heidegger 1962: 102-104 [72-74]). Heidegger calls the first manner of 
unreadiness-to-hand the ‘conspicuous’ mode (ibid: 102 [73]). A conspicuously unready-to-
hand entity is not usable for its purpose, “not properly adapted for the use we have decided 
upon” (ibid: 102 [73]). Importantly, this unusability is not discovered by “looking at it and 
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establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use 
it” (ibid: 102 [73]). Our earlier example of a pen running out of ink is a case of conspicuous 
unreadiness-to-hand. The example that Dreyfus uses for this conspicuous mode of 
unreadiness-to-hand is when a hammer is found to be too heavy to be used, and he describes 
this as a malfunction of equipment (Dreyfus 1991: 71-72, 124). This is an accurate 
description and an excellent example, and one which Heidegger alludes to when describing an 
aspect of the structure of disclosedness in chapter five of Being and Time (Heidegger 1962: 
200 [157]). The ‘being too heavy’ of a hammer, as Dreyfus points out (Dreyfus 1991: 77-
78), is a relational understanding of the hammer from within the referential totality of 
significance and involvement. A hammer that is conspicuously unready-to-hand is not so 
because of its inherent ontical properties, which is how it would be understood if were 
experienced as the presence-at-hand of the ontological tradition. ‘Being too heavy’ is a 
context-dependent understanding of the hammer as not fit for purpose.
After the conspicuous mode, Heidegger identifies the ‘obtrusive’ mode of unreadiness-
to-hand, which is where an entity required from within Dasein’s current involvement, is 
experienced as missing (Heidegger 1962: 103 [73]). A hammer is obtrusively unready-to-hand 
when you need to hammer a nail, but are unable to locate a hammer for the task. This mode of 
unreadiness-to-hand reveals to Dasein’s circumspective concern those elements of equipment 
that are not missing as “present-at-hand and no more, [and] which cannot be budged without 
the thing that is missing” (ibid: 103 [73]). When an entity from within the referential totality 
is obtrusively missing, the whole relational structure of what was previously ready-to-hand 
becomes apparent. The absence of a necessary part throws into stark relief the whole system 
of significance of entities; the deficiency in the system can then induce theoretical reflection 
which may lead into the understanding of entities in terms of presence-at-hand. Dreyfus calls 
this the permanent or total breakdown of the equipment (Dreyfus 1991: 79, 124). In our 
example of a house having burned down, the house would be described, initially, as 
obtrusively unready-to-hand. Over time, as the owner adapts their world ‘and moves on’, the 
destroyed house would take on new modes of ‘being’. In this example it is important to 
remember that ‘being’ is not an entity, and as such “it neither is nor is not” (Blattner 2006: 
116, emphasis as in original). While the house as an entity has been destroyed, its changing 
mode of ‘being’, its ‘how-ness’, still exists within owner’s referential totality. It is the 
‘significance’54 of having the absent home that remains with Dasein’s concernful dealings with 
the world.
However, it is with regards to the interpretation of the third mode of unreadiness-to-
5 4 ‘Significance’ is a technical term within this phenomenology, and will be described later in this section.
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hand that I disagree with Dreyfus’ description of Heidegger’s phenomenological account. This 
mode is what Heidegger identified as the ‘obstinate’ mode of unreadiness-to-hand (Heidegger 
1962: 103 [73-74]). This is where an entity is found somewhere that is out of place in a 
Dasein’s referential totality. Dreyfus calls this the temporary breakdown of equipment 
(Dreyfus 1991: 72-79, 124), seemingly in order to emphasise that this mode of unreadiness-
to-hand is in-between the malfunctioning of the conspicuous mode and total breakdown of the 
obtrusive mode. The example that Dreyfus uses to illustrate this obstinacy is when the head 
comes off the top of a hammer (ibid: 124). I do not agree with this ‘in-between’ interpretation 
of obstinate unreadiness-to-hand. For Heidegger, the obstinately unready-to-hand is 
something “which is not missing at all and not unusable, but which ‘stands in our way’ of our 
concern” (ibid: 103 [73], emphasis as in original). This is not a transitory mode between the 
conspicuous and the obtrusive, it is a unique manner of encountering an unready-to-hand 
entity. A hammer whose head has fallen off is conspicuously unready-to-hand if can still be 
used to get the job done or the head can be put back on ‘without too much fuss’, or if in the 
tool box from which the first hammer was picked up there is another ready-to-hand hammer 
available. Alternatively, this headless hammer is obtrusively unready-to-hand if it means that 
the job of hammering down the nail can no longer be performed, and reflection on what has 
similar properties to hammers begins. However, an obstinately unready-to-hand entity is 
neither missing nor unusable, it is something that is getting in the way. This means that it is 
not the hammer that is being obstinate, but another entity in relation to the work of 
hammering. 
For example, if you found that there was a venomous snake resting in the tool box you 
were reaching into for your hammer, then that snake would be obstinately unready-to-hand. 
“Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see 
the obstinacy of that which we must must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do 
anything else” (ibid: 103 [74], emphasis as in original). An obstinately unready-to-hand entity 
is an obstacle to the current task, it is something that does not belong to the situation. With 
the snake example, it is clear how an entity can be neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand, 
but not conspicuously nor obtrusively unready-to-hand either. The snake does not reside 
within the referential totality of equipment, but neither does it become a present-at-hand 
object of theoretical properties. It is not conspicuously unready-to-hand because it is not that 
the snake is unusable, it is that it was never intended to be used in the first place, and it must 
be dealt with before circumspective coping with the original work can get going again. Nor is it 
obtrusively unready-to-hand, the snake would have this unreadiness-to-hand if it was missing 
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for someone. The snake, as an entity encountered by Dasein, is ‘being’ obstinately unready-
to-hand. It is ‘there’, it should not be ‘there’, and it has to be dealt with. This unreadiness-to-
hand of the snake assumes that the Dasein dealing with it has not incorporated encountering 
snakes as a matter of their everyday concern. A zoologist studying snakes in a jungle, and 
who has pitched up a tent in a region abundant in snakes, would encounter a snake resting 
amongst their tools in a quite different manner than we in our hammer’s tool box example. 
While that zoologist’s goal is ultimately to study the snake’s ontical properties as something 
present-at-hand, it is the training and experience they (hopefully) have with dealing with 
snakes as entities ready-to-hand in their involvement with the world that enables the 
zoologist to go about this task. Such a zoologist would not deal with a snake amongst their 
tools as something obstinately unready-to-hand55. 
In our earlier reference to Heidegger’s example of ‘Nature’ being taken either present-
at-hand or ready-to-hand, the structure of how the snake could potentially be ready-to-hand 
is apparent. The ‘towards-which’ of the zoologist is to learn the ontical properties of the 
snake, and in this manner the snake is modally present-at-hand. However, this ‘being’ of the 
snake is when the zoologist is cognitively encountering the snake. But the zoologist need not 
all the time be engaging in theoretical reflection about the snake. Assuming that the zoologist 
is familiar with snakes so that they are not encountered as obstinately unready-to-hand, then 
the zoologist’s concernful dealing with – rather than concernful cognition about – snakes is as 
readiness-to-hand. By going about their work, keeping an appropriate distance from the 
snake, setting up the rest of their equipment for the task at hand, by circumspectively 
acknowledging the snake and dealing with it appropriately, by letting it ‘withdraw’, the snake 
becomes ready-to-hand. If the snake suddenly started behaving erratically, or became 
aggressive towards the zoologist’s presence, then its ‘being’ would become conspicuously 
unready-to-hand. It would not no longer be circumspectively withdrawn, but the zoologist 
would still have to deal with as a matter of concern. This is assuming that the zoologist can 
deal with a snake behaving erratically. If not, then the zoologist’s cognitive concern about 
why the snake is behaving in this way, and what to do about it, would make the snake’s 
‘being’ present-at-hand.
An important clarification is necessary at this point, which the case of considering a 
snake as a ready-to-hand entity provokes. The term that Heidegger introduced to describe 
what Dasein concernfully deals with is ‘equipment’ (das Zeug). While Heidegger’s examples 
of the phenomenon of worldhood all involve simple everyday tools in the conventional sense, 
5 5 However, if no snakes appeared at all then they would be obtrusively unready-to-hand to the unlucky 
zoologist.
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such as the hammer, he is not claiming that worldhood can be reduced to the utility of making 
and using these tools. In his text on Heidegger and Being and Time  Polt counters this 
misinterpretation:
Soon after the publication of Being and Time, he [Heidegger] had to protest, 
“It never occurred to me... to try and claim or prove... that the essence of man 
consists in the fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks and use the 
tram”. There are many human activities that are not the equivalent to using 
things in order to produce a useful result: for example, making a political 
decision, having a conversation with one’s spouse, playing the cello, exploring 
a glacier, or studying calculus. These activities can all involve using things, but 
they cannot be reduced to utility. (Polt 1999: 49-50, emphasis as in original)
The term ‘equipment’ is misleading, as it conveys the impression that the ready-to-hand 
entity has to be a helpful ‘device’. The translation of ‘Zuhanden’ as ‘ready-to-hand’ adds to 
this misinterpretation, in so far as the emphasis on ‘being’ ‘to-hand’ conveys the idea that it 
is an entity that is necessarily manipulable by actual hands. This is one reason why some 
translators refer to the ‘Zuhanden’ as the ‘available’. Blattner also argues that not all ready-
to-hand entities can also be found as ‘being’ present-at-hand within the ontical world.
To see this it is best to move beyond the narrow compass of equipment or 
tools in the conventional sense. Heidegger focuses on equipment in §15, but in 
the course of his discussion he progressively broadens his scope to a wider 
range of entities ready-to-hand, including materials (§15), signs (§17), and 
what we can call paraphernalia in general (§18). This is a good thing, because 
for many of us tools in any ordinary sense of the term are not a dominant sort 
of entity in our lives. (Blattner 2006: 53)
‘Paraphernalia’ is a better term than ‘equipment’, but it still has connotations of general 
‘things’ produced and used for production. A mountain can be ready-to-hand in a Dasein’s 
world56, but it is difficult to describe a mountain as either ‘paraphernalia’ or ‘equipment’. 
‘Technology’ may be as good a term as any, in as far as it is understood in its Greek root 
5 6 It is interesting to analyse the way in which a mountain can be understood as being ready-to-hand, as it helps 
to demonstrate the phenomenology of entities that are dealt with. One way in which a mountain might be 
ready-to-hand would be in an animistic religion. If we imagine this prototypical animistic religion, its belief 
structure might hold that a particular mountain was holy, on account of its spiritual force. Adherents to this 
religion would be socialised to a way of ‘being’ in which the mountain was not merely an ‘object’ of the 
landscape, in the sense of ‘being’ present-at-hand, but would rather deal with the mountain as an entity that 
could aid or hinder going about the task at hand. In their pre-conceptual going about their work, the adherents 
of this animistic religion would comport themselves to the mountain in such a way that the mountain helped 
achieve the tasks of the day. This would not be the same manner of comportment as an explicit act of worship 
of the mountain, though the two would be interrelated. However, this religious example is not the exclusive 
manner in which a mountain could be ready-to-hand. Another example could be one were a group of people 
lived on the mountain. In this example, these people would have a precognitive engagement with how to go 
about living on, and dealing with, the mountain. This engagement could include their kinaesthetic manner of 
walking about the mountain such as ‘knowing’ how and where to stand without risking injury. In these 
examples, the mountain is ready-to-hand because as an entity its ‘being’ was part of the referential totality of 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
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meaning of ‘techné’, as a ‘bringing forth’57. Following this possible translation of ‘das Zeug’ 
as ‘techné’, these entities are understood as ‘bringing forth’ Dasein’s world. This provides a 
useful indication that these entities, in their ‘being’, are not in the first instance related to in 
terms of a subject cognising objects. Rather, they are part of the referential totality of being-
in-the-world. 
The term ‘intra-worldly’ entities, which we have previously used to indicate 
‘equipmental’ or ‘technical’ entities, is not entirely appropriate. It is not the case that these 
entities are inside or outside a world. Rather, these entities are part of the referential totality 
of world disclosure. It is through Dasein’s constitution as being-in-the-world that ready-to-
hand equipment, or techné, and present-at-hand objects are disclosed to Dasein. However, 
this should not be interpreted as stating that it is Dasein’s world that discloses the ‘being’ of 
entities as either ready-to-hand, unready-to-hand, or present-at-hand. This formulation is 
challenged in Heidegger’s later works such as The Question Concerning Technology, Building 
Dwelling Thinking, and The Thing, when he inverts the directionality of this linear 
interpretation, to show a view in which it is techné that discloses the world to Dasein. If 
being-in-the-world is a unified structure, then the ‘being’ of Dasein, the ‘being’ of worlds, and 
the ‘being’ of techné are co-emergent or equiprimordial, and one cannot be understood as 
giving rise to the others alone. Furthermore, because of this holistic interpretation of entities, 
it is not strictly accurate to describe an item of techné. 
Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment [das Zeug]. To the 
Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in 
which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially ‘something 
in-order-to’. A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 
‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. 
(Heidegger 1962: 97 [68], emphasis as in original)
That techné cannot be described as an individual piece of the technological apparatus is a 
5 7 The danger of this translation is that the dominant interpretation of ‘technology’ relates to that which is 
‘advanced’, ‘modern’, or ‘scientific’. There are two related phenomenological observations about this 
dominance, but it is important to differentiate the two before analysing their relatedness. First, is that the 
underlying ontological structure, or way of ‘being’, of technology as the disclosure of worlds does not alter 
depending on the relative scientific complexity of the item of technology. A modern bridge of corrugated and 
welded iron is no more ‘technological’, in this sense, than a felled tree used to cross a river. A word processing 
computer ‘brings forth’ the world in the same way as ink from a pen. The bridges and the inscription devices 
are not technological because they share a type of utility either. Rather, they are technological because they are 
part of a nexus of entities that are dealt with by Dasein, and in so doing disclose Dasein’s world. This way of 
‘being’ of the technological can be called ‘techné’. The other observation is that it is nevertheless important that 
technological entities are commonly perceived in terms of a pre-scientific and scientific duality. That using a 
computer, for instance, may be understood by someone as using an item of technology, while using a fountain 
pen is not, demonstrates that the world for that person is disclosed in terms of an industrial-scientific 
worldview. This worldview privileges the complexity of production and use of modern items over against 
simpler or older ‘tools’. Understanding this particular, dualist disclosure of the world is necessary as part of 
phenomenological destruction of technology, which is part of the wider phenomenological methodology that 
uncovers the ontology of technology. The phenomenological uncovering of the ontology of technology is its 
structure as ‘techné’, its ‘bringing forth’ of the world.
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demonstration that its ‘being’ is not as the presence of a present-at-hand object. “And here 
again, when the equipmental characters of the ready-to-hand are still circumspectively 
undiscovered, they are not to be Interpreted as bare Thinghood presented for an apprehension 
of what is just present-at-hand and no more” (ibid: 112 [81], emphasis as in original). Rather, 
techné has the way of ‘being’ of readiness-to-hand. It is characterised by ‘being’ a holistic 
part of how Dasein circumspectively deals with the environment that involves it.
Ready-to-hand techné is characterised by the structure of Dasein’s ‘being’ involved 
with its world. “The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a totality of 
involvements” (ibid: 191 [150]). However, this is not the full constitution of readiness-to-
hand. As Heidegger also states, it has been “indicated that the state which is constitutive for 
the ready-to-hand as equipment is one of reference or assignment” (ibid: 114 [83]). Ready-to-
hand techné are collectively constituted by the referential totality of involvement and 
significance. This is the structure of how techné discloses the world, and how the world 
discloses techné. The term ‘referential’ is the translation of the German ‘Verweisung’. This 
can also be translated as assignment.
But what, then, is “reference” or “assignment” to mean? To say that the 
Being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assignment or reference means 
that it has in itself the character of having been assigned or referred 
[Verwiesenheit]. An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred 
to something, and referred as that entity which it is. With any such entity 
there is an involvement which it has in something. The character of Being 
which belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an involvement. If something 
has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. The 
relationship of the “with... in...” shall be indicated by term “assignment” or 
“reference”. (ibid: 115 [83-84], emphasis as in original)
The referential totality is the web of non-thematic meaning that has been assigned to entities, 
and which is only meaningful as the totality. A rain hat is ready-to-hand when its 
circumspectively used by being placed on your head, it has been ‘assigned’ the role of keeping 
the head dry. But this assignment is only functional in terms of a variety of other assignments 
such as ‘rain’, ‘rain coat’, and so forth. The rain hat can also be cognitively known in 
isolation, but this is only as a present-at-hand object. Returning to our consistent example, 
the hammer can be known as an ontical existent, in terms of its form, material, weight, colour, 
and can have value predicates such as ‘a good hammer’. But as ready-to-hand techné, the 
hammer is meaningful only in a web of assignments such as nails, hammering, building, 
shelves, and houses, for example. The hammer, amidst its referential totality, is involved with 
the world.
As ready-to-hand techné, the referential totality of entities is constituted by Dasein’s 
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‘involvement’ (Bewandtnis) with the world. The structure of involvement is constituted by 
the totality of Dasein’s ‘directional’ engagement with its world. This totality includes 
Dasein’s ‘in-order-to’, its ‘towards-which’, and its ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. This ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’ is constituted in the ecstatical temporality of Dasein’s existentiality, by its 
projecting into its potentiality for ‘being’.
In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has 
assigned itself to an “in-order-to” [Um-zu], and it has done so in terms of a 
potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is – one which it may 
have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be either 
authentic or inauthentic. This “in-order-to” prescribes a “towards-this” as a 
possible “in-which” for letting something be involved; and the structure of 
letting it be involved implies that is an involvement which something has – an 
involvement which is with something. Dasein always assigns itself from a 
“for-the-sake-of-which” to the “with-which” of an involvement; that is to 
say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-
hand. (ibid: 119 [86], emphasis as in original)
Through this structure of the referential totality of involvement, techné’s disclosure of the 
world and the world’s disclosure of techné, has been shown to be primordially constituted by 
Dasein existential temporality. The understanding of ready-to-hand techné is disclosed by 
Dasein’s ecstatical projecting into its future, and, as we have already shown in section 3.3, 
this projecting into the future is equiprimordial with Dasein’s disposedness to its inherited 
thrownness. The thrown disclosure of techné is its ‘significance’ (Bedeutsamkeit). Significance 
is the thrown totality of the referential structure of involvement.
These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; 
they are what they are as this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives 
itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The 
relational totality of this signifying we call “significance”. This is what makes 
the structure of the world – the structure of that wherein Dasein as such 
already is. (ibid: 120 [87], emphasis as in original)
Consequently, because the ready-to-hand is constituted by the referential totality of 
involvement and significance, it has been phenomenologically uncovered that the ‘being’ of 
technology, techné, is constituted by the ecstatical temporal-historical unity of Dasein as 
being-in-the-world. The ontology of technology, its ‘how-ness’, is temporality. Techné 
discloses Dasein’s circumspective concern with the world, an ontological-existential world 
which is ‘there’. This ‘there-ness’ of the world’s disclosure is constituted by Dasein’s 
disposedness, understanding, and discourse. Dasein is in this world with others, it is 
constituted in its ‘who-ness’ as ‘being-with’ others in a ‘with-world’. The average Dasein 
understands its everyday world as ‘they’ understand the world. These structures are unified 
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in Dasein as being-in-the-world, by how Dasein temporally cares, authentically or 
inauthentically, about its existence.
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Epilogue
A traditional conclusion is not appropriate for this thesis. It has not been designed as a posing 
of a hypothesis that is then scrutinised through the available evidence in order to either verify 
or refute it. Heidegger also makes this point in his epilogue to The Thing, a reply to a letter 
sent to him by a student of this essay. In this epilogue, titled A Letter to a Young Student, 
Heidegger explains why he cannot prove anything which he said about ‘being’.
I can provide no credentials for what I have said – which, indeed, you do not 
ask of me – that would permit a convenient check in each case whether what I 
say agrees with “reality.”
Everything here is the path of a responding that examines as it listens. Any 
path always risks going astray, leading astray. To follow such paths takes 
practice in going. Practice needs craft. Stay on the path, in genuine need, and 
learn the craft of thinking, unswerving, yet erring. (Heidegger 1971b: 184)
This ending to Heidegger’s reply is both a note of encouragement to the eponymous young 
student, and a defence of Heidegger’s own method and subject of investigation. The piece is 
taken from Heidegger’s later period, and as such is more poetic than his earlier work. 
However, in this instance the poetic quality found in the second paragraph is appropriate for 
what Heidegger is describing. Having stated that the subject matter of his investigation, 
‘being’, cannot by its character be checked and proved in the manner of the natural sciences, 
Heidegger then describes how the method for his investigation is also not fixed in ‘reality’. 
Rather, the investigation is an act of following paths that may hopefully lead to an 
understanding of ‘being’. Furthermore, following these paths is a craft, something to be 
worked at and improved over time.
This thesis has not taken the path of attempting to prove what hermeneutical 
phenomenology describes about ‘being’. Phenomenology is not an art or a science that 
attempts to prove anything. Rather, its goal is to clarify and explain what belongs to the 
‘being’ of the structures, systems, entities, and modalities of the world. This is true of both 
Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. For example, before a scientific account of the 
ontical causality of consciousness is attempted, the phenomenology of consciousness seeks 
to describe what consciousness ‘is’. It is to be preferred when studying what gives rise to 
something, to be able to explain what is being studied. It would be difficult to say what gives 
rise to consciousness, without first being able say ‘what’ consciousness ‘is’. In this sense, 
phenomenology is a necessary propaedeutic to conventional ontical investigation, a ‘queen of 
all the sciences’ to allude to Kant’s description of metaphysics. Yet as we have seen 
Heidegger argue, understanding ‘something’, in its ‘being’, cannot be reduced to its ‘what-
ness’. While this ontical quiddity, ‘what-ness’, does constitute an element of the required 
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description of an entity, this description is fundamentally flawed if this is the only 
ontological character of ‘being’ uncovered by the phenomenological method. Consequently, 
one path that has been followed in this thesis is to attempt to show what is constituted in the 
‘being’ of an entity other than its ‘what-ness’. This path began by providing a 
phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, to show how and why ‘being’ 
became understood as ‘what is’ in the ancient Greek philosophy of the pre-Socratics58, Plato, 
and Aristotle. This understanding of ‘being’ as the present ‘what’ was also shown to have 
diverged into two different branches. One branch was called the ‘classical realist’ 
understanding of ‘being’, while the alternative branch was called the ‘noetic idealist’ 
understanding of ‘being’. However, despite some scholarly interpretations to the contrary, it 
was found that both these branches of ‘what-ness’ ontology shared a basic foundation upon a 
subject-object model of understanding. The ontology of knowing, or cognition, was shown to 
be predicated upon the relationship between the subject-knower ‘what’ and the object-known 
‘what’. This ontology of reflexive consciousness was shown to have been contingent upon 
the introduction and adoption of new information technologies, particularly in the shift from 
the technology of orality to the technology of literacy. The investigative path then progressed 
by stepping through the various stages of Heidegger’s thought about the ontology of ‘how-
ness’ and proceeded to interpret his phenomenology through a close exegesis of his texts, 
with the dominant focus being on his magnum opus, the text of Being and Time. While this 
path leads through Heidegger’s thought, the arrangement of the interpretation has been my 
own. Furthermore, I have throughout this exercise supplemented Heidegger’s ontology with 
my own phenomenological examples, and I have provided additional material for comparing 
Heidegger’s thought with that of other scholars and philosophers such as Sartre, and in 
particular Husserl.
This hermeneutical endeavour of the thesis has been characterised by a recursive 
structure. As I have progressed through considering phenomenology via the exegesis of 
Heidegger’s work, I have frequently introduced phenomena that relate to ‘being’ in a 
preliminary fashion. This preliminary understanding of the phenomena has been continuously 
revised in the light of a progressive understanding of the unified structure of being-in-the-
world. An improved understanding of one region that constitutes this totality, has necessarily 
improved the understanding of other regions in terms of how they relate to the greater whole. 
This recursive development of the themes of the thesis has mirrored Heidegger’s own system 
from Being and Time. As with Heidegger’s effort, my recursive analysis is also incomplete. 
While a progressive understanding of ‘being’ has been uncovered, it is not possible to provide 
5 8 With the arguable exception of Heraclitus.
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a final analysis about ‘being’. ‘Being’ is fundamentally temporal-historical, ‘being’ is unified 
with the ‘being-no-longer’ and the ‘being-not-yet’, and this means that ‘being’ is constituted 
by the capacity to change. The contingency of ‘being’, not only characterises Dasein’s 
existentiality, it also characterises all possible existential analytics of ‘being’ that are pursued 
through the hermeneutical phenomenological method.
Nevertheless, while addressing the question of ‘being’ is an open ended endeavour, 
this does not excuse not attempting to address it all. Passing over the question of ‘being’ was 
the mistake of the philosophical tradition up until Heidegger systematically re-presented it in 
Being and Time. The analysis of this text’s strength is not that it succeeds in answering the 
question of ‘being’, which is an ongoing process. Rather, its strength is that it succeeds in 
asking the question of ‘being’. It then provides a hermeneutical phenomenological way to 
proceed with the question of ‘being’. Heidegger finishes Being and Time with his own 
reflections on this matter.
One must seek a way of casting light on the fundamental question of ontology, 
and this is the way one must go. Whether this is the only way or even the 
right one at all, can be decided only after one has gone along it. The conflict of 
the Interpretation of Being cannot be allayed, because it has not yet been 
enkindled. And in the end this is not the kind of conflict one can ‘bluster 
into’; it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are 
made for it. Towards this alone the foregoing investigation is on the way. 
(Heidegger 1962: 487-488 [437], emphasis as in original)
I would submit, in the spirit of this statement by Heidegger, that my thesis, which I 
tentatively entitled A hermeneutics of the ontology of time and technology, be regarded as an 
exercise ‘on the way’ to furthering the understanding of ‘being’ in terms of how it is disclosed 
by structures such as temporality-historicality, technology, ‘being-with’ others, and 
worldhood. Consequently, this thesis should be of wide interdisciplinary interest, including 
those with a concern for ontology, hermeneutics, phenomenology, existentialism, technology, 
cultural studies, information theory, and theories of personal and collective identity. Moving 
beyond this thesis is the task of analysing the contributions to ontology and hermeneutic 
phenomenology from scholars who have written after Heidegger, and a particular research 
project that needs to be developed is an examination of Heidegger’s influence on these 
contributors.
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